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ii  Occupational pensions in the European Union INTRODUCTION 
Purpose and Scope 
In  1992  the  European  Commission  decided  to  establish  an  Experts'  Network  on 
supplementary pension schemes, bringing together 12 independent national experts (one from 
each Member State) and a coordinator. 
The Network's main task is to review and to analyse the different facets of the current 
development in Member States of schemes and arrangements, whether private or public, whose 
aim is to enable individuals to obtain at retirement a cash benefit over and above an individual's 
entitlement under mandatory state social security legislation.  A specific topic in  the Network's 
terms of  reference is to relate the development of the 'second tier' of pension protection to issues 
relevant to the process of European integration. 
In  the  course  of 1993  each  national  expert contributed  a report describing  the  main 
features of supplementary pensions in his/her own country and examining policy issues relevant 
to  the  national  European  debate  in  this  area.  The  information  contained  and  the  opinions 
expressed in the national contributions have been summarised and joined together in the present 
consolidated report. In doing this, the Coordinator has-whenever necessary- inserted additional 
analysis in  order to enhance the discussion of questions of particular relevance. 
Following an initial clarification of terminology and definitions, this report is structured in 
chapters dealing respectively with: 
- the origins and role of supplementary pension provision, with its social, financial and political 
implications  (Chapter 1); 
- an  analysis  of the  link  between  supplementary  provision  and  social  security  in  terms  of 
retirement income expectations and experience (Chapter 2); 
- a sketch  of the overall structure of the first and  second tier of retirement provision  in  each 
Member State (Chapter 3); 
- a full account of  the supplementary pension schemes which have been made compulsory by 
way of national legislation  (Chapter 4); 
- a detailed description of the main features of voluntary and  private supplementary pension 
arrangements (Chapter 5); 
- a review and a summary of  statistical data concerning the economic and financial implications 
of funding pension liabilities  (Chapter 6); 
- an  overview of existing  and/or proposed European legislation  dealing with different aspects 
of supplementary pension rights (Chapter 7); 
- an analysis of  the European issue relating to cross-border labour mobility and pension rights 
(Chapter 8); 
- an  agenda for the future (Chapter 9). 
The present report is aimed at a broad audience: those who seek an explanation of the 
origin, the role and the salient features of supplementary pensions as well as those specialists 
who have a professional interest in obtaining detailed national information. Naturally, the report 
is also addressed to readers who follow Community policies on  pensions. 
Terminology used and conventional definitions 
The first tier of pension protection is  constituted by public retirement income provision, 
that is  the  mandatory social  insurance  or social  security  programmes  or schemes which  are 
found  in  each Member State,  albeit shaped differently according to national legislation.  In the 
present report the first-tier will  be referred to in short as  'social security'. 
The terms of reference of the Experts' Network indicate that the present report should 
deal with the 'second-tier' of pension provision. Two questions, however, arise. The first relates 
to terminology.  The  term  'supplementary  pension  provision'  is  usually  used  in  this  report to 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  1 describe the scope of the 'second tier',  recognising that (i)  in certain countries alternative terms 
are  used,  such  as  'occupational  pensions'  (in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland),  and  that in 
French  the  relevant  concept  is  expressed  by  using  the  adjective  'complementary' 
(complementaire)  rather than 'supplementary'.  The second question, more importantly,  relates 
to the definition of the scope of  the 'second tier', an issue of great importance when comparisons 
are made between EC countries. 
One is concerned not so much with a possible overlap between first and second tier but 
rather with establishing criteria that will  allow the second tier to be separated logically from the 
third. Difficulties  arise because of the similarities  between the two tiers,  such as their ultimate 
object (supplementary provision for retirement),  the fact that the state encourages  both  (both 
may enjoy favourable tax treatment) and the fact that individual  initiative  is  not necessarily  an 
exclusive feature of the third tier. 
A satisfactory demarcation line between the second and third tiers could not be achieved 
by opposing the concept of collective to that of individual arrangements, or by contrasting public 
with private provision, or by using the terms compulsory and voluntary alone. There are obvious 
second-tier supplementary arrangements that cut  across  such  dichotomies  (as will  be  shown 
later). 
The distinction  becomes easier if one  recognises that, unlike the third tier, the second 
normally requires an  additional  element which  is  past or present membership in the workforce 
of an  enterprise,  or membership in  a profession.  It must be  accepted that borderline cases do 
exist  and  that  it  would  be  pointless  to  ignore  them,  pretending  that  perfect,  indisputable 
definitions can  be given. 
This report takes a pragmatic approach, treating  borderline  cases  on  their merits and 
taking  account of their importance, while  accepting that,  as  a general rule,  the second tier of 
supplementary pension  provision  discussed  here  includes  arrangements having  the following 
characteristics. 
(i)  The  benefits  are  intended  to  ensure  that  the  person  covered  (member)  acquires  an 
entitlement to a cash benefit in the event of retirement (and, if the case may be, in the event 
of disability and death), representing income which would be additional (i.e. supplementary) 
to that due to  the said  person  for the same contingency  by the  public retirement income 
system (social security). 
(ii)  Coverage is collective, i.e.  plans and schemes are established for the benefit of a group of 
people (such as the employees of one or more companies, the members of an association, 
a given  category  of self-employed).  Exceptions  to  the collective  coverage  criteria  have, 
however, been made in order to cover cases where individual coverage or individual choice 
is  a legally  acceptable  alternative  for opting  out of or opting  in  to a collective  retirement 
arrangement. 'Legally acceptable' means here that the option exercised by the individual is 
specifically  foreseen  (permitted)  by  the  regulatory  framework  of supplementary  pension 
provision. 
(iii)  Coverage  may  be  compulsory
1  or voluntary.  For the  purpose  of this  report,  'compulsory 
schemes' are meant to be those which impose on the employer a legal obligation to affiliate 
its employees either to a statutory scheme purposely established to provide pensions which 
are supplementary to social security or to a contractual supplementary scheme previously 
established  by  agreement  between  the  social  partners.  Such  a legal  obligation  may  be 
directed  not  only  to  employers  but,  collectively,  to  self-employed  persons.  The  usual 
definition  adopted  means  that  in  this  report  'compulsory  schemes'  do  not  include  those 
based exclusively on a contractual obligation.  Furthermore, the fact that an employee may 
be obliged to join his  employer's scheme (if there is one}, is not a criterion that defines the 
scheme as  'compulsory'  in  the context of the  present report.  The conventional  definition 
includes among  the compulsory arrangements those  made  by the  state, through  specific 
legislation,  to provide supplementary retirement benefit to its employees. 
2  Occupational pensions in the European Union CHAPTER 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGIN OF AND THE 
RATIONALE FOR SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS 
The  development  and  the  relevance  of supplementary  pensions  are  not  the  same 
throughout all the countries ofthe European Union. Their contribution to social protection or their 
impact on  labour and  capital  markets varies considerably from one  country to  another.  Public 
perception of  the subject is not uniform either. It seems therefore important to begin the analysis 
of  the present situation by clarifying  an initial question: why do supplementary pensions present 
such dissimilarities within the EU? 
All  the  countries  of the  European  Union  started  early  in  the  20th  century  to  adopt 
legislation  and  to  organise  institutions  which  were  to  ensure  retirement  income  to  large 
categories of  wage earners and salaried employees in the private and public sectors. In Germany 
social insurance legislation dates back to 1891. 
Old age pensions paid by social insurance were not necessarily generous. In the first half 
of the century they would  hardly have enabled  workers to maintain their previous standard of 
living, although certain occupational groups (i.e. public servants, miners) fared better than others. 
Historically, a turning point was reached in the late 1940's when the influence of new and 
more ambitious social and  political  doctrines was increasingly felt,  and when the guarantee of 
a decent income after retirement became a basic social and economic right to be granted to all 
citizens.  A  new  approach  to  social  security
2  with  an  increasing  acceptance of welfare  state 
policies,  led  all  European  countries  to  review  and  to  reform  the  earlier  state  old-age  and 
retirement systems. 
During the 1950's and early 1960's, more and more categories of citizens were brought 
within  the  scope  of compulsory  pension  insurance,  reaching  in  some  countries  (the  United 
Kingdom,  Denmark and the Netherlands) the entire resident population. At the same time, old-
age  benefit levels were gradually improved.  In  spite of the pursuit of such  common  policies  it 
became clear,  however, that European countries were taking different paths as regards the role 
that public provision should play within an  overall national pension strategy. 
Countries in the northern part of Europe had strong traditions of government-sponsored 
non-contributory benefits and means-tested old-age pensions. It was natural for them to build a 
consensus  around  policies  which,  under the  state  scheme,  would  guarantee  for the  elderly 
modest pensions,  often  near subsistence  level.  The  understanding was that private  provision 
would fill the gap for those who wished for higher benefits and who could  pay for them. 
The development of social security in the United  Kingdom is  a good illustration  of this 
approach.  The  reform  of National  Insurance  (1948)  along  the  lines  recommended  by  Lord 
Beveridge (a modest flat-rate old-age pension for all) clearly spelled out the vitally important role 
assigned  in  future years to private pension provision. 
In fact, company pension arrangements were already well established in the UK and no 
attempt  was  made  by  the  government  to  restrict  their  development.  Only  in  1959  (when 
increasing  prosperity created pressure for better pensions)  was  a graduated pension  scheme 
introduced for employees, under which earnings-related retirement benefits became payable on 
the basis of earnings-related contributions. It was too late, however, to reverse public acceptance 
of, and public support for, occupational pensions already provided, at the time, to over 8 million 
employees. Consequently, the 1959 National Insurance Act permitted employers to 'contract-out' 
from  the  earnings-related  retirement  benefit  if their  employees  enjoyed  rights  under  an 
occupational scheme at least as generous as those available under the state scheme. This policy 
was enhanced by the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act which improved on the earnings-related 
pension entitlements (henceforth called  SERPS) but maintained the 'contracting-out' option. 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  3 These developments revealed  a deliberate governmental choice to seek a partnership 
between public and private provision,  rather than trying to assert the primacy or priority of state 
benefit schemes. 
Another example is  Denmark. The present system for the state 'social  pension',  which 
comprises a basic flat-rate universal benefrt, was introduced in  1957. Being a modest amount, 
the  basic  social  pension  left  ample  opportunities  for  additional  provision  outside  the  state 
scheme. During the 1960s and 70s, there was discussion over whether to improve the coverage 
of public  pensions  through the  introduction  of a supplementary  pension  scheme  covering  all 
employees  or all  residents.  One  result  of these  discussions  was  the  establishment  of the 
compulsory supplementary  labour market pension  (A TP),  enabling  wage  earners to  save for 
retirement  with  the  financial  contribution  of their  employers.  The  benefrts  under the  A  TP, 
however, turned out to be not very attractive. This led trade unions and individuals to seek better 
pension  protection  through  additional  private  provision,  and  a number of pension  schemes, 
covering  employees  belonging  to  a  profession  or  to  an  economic  sector,  were  negotiated 
between the labour market partners in the  1960s and  early 70s. The wage negotiations which 
took place in  1989-93 extended supplementary pension schemes to cover the large majority of 
Danish employees. 
It is interesting to recall that deliberate public policies aimed at creating opportunities for 
private pension provision were not exclusive to Anglo-Saxon or Nordic countries. In France, post-
war legislation (1945) opted for earnings-related state old-age pensions well above subsistence 
level,  but public policy  clearly  recognised  and then  encouraged a second tier of occupational 
pensions based on  collective agreements freely negotiated by the social partners. 
In  Germany, the partnership between  public and  private provision  may not have been 
as  obvious as  in  other countries,  but the outcome has not been  very different.  In this country, 
compulsory pension insurance was extended gradually, after the end of World War II, to various 
categories of citizens until 1972, when almost universal coverage was reached.  Pension levels 
were gradually improved but, at the same time, supplementary pension arrangements, which had 
a long tradition in large enterprises, continued to expand and develop. No attempt was made by 
successive  governments  to  limit  them;  on  the  contrary,  fiscal  policies  clearly  encouraged 
enterprises to earmark resources for private pension  provision. 
A different pattern emerged  in the countries of southern Europe, and to some extent in 
Luxembourg  and  Belgium.  Successive  governments  seem  to  have  interpreted  the  post-war 
welfare state doctrines  as  requiring  the state to  meet all  the  retirement  income needs  of the 
labour force directly through state schemes. Compulsory pension insurance legislation set, from 
the start, generous income replacement levels for old-age benefrts. The intention was clearly that 
private provision was to remain  marginal or confined to highly paid  employees. 
Taking a broad view of all the EU countries, it can be said that alternative developments 
to public and private pension provision were, without significant exception, spurred on by a wide 
political  consensus.  Various  political  parties  under different economic conditions  all  tended to 
move in the same direction, with the result that a substantial'market' for supplementary pensions 
was opened  in  Denmark, the Netherlands,  the United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  Germany and,  under 
different assumptions,  in  France and in  Greece. 
In the other European countries such an 'opening' was not encouraged and the debate 
remained  dormant until  the  'second  wave'  of pension  reforms  which  reached  Europe  in  the 
1980's for reasons which are all too well known: social and demographic change, the maturing 
of pension  programmes  and  the  effect of liberal  benefrt  provisions  in  a context of economic 
slowdown  have all  resulted  in  the escalation  of the cost of providing  public  pensions  and  in 
increasing  difficulties  in  finding  the  necessary  additional  financing.  During  the  subsequent 
process  of  reviewing  pension  strategies,  still  outstanding  in  some  European  countries, 
governments have  begun to  look to  private supplementary pensions  as  a means of providing 
retirement income,  without,  it is  hoped,  having to  raise taxes and  compulsory contributions  in · 
future years.  · 
Contrary to what happened forty years ago when the State was confidently distributing 
the roles, private retirement provision seems to have now become desirable mainly as a 'remedy' 
for the difficulties encountered by the state in sustaining the growing cost of social security. This 
4  Occupational pensions in the European Union new  perception  is  not without  significance  because  it  has  reopened  a debate,  which  some 
thought  had  been  closed  half a century  ago,  on  the  virtues,  or otherwise,  of relying  on  the 
individual  initiative of workers and employers to enhance economic security in  retirement. 
A gradual shift of public policy is taking place in several countries. Spain (in  1987) and 
Italy (in 1993) have adopted comprehensive new legislation to encourage and to regulate private 
pension provision. The constitution of Portugal (1976) specifically assigned to private provision 
fundamental social security objectives. Between 1989 and 1992 this constitutional principle was 
implemented by way of specific legislation  dealing with supplementary pensions. 
In France, legislation  has, since 1972, established that the 'regimes complementaires' 
managed by the social  partners were to  become compulsory for the  large majority  of private 
sector employees.  Notwithstanding renewed  government commitment not to deviate from the 
principles  of 'repartition'  and  solidarity  between generations,  on  which  such  'regimes'  rest,  a 
change  of emphasis  in  the  government's  plans  for the  future  is  noticeable  in  some  of the 
statements included in the 1991  White Paper (Livre  Blanc sur les Retraites). 
Among  the  measures which,  according  to this White  Paper,  deserve closer scrutiny, 
mention  was  made  of  promoting  the  constitution  of  collective  savings  funds  in  various 
occupational sectors covering, for instance, all the workers of a given enterprise or occupational 
group. Established by the social partners, such supplementary pension funds would be financed 
according to the pre-funding technique ('capitalisation'). 
The point is that renewed interest in the virtues of private provision is presented to the 
public with the help  of considerations which  go  beyond the traditional  argument according  to 
which pensions (whether basic or supplementary) are a response to social goals and needs. The 
argument is that a shift towards more private provision would be beneficial because of financial, 
rather than social,  considerations. 
In Italy, for instance, the 1993 legislation regulating the growth of supplementary pension 
funds  was  a  response  to the  government's  declared  aim  of increasing  savings  and  capital 
accumulation within the economy, of  supporting and enlarging the domestic financial market, and 
of creating the capacity to absorb the huge amount of assets to be put on the market during the 
process of privatisation of public enterprises. 
It should be added that financial objectives linked to the role of pension funds in  capital 
markets are not new in  Europe. However, they now acquire more weight and new exposure in 
the current political  debate on  pensions in those countries which have not had a long tradition 
of funded private pension arrangements. 
The financial  aspect of the  rationale  of supplementary  pensions will  be  developed  in 
Chapter 6.  A  few  general  explanations  are,  however,  in  order here  because  of the  growing 
interest in the subject, and the fact that the European Commission has been developing specific 
new directives in  this field.
3 
Old-age pensions paid  and guaranteed by the state are, of necessity, financed through 
a pay-as-you go system, meaning that the pension costs of each year are covered by the taxes 
and contributions collected during roughly the same period. No reserves are accumulated, except 
as contingency provisions. 
Private pensions, on the contrary, are often (not always) funded ('pre-funded'), meaning 
that  future  liabilities  are  matched  by  assets  accumulated  in  advance  through  appropriate 
contributions. The funding technique (in French 'capitalisation')  is standard practice in group-life 
insurance transactions and is also common practice in a large number of private pension funds 
('institutions  for retirement provision',  to  use the EU jargon). 
In the EU, many employers and workers participating in pension plans rely on group-life 
insurance contracts or similar insurance policies. Considerable reserves are accumulated by the 
relevant institutions. 
As  an  alternative  to  insurance  contracts,  the  sponsors  of  private  provision  have 
established pension funds, welfare institutions, pension trusts and similar financial vehicles which 
also pre-fund their liabilities according to actuarial standards. They do so either of their own free 
will  or because the  regulatory  framework  makes  'capitalisation'  (i.e.  funding)  a condition  for 
obtaining  preferential  tax treatment  on  contributions  or on  investment  yield  (in  Ireland,  Italy, 
Spain, etc.). 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  5 Pre-funding private or occupational pension liabilities  has generated large scale capital 
accumulation in countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Ireland. In the rest 
of  the EU the volume of pension assets may be less striking but, on the domestic scene, it is not 
of negligible  importance (see Chapter 6). 
In  Germany  and  in  Luxembourg  the  use  of tax deductible  balance-sheet  provisions 
('book-reseNes) to back the employer's pension promises in a large number of  enterprises, does 
not explicitly  lead  to the  accumulation  of segregated  assets  available  for investment  on  the 
capital  market.  However,  this  technique  does  have  an  important  economic  and  financial 
dimension  because it has provided  a welcome  and substantial source of self-financing  for the 
enterprise. 
It is, however, fair to point out that in Europe there are many examples of  private pension 
arrangements financed  on  a pay-as-you-go basis  (apart from the special case of the 'regimes 
complementaires par  repartition' in France). Public servants or civil servants funds in the United 
Kingdom,  in  Ireland,  in  Spain or elsewhere are relevant examples. 
Economists  have  been  arguing  over whether or not the expansion  of funded  pension 
arrangements  increases  the  rate  of national  savings.  No  consensus  has  emerged,  which,  in 
political terms, does not have much importance. What is  certain,  and is  visible,  is that pension 
funds as well as  insurance companies  managing  pension  assets,  have become important and 
respected  institutional  investors  in  a  number of countries  such  as  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Netherlands and Ireland, to mention the most obvious markets in the EU. In a modern economy, 
with  the  increasing  internationalisation  of financial  markets,  the  institutional  investor wields 
considerable power and  may have an  influence on  major corporate decisions. 
From passive investors, fund managers have begun to take an active interest in company 
management,  as  well  as  in  their  finance.  This  reality,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  all  EU 
governments  have  granted  preferential  tax  treatment  to  the  savings  channelled  through 
institutions  for supplementary  pension  provision,  justifies  and  explains  the keen  interest that 
finance  ministries  show for retirement  income  policies  involving  the  private sector and  which 
imply the funding of future liabilities. 
Turning  now to another issue,  it will  be  recalled that the link with  the labour market is 
often discussed as part of the rationale of supplementary pensions.  It has been argued that the 
growth of employer-sponsored  pensions  may have an  effect on  labour mobility,  on  retirement 
choices,  on  labour productivity,  on  wage  adjustment,  etc.
4 The theoretical treatment of these 
subjects is not always supported by reliable empirical evidence, at least in Europe, although one 
does not deny that labour market issues do arise in this context and that they may be important. 
In  the  present  report  attention  will  be  focused  only  on  the  possible  impact  of 
supplementary pension provision on labour mobility because the subject is of particular interest 
for the European Union,  which  has among  its fundamental  aims the freedom of movement of 
persons within the Single Market. The European Commission is naturally concerned that cross-
border labour mobility,  in  particular, should not be hampered by the ways in which membership 
and entitlement of workers to supplementary pensions is  organised in  various Member States. 
Chapter 8 will  explain  and develop this important issue. 
In  concluding, it could be said that historical factors
5 influencing the alternative choices 
made by Member States as regards the role of public pensions help to explain the dissimilarities 
now observed in the scope of  supplementary pension provision. But even when 'first tier' policies 
were similar or convergent the supplementary pension scene took different paths,  because of 
the  preference  given  to  a specific technique  for financing  the  pension  commitment  in  each 
Member State, a subject which will  be fully illustrated  in  the following  chapters of this report. 
The differences in  the outcome could  also  be  related to the role  played  in this  context 
by the trade unions:  from an  active and  sustained  role  in  certain  countries  (Denmark,  France, 
Netherlands) to minor involvement in  others (the United Kingdom). 
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THE LINK BETWEEN SUPPLEMENTARY 
PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
Assessing expectations from State pensions 
For an individual, the desire to belong to a supplementary pension arrangement, or the 
preference given to subscribing to a retirement saving plan, springs essentially from the actual 
or the presumed inadequacy of the pension that the individual expects from social security. His 
perception is that more may have to be done to maintain the living  standards enjoyed while at 
work. 
For an employer, the incentive to sponsor a supplementary pension arrangement for his 
employees is more subtle. Several factors play a role: the desire to attract the best staff and to 
retain  them, the need to match the behaviour of competitors,  a sincere wish to care for staff 
welfare,  and  the importance of bargaining  for pensions  in  overall  industrial  relation  practices. 
Employers' motivation, as  it is well known,  is  also strongly driven  by available opportunities to 
reduce the company's tax burden through contributions to a staff pension plan. It has often been 
said  that  supplementary  pensions  are  essentially  'tax driven'.  The  actual  or the  presumed 
inadequacy  of the  social  security  benefits  at  retirement  does,  however,  also  play  a  role  in 
shaping employers' willingness to sponsor employees' pension plans
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Given the fact that acquiring  entitlements to an  old-age or retirement  benefit is  a long 
term  process  that  may  well  span  over 40  years  (or more)  in  the  life  of an  individual,  and 
recognising that over such a long period social security legislation is likely to change more than 
once, the individual's perception of  the actual or the presumed inadequacy of  the expected social 
security benefit depends inevitably on assumptions. 
Assumptions may derive from the observation of the amount of social security pensions 
currently  received  by  people  who  have  retired,  at  least  by  those  in  a  comparable  socio-
professional environment and discounting personal factors. Assumptions may also be made with 
reference to available information on average expected benefrts under current legislation.  What 
proportion of final earnings (income) would be replaced by the social security pension at the time 
of retirement? 
A  general  (not  individual)  answer  to  the  question  is  provided  by  statisticians  who 
simulate, through appropriate calculations  based  on  a given set of assumptions, the so-called 
'replacement rate' at retirement for a particular social security pension scheme. 
This exercise is, as will be explained later, full of hurdles and traps due to the complexity 
and the volatility of  some of the basic assumptions. Notwithstanding the difficulties, replacement 
rates are estimated,  circulated  and quoted frequently  in  technical reports and  in  press articles 
throughout Europe. Comparisons among EU countries are made and conclusions, often hurried, 
are drawn. 
The EUROSTAT income replacement rates: highlights and interpretation 
A very valuable  recent source of information  is  an  analytical  study carried  out by the 
Statistical Office ofthe European Communities, EUROSTAT, containing data on the relationship 
between retirement income and final pre-retirement earnings
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• Data refers to 1989 earnings and 
to pensions claimed  on  1.1.1990. 
Two sets of figures are  presented. One relates to gross pension and gross earnings at 
the point of retirement, another compares net pension with net earnings, that is deducting direct 
taxes  and  compulsory  social  security  contributions.  The  results  obtained  reflect  various 
hypothetical  profiles  as  to  marital  status,  length  of insurance  career  and  average  level  of 
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countries with  nationwide compulsory second-tier schemes these benefits are also included. 
A general impression given by the EUROST  AT results is that social security benefits in 
many  countries  replace  a  very  high  proportion  of pre-retirement  earnings,  in  particular  for 
Table 1: 
Typical replacement rates for countries with 
high social security coverage, assuming a full 
insurance career 
Country:  Gross rate (%)  Net rate(%) 
Greece  87  96 
Italy  70  79 
Portugal  82  98 
Spain  90  98 
Assumptions:  - male  employee with spouse 
- average wage at retirement 
- first tier of compulsory coverage. 
Remark:  High coverage is taken to be that of 
a scheme offering rates above 70% 
on  a gross basis. 
average  or  lower  income 
groups  and  for comparisons 
made  on  a  net basis.  This 
confirms  the  common 
perception  that  higher 
incomes attract relatively less 
from state schemes and that 
taxation  tends  to  be  less 
heavy for pensioners than for 
active persons. 
A few  key  results  of 
the  EUROST  AT  study  are 
shown  in  a series  of tables 
as  an  illustration  of  the 
prevailing  trends;  they  are 
followed  by  a  number  of 
observations  intended  to  put 
the results into perspective. 
The  picture  looks 
different  if one  looks  at  the 
replacement rates correspon-
ding  to  an  average length  of 
insurance career of 20 years 
(instead  of  35-40  as  in 
Table 1).  A  similar  drop  in 
the  expected  level  of social 
security  benefits  for  shorter 
careers at retirement can  be observed in the other countries where replacement rates for a full 
career ranged between 40%  and 70%  (for the typical worker reflected  in  these tables). 
8 
The important point here is that social insurance records show that women, for instance, 
seldom  reach  a 'full'  career. 
Long-term  unemployment 
Table 2: 
Typical replacement rates for countries with 
high social security coverage assuming an 
insurance career of 20 years 
Country:  Gross Rate (%)  Net Rate(%) 
Greece  61  67 
Italy  40  51 
Portugal  48  58 
Spain  63  73 
Assumptions: see Table 1. 
and  extended  periods  of 
education  and  training  may 
also  reduce  the  number  of 
years  taken  into  account  in 
the  final  pension  calculation 
for  both  men  and  women. 
Migration  is  another  factor, 
notwithstanding the compen-
sating  effect  of the  coordi-
nation  of pension  legislation 
achieved  by  the  EU  Regu-
lations.  The  increasing  fre-
quency  of  early  retirement 
also  tends  to  reduce  the 
length  of insurance careers. 
There  is  a  feeling, 
moreover,  that  the  EURO-
ST  AT replacement rates may 
tend  to  overstate  the 
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are earnings-related (the majority in the EU), legislation prescribes that retirement pensions are 
calculated  on the basis of the earnings of the covered person over a prescribed period before 
retirement (5,  10,  15 or more years). The trend now is  to extend gradually this  period  and,  in 
some countries, to reach the average of all the career's earnings (e.g. the recent reform in  Italy). 
Unless the earnings in earlier years are effectively revalued when the pension is calculated, the 
benefit amount would accordingly suffer because the average would  be  negatively affected by 
inflation, wage trends, etc. The methodology followed by EUROSTAT in calculating replacement 
rates  assumes  that  past  earnings  revaluation  is  thorough  and  complete  in  all  cases,  an 
assumption which could be challenged for countries such as Spain, Portugal or Italy. A recent 
study in  France has shown that the technique  used  in  the general scheme for employees to 
revalue past earnings may have the result of depressing the theoretical replacement rate for a 
full career at the earnings ceiling
8
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Table 3: 
Typical replacement rates for countries with average 
or modest social security coverage, assuming a full or 
a reduced length of insurance career. 
Country  Full career  20 years' cover 
%  Gross rate  Net rate  Gross rate  Net rate 
France  45-69  54-83  24-38  29-46 
Germany  53  69  23  31 
Ireland  48  62  48  62 
Netherlands  48  67  48  67 
United Kingdom  35-46  45-59  16-27  21-34 
Assumptions:  - male employee with spouse 
- average wage at retirement 
- first tier of compulsory coverage. 
Remarks: 
France:  - the second figure in  each column represents the rate including the 
compulsory regimes complementaires. 
United Kingdom:  - the second figure in  each column represents the rate including the 
earnings-related benefit component (SERPS). 
Another point to be  kept in  mind  is  that the level of retirement income provided to an 
individual  by social security at the date of retirement could  be significantly  eroded,  in terms of 
living standards or purchasing power, unless the benefit is  frequently adjusted upwards to take 
account of inflation,  currency depreciations  and trends  in  real wages.  The replacement  rates 
normally calculated and  published,  including those of EUROSTAT, only reflect the situation at 
the time  of pension  award.  The effect - good  or bad  - of subsequent adjustment by various 
indexation techniques cannot be  appreciated
9
•  Recent experience has shown that,  pressed by 
cost  escalation  and  other  unfavourable  circumstances,  governments  tend  now  to  be  less 
generous than in  the past, particularly when it comes to legislating  on  periodic adjustments of 
pensions in payment. 
Pressure  for supplementary  pension  provision  has  been  more  strong  in  a  national 
environment where social security pensions (first tier) are not meant to replace a very significant 
portion  of pre-retirement  earnings,  even  on  a  net  basis.  A  few  examples,  drawn  from  the 
EUROSTAT study,  illustrate this  point.  The countries  included  in  Table 3 are  in  effect those 
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chapters. 
Traditionally,  employees in the higher wage bracket have been the first to benefit from 
supplementary, mostly private, pension arrangements. For them social security benefits tend to 
be  much  less  adequate  for 
maintaining  the  habitual 
Table 4: 
Earnings ceilings in social security pension 
schemes, 1993 
(annual earnings) 
Country:  Local currency  ECU's 
Belgium  BF 1  ,330,000  32,500 
France  FR 149,820  22,658 
Germany, West  DM  86,400  44,055 
Germany, East  DM 63,600  32,430 
Greece  DR 5,299,000  19,841 
Luxembourg  LF 2,372,892  58,886 
Spain  PTA 4,057,560  27,076 
Remarks:  ECU rates as at 1 July 1993 
Belgium: the ceiling  applies only 
to the calculation  of pensions 
(and  not for assessing 
contributions). 
standard of living. 
The  main  reasons 
are  twofold.  In  earnings-
related  pension  schemes 
contributions and benefits are 
subject to an earnings ceiling 
and,  in  some  schemes,  a 
maximum pension amount is 
laid down. In flat-rate pension 
schemes,  the  flat-rate  com-
ponent  is,  by  definition,  de-
gressive  in  adequacy  (as 
incomes rise). 
The level of the ear-
nings  ceilings  observed  in 
1993  in  EU  countries,  with 
reference  to  the  general 
scheme  for  private 
employees  are  shown  in 
Table 4, in local currency and 
in  ECU.  Apart  from  the 
impact of the earnings ceiling 
(Table  4)  the  pensions  of 
higher  income  employees 
may  be  limited  by  upper 
limits  applied  by  national 
legislation  to  benefit  levels. 
First,  we  consider  benefits 
when  flat-rate  benefits  are 
given (Table 5). Secondly, we turn to the situation where legislation sets a specific maximum for 
the level of earnings-related retirement benefit (Table 6). 
Table 5: 
Maximum annual benefit amount for a couple 
Country:  National currency  ECU 
Denmark  92,616  12,282 
Ireland  5,668  7,048 
Netherlands  25,114  11,417 
United Kingdom  4,670  6,070 
In  Belgium,  the  earnings  ceiling  for contribution  purposes  has  been  abolished,  but a 
ceiling is still applied to earnings on which the retirement pension is calculated, at present (1993) 
equal to BF 1  ,330,000, that is 32,500 ECU. A couple whose breadwinner worked 45 years would 
earn the maximum retirement pension of 25,125 ECU. 
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Maximum annual benefit prescribed 
Country:  National currency  ECU 
Greece  5,299,000  19,842 
Luxembourg  1,923,446  47,732 
Spain  3,437,644  22,939 
Table 7: 
Comparison between the limits imposed to pension entitlements and 
the income of non-manual workers 
Recent estimates (ECU) 
Earnings  Benefit  Average earnings, 
ceiling  ceiling  non-manual 
Country:  workers in  industry 
Belgium  32,500  25,125  26,148 
Denmark  - 12,282  29,172 
France  22,658  - 24,468 
Germany, West  44,055  - 31,620 
Greece  19,841  19,842  11,340 
Ireland  - 7,048  23,352 
Luxembourg  58,886  47,732  31,944 
Netherlands  - 11,417  23,616 
Portugal  - - 8,172 
Spain  27,076  22,939  19,320 
United Kingdom  - 6,070  26,556 
Remarks:  For data in the first two columns refer to footnotes and explanations 
concerning Tables 4 and  5.  Data in the third column are from: 
EUROSTAT, Earnings in  Industry and SeNices,  1992, page 154. Figures 
are either last quarter 1991  or first quarter 1992, except for Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands (1990 data). 
Italy: there is no earnings ceiling  in the general scheme (INPS).  In the 
pension scheme for executives and  managers the earnings ceiling was 
122,200 ECU per year in  1992. 
In  Italy, better paid  employees with executive and  management functions  are affiliated 
to a special scheme which enables them to have higher benefits than those normally paid by the 
general scheme for wage and salary earners (INPS). The ceiling for this special group has been 
set  at  a  relatively  high  level,  195  million  lire  per  year  in  1992,  which  was  approximately 
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resulting from the benefit formula. 
The above information acquires more meaning when compared to the average earnings 
of potential  beneficiaries  (see Table  7).  Confirmation  that higher paid  employees  have  lower 
expectations from  social  security is  given  by the  results  of the  EUROSTAT study,  looking  at 
replacement rates for insured persons earning twice the average national wage (Table 8). 
Table 8: 
Typical replacement rates for employees earning 
twice the average wage in manufacturing 
Full career  20 years' cover 
Gross rate  Net rate  Gross rate  Net rate 
Country:  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Belgium  43  62  24  38 
Denmark  29  46  29  46 
France  31  40  17  21 
Germany  39  55  18  24 
Greece  78  89  45  59 
Ireland  24  35  24  35 
Italy  69  79  39  49 
Luxembourg  54  65  30  39 
Netherlands  24  37  24  37 
Portugal  79  103  45  59 
Spain  90  97  63  71 
United Kingdom  17  24  8  11 
Assumptions:  - male employee with spouse 
- first tier compulsory coverage 
Since 1990, the year of measurement of the EUROSTAT replacement rates, the trend 
is  towards  downward  benefit  revisions,  austerity  measures  and  similar  restrictions  on  future 
entitlements. 
An  example  is  the  1992/93  Italian  pension  legislation.  A  new  pension  formula  will 
henceforth be applied to new entrants in the general scheme for employees, resulting in a drastic 
reduction  of future  replacement  rates.  The  current generation  is  also  - to  a lesser degree  -
affected. 
Similar measures have  been  taken  in  Greece:  as from  1993 old-age  benefits for new 
entrants will  be far less generous than in the past (higher age,  lower pensions). 
A  recent  reform  in  Portugal  (Law  No.329  of 25  September 1993)  introduced  stricter 
entitlement conditions. The retirement age for women will be raised gradually from age 62 to 65, 
the minimum qualifying period of contributions for retirement benefits has increased from 10 to 
15  years,  the  accrual  rate  has  been  lowered  from  2.2%  per year to  2.0%  and  the  reference 
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years out of the last 15 (instead of the best 5 out of the last 1  0). 
The suggestion that great care should be taken in  handling the subject of replacement 
rates is confirmed by the following  information, from national sources, illustrating pension levels 
from an angle which is different from that adopted by EUROSTAT. 
Income replacement rates estimates from other sources 
DENMARK 
The level  of the state universal social pension  is  fixed  annually and  is  calculated  with 
reference to the index for the average earnings of an industrial worker. There is no official goal 
as regards the income level provided through the social pension as compared with the average 
income of wage earners. 
Average earnings of a male worker (1993) (estimate)  225,000 DKR 
Income tax  101,800 DKR 
Disposable income  123,200 DKR 
Social pension for single person without supplements (for  58,200 DKR 
housing, heating, family circumstances) 
The net replacement ratio provided through the social pension  is  relatively high, taking 
into consideration that pensioners receive a tax allowance which  is the double that granted to 
working persons. A comparison of the disposable income of the average wage earner and  of a 
single person  receiving the old-age social  pension  is  given  by the following  calculation,  which 
does not take into account the various supplementary benefits that a pensioner may receive. 
With the introduction of new tax rules from 1994, the double tax allowance for pensioners 
will be abolished but at the same time there will be a considerable increase in the social pension. 
The end result of the tax reform entering into force from 1994 should be an improvement of the 
relative income situation of pensioners. 
In  addition  to  the  social  pension,  Denmark  has  instituted  a  second-tier  compulsory 
retirement scheme, the Supplementary Labour Market Pension (ATP) (see Chapter 4). A person 
who  has  been  a full-time  wage  earner since  the  establishment  of the A  TP  in  1964  currently 
receives  an  amount  of 9,600  DKR  annually  (which  is  subject  to  ordinary  income  tax).  This 
represents  a  relatively  modest  amount  compared  to  the  benefits  provided  under the  social 
pension. 
FRANCE 
A sample  survey was  carried  out in  1988 in  order to  obtain  reliable  estimates of net 
replacement rates for employees with a full career. A full career is  37.5 years, according to the 
standard set by the general social security schemes for employees.  The old-age pension after 
37.5 years of  service should be equal to 50% of average revalued earnings of  the best 1  0 years. 
A contribution ceiling is traditionally applied in old-age pension insurance - it was Fr. 12,010 per 
month in  1992). The results of the survey are shown in  Table 9. 
In  France,  however,  a second tier of pension  provision  which  was  initially  organised 
voluntarily  by  the  social  partners  was  made  compulsory  for  all  wage  earners  and  salaried 
employees in the private sector (see Chapter 4). 
Consequently, social security replacement rates in France often include the effect of  the 
compulsory membership of  workers to the supplementary schemes (essentially AGIRC, ARRCO) 
which levy contributions on  incomes below and above the social security ceiling. 
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including basic and supplementary mandatory schemes should be in line with the standard used 
for the civil service retirement scheme: 75% of the last gross remuneration for a full career. The 
trade unions continue to support this target. 
Table 9: 
France: Net replacement rate for selected levels of  earnings 
under the first and second tier of compulsory pension coverage 
Full career, year of birth 1922, 
year of observation 1988. 
only first tier  first and second  tier 
Last monthly net  Males  Females  Males  Females 
earnings (Fr.  Francs)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Less than 5,000  86  72  113  95 
5,000 - 6,000  75  60  102  79 
6,000 - 8,000  63  57  93  79 
8,000 - 10,000  52  49  84  75 
10,000 - 12,000  43  41  83  74 
12,000- 16,000  34  34  77  69 
16,000 or more  20  n.a.  66  n.a. 
The theoretical target of 75% seems to have been  largely met for employees having a 
full  insurance career thanks to,  in  particular,  the effect of income tax schedules which  favour 
retirement income and to a very substantial extent 'second pensions'. Many French pensioners, 
however,  did  not have  a full  career and  received  lower old-age  pensions  and  the minimum 
pension. 
For the self-employed different social security schemes operate both at the first and the 
second tier. The income replacement rates are uneven: they tend to be low for the self-employed 
in  handicrafts, trade and  commerce and high for liberal professionals. 
GERMANY 
The main national pension insurance scheme covers broadly wage earners and salaried 
employees (excluding civil servants) as well as self-employed persons who apply for mandatory 
coverage. It is administered by the Federal Insurance Office as regards salaried employees and 
by  regional  pension  insurance  institutions  as  regards  wage  earners,  (see  also  Chapter  3, 
Germany). 
The level of benefit depends on the number of years a person has been insured and his 
average earnings during these years in  relation to the average income of all employees. There 
is an income limit for the assessment of  contributions which is also relevant to benefit levels (see 
Table  4).  Benefits  are  adjusted  every  year  in  accordance  with  the  net  wages  of people  in 
employment. 
Pension insurance is aimed at guaranteeing an  adequate standard of living  in  old age, 
understood as 70% of the last net earnings in  employment after a full employment career of 45 
years. This level is now set out in section 68, subsection 3, of  the Social Code, sixth book (Public 
Pension Insurance). The net replacement rate in  1991  would be 68.3% for West Germany and 
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years the replacement rate would be 60.7% for West Germany and 61.1 o/o  for East Germany. 
In 1990 the average number of years of insurance (earned or credited) of those applying 
for benefits was 37.3 years for men and 23.4 years for women  in  West Germany whereas the 
same numbers for East Germany are 47.1  years for men and 36.2 years for women. This means 
that  for  an  average  employment  career  the  theoretical  replacement  rate  aimed  at  by  the 
legislation would not be achieved. 
Social security benefits  are  only taxable  in  part.  This part is  in  theory the revenue of 
contributions paid  in the past (Erlragsanteil).  The Income Tax Act (Einkommensteuergesetz) 
contains a table which shows the taxable percentage depending on the age of the pensioner at 
the beginning  of payments of benefits.  This percentage is 24%  at age 65,  26%  at age 63 and 
29% at age 60. 
Such percentages are very likely to be increased with effect from 1 January 1994. The 
percentage for age 65 then will  be 27% and for age 60 it will  be 32%. The recent reform of the 
pension insurance system (Rentenreform  1992) links the indexation of benefits to the variation 
of net wages and net benefits. 
GREECE 
The  estimates  made  by  EUROSTAT were  based  on  legislation  in  force  in  1990.The 
reform of social security effective 1 January 1993 has changed the conditions for entitlement to 
a retirement pension under the general scheme (/KA) reducing the expectations to benefit. Apart 
from the fact that pensionable age is to be gradually raised to 65, new entrants into the scheme 
with a full insurance career of 35 years cannot earn a pension representing  more than 60% of 
gross pensionable earnings (revalued earnings of the last 5 years). 
IRELAND 
An  analysis of the percentage of a male industrial worker's income replaced  by the old 
age  contributory  pension,  since  it  was  introduced  in  1961  is  contained  in  two  Irish  studies 
(Hughes: 1985; Hughes: 1994)
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subject to income tax and social insurance contributions, whereas a social insurance pension is 
exempt from taxation,  if it is the only source of income. In 1961  approximately 20 per cent of  the 
single  male  industrial  worker's  average  gross  earnings  was  replaced  by  the  basic  old  age 
contributory pension.  The replacement rate was around 23 per cent, when account was taken 
of deductions of income tax and social insurance contributions. 
The gross replace-ment rate in  1982 for a single adult was over 29 per cent of average 
earnings and the net replacement rate was 42 per cent. Hughes points out that the much larger 
increase in  the net replacement rate was due to the increase in  the burden of income tax and 
social insurance contributions on the average industrial worker during that period. 
In 1992, the gross replacement rate for a single person was 24 per cent of the average 
earnings of a male industrial workers and the net replacement rate was 37 per cent. 
The net replacement rate for a married couple increased from about 36 per cent of male 
average industrial earnings in 1961 to over 62 per cent in  1982. In 1992 the net replacement rate 
was 51  per cent (where one spouse is under age 66), and 53 per cent, where both spouses are 
over age 66. 
The replacement rates would be higher if account were taken, where appropriate, of  the 
various allowances ('household',  'living  alone' and  'over 80'). 
ITALY 
Stricter entitlement  conditions,  lower accrual  rates  and  a significant  raising  of state 
pensionable age have been introduced with the 1992 pension reform. The effect of  such changes 
on the benefit level promised by the general scheme for employees (INPS) has been estimated 
as follows. For a future full career (40 years) of an employee the average gross replacement rate 
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between 70% and 80% gross, according to income. At present in  Italy a large number of INPS 
pensions are awarded on the basis of fairly short insurance careers. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Pensions calculated on the basis of a full career, that is 40 years of contributol)' social 
security coverage, would represent on a gross basis 76% of  the earnings level of active workers 
in  non-agricultural  employment.  There  would  be  a  higher  replacement  rate  for  workers  in 
agriculture. 
The corresponding rate on a half-net basis (that is deducting compulsol)' social insurance. 
contributions from the earnings of active persons) would  rise to 85%. 
PORTUGAL 
The general social security scheme for employees and self-employed persons promises 
old-age pensions at the rate  of 2.2% of the reference salal)' for each year of contribution, with 
a minimum of  30% and a maximum of 80%. The reference salal)' is the gross amount of monthly 
earnings averaged over the best five out of the last ten years of contribution.  Pensions are paid 
in  14 payments over the year (one payment eve!)' month, plus at Christmas and Easter). There 
are no earnings ceilings. 
Theoretically, with a full career of 37 years a worker should reach a gross replacement 
rate of 80% at retirement (it was only 70% between 1965 and 1982). 
In  practice, replacement rates are lower because: 
- monthly  earnings  averaged  for the  purpose  of pension  calculations  are  not  revalued  for 
inflation or changes in salal)' scales; 
- pensionable  earnings  do  not  include  miscellaneous  items  of  compensation  (bonuses, 
allowances); 
- average contribution careers fall short of 37 years; 
- there are delays in  indexation  in the year of award. 
Neglecting the effect of  inflation is a serious shortcoming in pension calculations because 
in  Portugal the consumer price annual index increased between 9% and 13% during the last six 
years (higher rates were recorded in  previous years). 
The average length of an  insurance career was - in  1991  - less than 15 years for 68% 
of the pensioners retiring  in that year.  Only 7%  of pensioners could claim on the basis of a full 
career. As a consequence 61% of pensioners were drawing only the minimum pension (52.1 0% 
of the minimum wage). The average pension was only 22%  higher than the minimum. 
A  favourable  circumstance  for  the  pensioner  is  that  pensions  are  subject  to  lower 
personal income tax rates than earnings. Moreover, the threshold of  taxable income is such that 
it is  estimated that about 97.7% of pensioners virtually pay no income tax. 
In theol)', a single person retiring in 1992 on the basis of a pensionable salal)' averaged 
over the period  1987-1991  and with  a full  career (37 years), would  reach  in  1992 and  1993 a 
replacement rate of 68.9% gross and  of 85.1% net. 
The above empirical rates appear to be lower than the comparable estimates shown in 
the EUROSTAT study. 
SPAIN 
Old-age pensions under the General Scheme for Employees are paid at age 65 subject 
to a minimum period of contribution,  at present 15 years. The pension rate is  50%,  of average 
relevant  earnings, for the first 1  0 years  of contribution,  plus  2%  per additional  year,  reaching 
1  00%  after  35  years  of contribution.  A  minimum  pension  is  guaranteed  from  age  65  to  a 
beneficial)' with a dependent spouse: in  1993 the minimum annual amount was Ps. 780,150. 
The average annual amount of all the new pensions awarded in 1992 was Ps. 1,171 ,380. 
This  amount,  compared  with  average  insured  earnings  (Ps.  1  ,684,464),  shows  an  average 
16  Occupational pensions in the European Union replacement rate of 69.5%.  This gross  rate  is  influenced  by the actuarial  reduction  applied  to 
early retirement pensions (8% per year between age 60 and 65) because the group of the 1992 
new pensioners retired  on  average at age 62.4. Another factor to be taken into account is that 
average revalued earnings are calculated on the basis of annual earnings over the last 8 years, 
of which only 6 are revalued to neutralise the effects of inflation. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The amount of  the 
flat-rate  National  Insu-
rance  old-age  pension 
payable to residents at 65 
(men)  and  60  (women) 
corresponded  in  1992  to 
approximately 18 per cent 
of  national  average 
earnings.  For  the  lowest 
paid  workers  whose 
earnings  are  around 
£3,000  per  year the  flat-
rate  pension  for a person 
with  a  complete  contri-
bution  record  would  yield 
a  replacement  rate  of 
100%;  but  as  earnings 
increase this rate falls. 
In  addition  to  the 
flat-rate  old-age  pension, 
earnings-related pensions 
are  payable  from  state 
pensionable  age to those 
who  have  contributed  as 
employed  persons.  The 
earnings-related  scheme 
was  only  introduced  in 
1978,  and  thus  has  not 
yet  matured.  Persons 
reaching  state  pension 
age  in  1993-94  can 
receive  an  additional 
pension of around 18% of 
revalued  career  average 
earnings  in  the  band 
between  the  lower  and 
upper earnings limit.  This 
proportion will rise to 25% 
for  those  reaching  state 
pension  age  in  1998, 
before falling  gradually to 
Table 10: 
UK: Replacement ratios for different generations at 
different earnings levels. Total basic pension and 
additional pension as percentage of earnings 
Earnings as  percentage of all  persons average 
earnings 
Year of  25%  50%  100%  200%  300% 
award 
1993  76  48  33  20  14 
1998  75  50  37  23  15 
2003  70  47  35  21  14 
2008  66  44  33  20  13 
2013  63  42  31  18  12 
Notes:  Additional pension  is calculated  on the basis of 
constant earnings in  each year at specified 
level in terms of all  persons average earnings, 
excluding  absence. 
It is  assumed that full  contributions are paid  in 
each year of working  life. 
Basic pension and additional  pension  in the 
year are shown as a percentage of average 
earnings in April of that year. 
Actual earnings are taken into account to 
1991/92; assumptions for 1992/93 and  1993/94 
are: 
Upratings  5% 
Earnings  6.575% 
For the long term it is  assumed that upratings 
of pensions will  be in line with  a cost of living 
of 5%  per year and an earnings increase in 
real terms of 1.5% per year. 
20% for those reaching state pension age in  2001  and later. 
An  estimate was made of the maximum possible replacement rates for a few selected 
generations  at different  earnings  levels,  including  both  the  flat-rate  and  the  earnings-related 
components of the old-age social security pensions. 
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The information obtained from national sources should help to put the results of studies, 
such as the study by EUROSTAT, into perspective. While the replacement rates give a measure 
of the  potential  coverage  under current  social  security  legislation,  figures  on  the  amount  of 
pensions  in  payment  at  present,  particularly  those  emerging  from  earnings  related  schemes 
reflect the past history of insured persons during times when wages were lower and periods of 
insurance  coverage  shorter,  particularly  in  schemes  which  have  not  yet  reached  maturity. 
Benefrts  in  course  of payment also  reflect the  number - considerable  in  some countries  - of 
pensions which were awarded in the past at minimum rates. 
Statistically  it would  not be  very significant to compare current average pensions with 
average earnings of  the working population. The average hides the situation of individual groups 
in  the respective distributions.  On the other hand,  a full  statistical analysis  of the relationship 
between  salary  distribution  and  the  relative  position  of different  categories  of pensioners  is 
beyond the scope of the present report. 
A comparison in  national currency could be attempted for the countries paying flat-rate 
old-age pensions, which are not based on  averages but are universal uniform entitlements. 
Country  Flat rate pension  Average earnings 
salaried employees 
(industry) 
Denmark  DKr 92,616 (1993)  DKr 231,500 (1992) 
Ireland  lr£ 5,668 (1992)  lr£ 17,900 (1991) 
Netherlands  HFI 25,114 (1993)  HFI 54,860 (1990) 
United Kingdom  £ 4,670 (1993)  £ 18,780 (1992) 
The differences in the years for which data are available are regretted; nevertheless the 
order of magnitude of the relationship  between the two series can still  be appreciated. 
For other countries, the following information may help to throw some additional light on 
the present level of social security pensions for various groups. 
In  Italy the average annual amount of pensions in  payment at the end  of 1991  was as 
follows: 
General scheme for employees  Lire 10,625,000 
social pension*  "  4,649,000 
self-employed  "  6,348,000 
special schemes: 
-banks  28,797,000 
- transport, telephone, etc  21,807,000 
- mines, gas,  etc.  19,182,000 
*paid at age 65 to citizens without pension insurance 
entitlements (means-tested) 
In  France the  overall  average  retirement  pension  paid  under the general scheme for 
employees  at  31.12.1990 was  Fr.  30,109  per year,  an  amount  considerably  higherthan the 
average  pension  in  payment for other categories  such  as  agricultural  labourers  (Fr.  13,440), 
artisans  (Fr.  18,794) or farmers  (Fr.  17,315).  It was,  however,  much  lower than the average 
pension enjoyed by lawyers (Fr.  54,800). 
18  Occupational pensions in the European Union In  Germany,  data  for  1992  show  that  old-age  pensions  in  payment  (net  of health 
insurance contributions) for employees retiring at 65 were significantly lower (OM 1  ,325 per year) 
than those of employees who had retired at 63 (OM 2,273). 
In  Luxembourg  a  special  survey  was  carried  out  to  assess  the  retirement  pension 
actually  paid  to  insured  persons  who  retired  in  1990  and  in  1991.  Out  of the  5,000  new 
pensioners  only  about  900  had  a full  insurance  career.  For the  latter group the  relationship 
between the pension and last earnings gave replacement rates very close to those shown in the 
EUROSTAT study (full career). 
In  Spain  the  average  annual  pension  currently  in  payment by the general  scheme  in 
1992 was  PTA  1,070,426 while  for coal  miners  it  was  1,677,830 and  for agricultural  labour 
669,088. 
These  few  examples  underline  the  concern  of pension  analysts  to  acquire  a  fair 
perception of the actual and potential level of income security guaranteed by the social security 
retirement benefits in order to plan for a second tier of protection. One should not forget that at 
present social security pensions do represent the most important means of financial support for 
millions  of pensioners, as illustrated  by the examples presented in  Table 11. 
Table 11: 
Sources of income of pensioners: 
Available estimates for EC countries 
o/o  of total income received from each source 
State  Supple- Employ- Invest- Other 
pension  mentary  ment  ments, 
Country:  pension  property 
France (1984)  85.2  6.0  8.8  -
Germany (1986)  78.0  15.0  2.0  4.0  1.0 
Ireland (1983)  55.2  38.4  1.9  4.3  0.2 
Netherlands (1989)  76.0  15.0  1.0  4.0  4.0 
United Kingdom (1988)  51.0  23.0  8.0  17.0  1.0 
Remarks: 
France:  Former employees (salaries)  aged over 60 and  not employed full-time. 
Germany:  excluding civil servants 
Ireland:  recent pensioners 
Netherlands:  data refer only to persons in  receipt of a basic pension, with total 
annual income in the range of:  HFL 22,000 to 26,000 per year. 
A  study  made  in  Belgium  about the sources  of income  of persons  aged  54  or more 
showed that in 1988 the social security pension represented 85.2% of  the total for persons in the 
lowest income quartile but only 28.4% in  the highest quartile. 
The data for Greece, admittedly not representative of all categories of pensioners, does 
nevertheless indicate that 88.5%  of income after retirement was  attributable to  pensions from 
compulsory schemes. 
Table  11  also  confirms the  greater role  occupied  by  occupational  pensions  in  overall 
retirement income in  countries such as  Ireland  and the United  Kingdom whose social security 
legislation  provides universal retirement pensions at a modest rate. 
To conclude this section, it is interesting to show the results of a sample survey carried 
out among retired people between 20 April and 18 May 1992 under the auspices of Directorate-
General Vofthe European Commission. Retired people were asked whether the pension income 
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was,  in their opinion,  adequate. 
The answers are summarised as follows  in the relevant publication11 : 
"Three  groups  of countries  can  be  observed.  A  first  group  comprises  Denmark, 
Germany (including  this time the former GDR), Luxembourg,  the Netherlands  and (to a lesser 
extent)  Belgium;  here  vast majorities  of older people  declare  themselves as satisfied (many 
'completely)  about the  adequacy of their pensions.  Smaller,  but still significant  majorities  in 
these countries also feel that,  taking into account the contributions  made during their working 
life, the pension they receive allows them to lead the life they would like to live.  A second group 
comprises  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Italy and the  UK;  here  opinion  is  more  divided  between 
adequacy and inadequacy and the balance contribution/pension  received is considered as not 
very  favourable.  The  pension  systems  of these  countries  do  not quite  seem  to  pass  the 
'contentment' test.  The third group comprises Greece and Portugal,  where dissatisfaction is the 
substantial  majority  view,  on  both  counts:  a significant  amount needs  to  be  done  by these 
countries  to  meet the  pension  aspirations  of their citizens.  It is  interesting  to  note  that,  at 
aggregate EU level,  women tend to be less satisfied than men: only 48% as opposed to  59% 
men consider the pension  they receive  as (completely/just  about)  adequate and only 33% as 
opposed to 42% of  men think that they receive (definitely/probably)  a decent pension .considered 
the contributions  they made.  As we have already noted,  pension systems, in penalising career 
interruptions,  have an  unfavourable  indirect bias against women" 
Similar questions were asked  of a sample of non-retired  persons. The pattern of their 
responses was rather similar to that of the retired. 
The pursuit of  global pension objectives 
Social  security  and  supplementary  pensions  are  two  facets  of the  same  retirement 
income coin but are they linked to social security by common deliberate objectives or are the two 
tiers  of protection  developing  fairly  independently?  This  question,  briefly  touched  upon  in 
Chapter 1, deserves further development because the answer is  not the same for all  countries 
of the EU,  as shown by the following  examples. 
In  France,  the  general  social  security  pension  scheme  for employees  has  developed 
since  the  1950's  in  full  awareness that the  social  partners were  taking  responsibility  for the 
organisation of a supplementary pension that would eventually reach the same categories of  the 
population.  The social security earnings ceiling  for pensions has been  deliberately maintained 
at reasonable levels in  order to allow  room for the supplementary schemes. A coherent policy 
has been followed  in relation to pensionable age. Trade unions and employers have negotiated 
on  the  understanding  that  for  workers  with  a  full  career  (37.5  years  or  more)  an  income 
replacement rate of 75% of last gross earnings was the desirable objective for the sum total of 
the  state  plus  supplementary  pension.  The  confirmation  that  public  policy  endorsed  such  a 
package came when the largest supplementary schemes were extended and made compulsory. 
In Germany a different attitude seems to have prevailed so far. The state views the old-
age  benefits  of its  social  security system for both  private  and  public  employees  as  providing 
adequate retirement income:  sufficient,  in  principle,  to maintain the pre-retirement standard of 
living.  The role of supplementary provision seems to be appreciated by the state for what it is: 
a voluntary and private initiative,  undoubtedly useful since it is encouraged through preferential 
fiscal treatment. On the other hand, the social  partners are not necessarily convinced that the 
state pension is adequate in all cases and have shown considerable interest in the development 
of a private  second  tier.  Trade  unions,  in  particular,  have  sometimes  argued  that company 
pensions  are  part  of the  global  remuneration  package.  Employers,  who  are  predominantly 
financing  the  second  tier,  tend  to  worry  about  public  interference  (notably  from  the  Federal 
Labour Court)  rather than  pressing  for a coherent joint public policy  between compulsory and 
private provision. 
The perception of  the link with social security in Ireland is quite specific. The main priority 
of public policy on pensions has been to ensure that all residents in Ireland will have a minimally 
20  Occupational pensions in the European Union adequate  income  in  the event  of retirement/old  age,  permanent  incapacity  for work and,  for 
surviving  dependants,  in  the  event  of death.  The  state social  security  pensions  system was 
designed to achieve this  objective through  both  flat-rate  pensions  under social  insurance and 
social assistance. 
Based  on  the recommendations  of a Commission  on  Social Welfare, the Government 
position is that the introduction of an earnings-related second-tier pension is  not a priority. The 
main  objective  is  to use  limited  resources to  improve the income  position  of all  categories of 
people in  need  (not only the elderly).  The deliberate policy is therefore to rely on  occupational 
schemes  and  private  pension  arrangements  to  provide  supplementary  pension  cover,  in 
particular,  for those on  higher than average earnings. 
Occupational pension schemes have been established for virtually all public employees 
and employees of  semi-state bodies, of both a commercial and non commercial nature. The state 
promotes the establishment  of occupational  and  private  pension  arrangements  in  the  private 
sector through the favourable tax treatment accorded to contributions to these schemes and to 
returns  on  investment of scheme assets,  and  by  providing  for a regulatory  system under the 
Pensions  Act  1990  to  safeguard  pension  rights,  including  the  rights  of early  leavers.  The 
Pensions Act also prohibits discrimination  between men and women.  Benefit targets in  private 
arrangements are not a matter of public policy, except that there are upper benefit limits for the 
purposes of the tax treatment accorded to such arrangements. 
The view of the Netherlands government and the policy so far pursued is that the state 
is responsible for ensuring an  adequate but basic income to all  citizens  and that it has fulfilled 
this responsibility through the universal AOW  social security scheme. 
According to this view, responsibility for supplementary pension arrangements rests with 
the social partners. The legislature has only a limited twofold task with regard to supplementary 
pension  arrangements.  In  the  first  place  it  has  the  task  of creating  a  suitable  regulatory 
framework.  To  this  end,  the  legislature  has,  for example,  introduced  tax facilities  relating  to 
supplementary  pensions,  and  has  established  rules  making  certain  industry  pension  funds 
compulsory. 
Secondly,  the  state  acknowledges  its  responsibility  (with  regard  to  supplementary 
pension schemes) to deal with matters of public interest, for example, combating discrimination  . 
(such  as  discrimination  between  men  and  women),  and  protecting  early  leavers'  rights  in 
supplementary pension schemes. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  public policy  for more than a decade has  been  to  restrict the 
growth of public provision for retirement and to encourage the growth of private provision.  The 
basic pension is intended to provide a low level of guaranteed retirement income for the majority 
of  members  of the  population,  financed  according  to  ability  to  pay  by  earnings-related 
contributions (subject to a ceiling). 
In the government's view, the second tier of retirement income should ideally be provided 
by occupational pensions  or personal pensions.  In recognition  of the fact that the coverage of 
such arrangements is  not universal and  is  unlikely to become so  in the foreseeable future,  an 
additional earnings-related pension facility (SERPS) was introduced in the state system. This is 
clearly  envisaged  as  a  back-up,  or  safety  net,  and  every  encouragement  is  provided  to 
employers and to individuals to replace this additional level of social security by occupational or 
personal  pension  provision.  Social  security  incorporates  incentives  to  encourage  private 
provision. Tax incentives are given to encourage both occupational and personal pensions. The 
self-employed are covered by the basic pension and are encouraged to make further provision 
through tax-efficient personal pensions. 
The five countries taken as examples are a fair illustration  of the trend toward adopting 
a global policy approach in respect of the respective roles of basic and supplementary retirement 
provision.  In other EU countries the degree of deliberate integration of the two components into 
a global strategy is not as clear, particularly where the second tier still performs a marginal role. 
However, the  rationale  for supplementary pensions  is  a pervasive  one:  it contains  social  and 
financial  considerations which inevitably fall  into each  country's political  debate and, sooner or 
later, filter through government policy,  even where, traditionally,  a global pension  strategy was 
not systematically pursued. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL 
TWO-TIER PENSION PROVISION 
1st Tier:  Social Security 
2nd Tier:  Supplementary Pensions 
Remark: 
The following country tables have to be read in conjunction with Chapters 4 and 
5, where the terminology used is fully explained and where the scope and nature 
of the various second tier schemes and  arrangements,  which  are part of the 
national structure for pension provision, are described in some detail. 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
1st tier Social  -General scheme for employees in the private sector 
Security 
-Pension scheme for the self-employed 
-Civil service pension scheme 
VOLUNTARY: 
Group contracts 
2nd tier  Private Sector 
Insurance  Deposit 
supplementary  Employees  administration 
pensions  (mainly white- Pension funds 
collar)  Non-profit  ASBUVZW 
institutions 
Mutual associations 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
1st tier Social  Universal Social Pension 
Security 
COMPULSORY: 
Private sector employees  Supplementary 
Labour Market 
Public sector employees  Pension (A TP) 
VOLUNTARY:* 
Company schemes 
administered by life 
assurance 
2nd tier  companies or 
supplementary 
Private sector employees  company pension 
pensions  funds 
Schemes covering 
specific occupations 
or economic sectors 
administered by life 
assurance compa-
Public sector employees 
nies or industry-wide 
pension funds 
Special schemes** 
* Excluding personal plans with banks/insurance companies. An employee 
taking a job in a company where a pension scheme has been established 
by a collective agreement is obliged to join the scheme. 
** Pensions are paid through the state budget to public employees with 
the status of 'public official' {tjenestemand). 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE: I.  EMPLOYEES 
General social security scheme for employees in 
1st tier Social  industry, trade and services. 
Security 
Agricultural employees' social security scheme. 
Special schemes for public servants and for miners, 
seafarers, notary clerks. 
COMPULSORY: 
Private sector employees: ARRCO and AG/RC 
schemes  OR: 
Other compulsory schemes (for employees in social 
security*, civil aviation, agricultural services, savings 
institutions) 
Scheme for public sector employees without civil 
2nd tier  servant status (IRCANTEC) 
supplementary 
, VOLUNTARY:  pensions 
Employers can add: 
Private sector  - additional contributions to 
employees 
AG/RC scheme 
- top hat arrangements 
- savings plans 
Public servants,  PREFON or CREF schemes 
non-classified 
public employees 
* Since 1.1.1994 has joined the federations AGIRC and ARRCO 
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OVERALL STRUCTURE: II. SELF-EMPLOYED 
Category of self- 1st tier Social Security:  2nd tier supplementary 
employed:  pensions: 
Farmers  Social insurance  Voluntary,  COREVA 
scheme (MSA) 
Industry and  Special fund,  Compulsory survivors 
ORGANIC  benefit + optional  commerce  coverage 
Handicraft  Special fund,  Compulsory+ optional 
CANCAVA  coverage 
Special fund,  CNA VPL  Compulsory+ optional 
Liberal professions  coverage,  depending on 
profession 
Lawyers  Special fund,  CNBF  Compulsory 
Church Ministers  Special fund,  none 
CAMAVIC 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
- General pension insurance for wage earners, 
salaried employees and non-established public 
1  st tier Social  sector employees* 
Security  - Civil service pension scheme 
- Miners' pension scheme 
- Self-employed farmers' pension scheme 
COMPULSORY: 
Public sector  Supplementary Civil Service 
employees  Pension Scheme 
VOLUNTARY: 
Direct commitment 
(Direktzusage) by employer; 
2nd tier  book reserve with insolvency 
supplementary  insurance (Pensionssicherungs-
pensions  verein,  PSV) 
Private sector  Group insurance contracts 
employees  (  Direktversicherung) 
Pension funds (Pensionskassen) 
Support funds 
(  Unterstotzungskassen), with 
insolvency insurance (PSV) 
Certain categories of self-employed are also covered (teachers, craftsmen, 
artists, etc.). There is a separate compulsory scheme for construction 
workers. 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
-General scheme for employees and urban self-
1st tier Social  employed, IKA 
Security  - General scheme for the rural sector,  OGA 
- Special schemes (civil servants, etc.) 
COMPULSORY: 
IKAITEAM,  private sector employees in  industry 
commerce, services 
NAT,  seamen 
IKAIETEAM, public sector employees, including bank 
employees 
2nd tier  Auxiliary funds,  employees or self-employed 
supplementary 
pensions  OGA,  agricultural employees and self-employed 
Civil servants' funds 
Provident funds (lump sums only) 
VOLUNTARY 
Mutual associations (under the Civil Code) 
Single employer group insurance contracts 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
- Universal non-contributory pensions for all residents 
(means-tested) 
1st tier Social  - Social insurance (contributory) pensions for 
Security 
employees and the self-employed (non means-tested) 
- Occupational pensions (earnings related) for certain 
public sector employees who are exempt from social 
insurance pension cover 
VOLUNTARY: 
Self-administered 
Employees in private sector  pension funds 
2nd tier 
and commercial public sector  Group insurance 
supplementary  contracts 
pensions  Public sector 
Employees in non-commercial  superannuation 
public sector  schemes 
(pay-as-you-go) 
Self-employed  Personal pensions 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
General scheme (FPLD) 
Private sector  managed by INPS and 8 
employees  special schemes including the 
1st tier Social 
industrial managers' pension 
Security1 
scheme (Dirigenti) 
Public sector  Special schemes: central 
employees  government,  local government 
Self-employed  14 special schemes 
VOLUNTARY 
(Situation before Decree-Law 124/1993) 
Private sector  Single employer funds, 
employees  industry-wide funds, 
sectoral funds
2 
2nd tier  VOLUNTARY 
supplementary  (Situation after Decree-Law 124/1993) 
pensions  Funds in operation before D-L 
124/1993 
Employees and self- Closed pension funds,  post-
employed  1993 
Open pension funds,  post-
1993 
Notes: 
1  From  1. 1. 1993 private and public sector pension insurance 
legislation has been harmonised and unified,  subject to maintaining 
separate management and accounting for the existing schemes. 
2  Pre-1993 funds were either pay-as-you-go, funded, book-reserve or 
directly provided by the employer.  Public employees' supplementary 
pensions would fall under compulsory provisions. 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
-General schemes for employees (2  schemes) and 
1  st tier Social  self-employed (2 schemes) 
Security  - Public employees' pension schemes 
-Railway employees' pension fund 
VOLUNTARY 
2nd tier  Direct commitment by employer 
supplementary  Private sector 
with or without book-reserve 
pensions  employees  Group insurance contracts 
Pension funds 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
Universal schemes for all persons resident in the 
1  st tier Social  Netherlands: 
Security  - Old-age pension (AOW) 
- Widows'/widowers' pension (AWB) 
- Disability pension (AA W) 
COMPULSORY: 
Private sector  Industry-wide funds 
employees 
Public servants 
Civil service pension fund (ABP) 
2nd tier 
supplementary  Railway employees' fund 
pensions  VOLUNTARY: 
Single employer funds 
Private sector 
Industry-wide funds  employees 
Group insurance contracts 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
- Universal non-contributory pensions 
-General social security scheme for employees and 
1  st tier Social  self-employed 
Security  - Special scheme for agricultural workers 
- Special schemes for selected categories of 
employees 
-Civil service pension scheme 
VOLUNTARY 
Closed pension funds 
2nd tier  Opened pension funds  supplementary  Private sector 
pensions  employees  Mutual benefit associations 
Insurance contracts,  book-
reserves* 
* not qualifying for tax advantages 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  33 SPAIN 
First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
- Universal non-contributory pensions 
- General social security scheme for employees in 
1st tier Social  industry, trade and services 
Security  - Special schemes for self-employed 
- Special scheme for public employees 
-Special schemes for selected categories of 
employees 
VOLUNTARY 
2nd tier 
Qualified pension funds 
Employees in the 
supplementary  private sector and  Mutuals for retirement benefits 
pensions  in the nationalised  Non-qualified  insured 
industries  Pension 
Plans  non-insured 
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First and Second Tier of Pension Provision 
OVERALL STRUCTURE 
1st tier Social  Universal contributory old-age pension (National 
Security  Insurance) 
COMPULSORY: 
State earnings-related pension 
scheme (  SERPS)  OR: 
Private and 
Guaranteed minimum pension 
public sector  under a contracted-out occupational 
employees  pension scheme*  OR: 
2nd tier 
Minimum contributions to an 
approved personal pension 
supplementary  (contracted out) 
pensions 
VOLUNTARY: 
Occupational pension scheme 
Private sector  Group insurance contracts 
employees and  Personal pensions 
self-employed 
Additional voluntary contributions 
(AVC) 
*Public sector employees are covered by a Civil Service Superannuation 
Scheme and by separate schemes for employees of public corporations 
and Local Authorities. 
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CHAPTER4 
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS: 
COMPULSORY PROVISION 
The gradual development and extension of  social protection in some European countries 
has included the policy option  of making compulsory the provision of  supplementary pensions. 
Legislation  enacted  ensures  that,  over and  above  the  first  tier of pension  protection  many 
employees would  be able to benefit from a second pension. 
It should be recalled, first of all, that the meaning of the term 'compulsory' in the present 
report  has  been  described  and  explained  in  the  Introduction.  Compulsion  is  an· essential 
ingredient of any public policy aiming at ensuring economic security in old age to the population 
at  large.  It may,  however,  be  difficult to apply compulsion  in  all  situations  without obstructing 
private initiatives which may be more generous, disturbing conditions of employment or adding 
to public expenditure. Some countries substitute compulsory provisions with incentives such as 
tax exemptions. 
The  underlying  justifications  for  choosing  the  compulsory  option  are  common  to 
European  countries  that  have  followed  this  path.  Differences  concern  the  strategy  or the 
technique applied  in  order to attain the stated objectives. 
In countries where the post-war social security consensus gave priority to establishing 
universal flat-rate pensions (examples are Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) 
subsequent  economic  growth  and  increased  prosperity  fully  justified  an  enhancement  of 
retirement incomes so that the elderly could also share the improvements in the living standards 
of the working population. Middle and higher income groups, in particular, could not be satisfied 
with contemplating retirement on the flat-rate pension alone. The earnings-related benefit offered 
the desired alternative. 
Governments could,  at that point,  have relied  on  voluntary private provision,  including 
contractual arrangements freely negotiated by employers and the trade unions, in order to foster 
and  to  promote  earnings-related  retirement  benefits.  Such  an  option  seemed  particularly 
attractive  in  countries  where  private  provision  was already well  developed  (United  Kingdom, 
Netherlands). 
However, governments expressed a legitimate concern that a strictly voluntary approach 
could  become too selective,  favouring the better paid  employees or those in  large enterprises 
to the detriment of lower income workers, or women in less stable jobs, or white and blue collar 
workers  in  small  private  sector firms,  and  more  generally to  vulnerable  groups  in  the  labour 
market. A broad-based compulsory second tier was considered politically  more advantageous, 
at least from the point of view  of equity,  and also because it was  not at all  meant to  exclude 
parallel private provision. 
The  option  had  an  additional  appeal.  By  institutionalising  the second tier (even  within 
limits) labour mobility would be enhanced because the difficulties  in  accruing adequate pension 
rights  often  encountered  by  members  of company  pension  plans  who  change jobs could  be 
avoided.  It is  not a negligible advantage for an employee to remain in the same supplementary 
pension scheme when moving from job to job during active life. 
Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  opted  for  a  new  general  supplementary  pension 
scheme for large  groups of the  working  population.  In  the  UK a new scheme,  SERPS, was 
actually 'grafted' on  top of the flat-rate national insurance pension,  while  in  Denmark the A  TP 
scheme  (see  below)  took the  shape  of a clearly  separate  institution  entrusted  to  the  social 
partners for its management. 
Because of this choice  SERPS was financed  on  a pay-as-you-go basis  like the basic 
national insurance scheme. In Denmark, on the contrary, ATP was conceived as a contribution 
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are set aside year after year, accumulated, invested and returned to the worker at retirement in 
the form of a pension. 
France and the Netherlands chose another approach: building  compulsory coverage by 
cementing the contractual relationship that the social partners had previously freely established. 
Broad-based  supplementary  pension  schemes  were  achieved  by  making  it  compulsory  for 
employers  in  particular  industrial  or economic sectors,  or,  as  in  France,  to  all  private  sector 
employers, to belong to a contractual supplementary pension network organised and managed 
by the social partners. 
The policy yielded the desired results in both the Netherlands, where the schemes made 
compulsory by the state were, and remained, fully funded (capitalisation),  and in France, where 
for historical and social reasons, the complementary pension plans made compulsory were and 
remained pay-as-you-go (repartition).  Furthermore, while in the Netherlands the basic universal 
pension  was,  and  still  is,  flat-rate,  the French  social  security pension  was,  and  still  is,  wage-
related.  The  above  shows  that the  value  of relying  for the  second  tier on  broad  contractual 
arrangements, having an element of solidarity,  is independent from the choice as to the method 
of financing or to the type of pension formula applied  by social security. 
Naturally,  the  approach  adopted  was  not devoid  of political  implications.  In  the  UK, 
SERPS  is  planned,  administered  and  controlled  directly  by  a  government  department 
(Department of Social Security,  DSS).  When  the  1986  Social  Security Act scaled  down  the 
retirement benefits in  order to contain overall social security expenditure in the longer term, the 
measure caused concern about the future adequacy of the supplementary state pension. 
In  the  other  three  countries  with  wide-spread  compulsory  supplementary  pension 
provision  the  guidance  and  management  of  compulsory  schemes  are  entrusted  to  the 
representatives  of the  social  partners.  It  is  true  that  the  public  authority  retains  a  distant 
benevolent  role  of supervision  and  that  it  follows  with  political  interest  the  development  of 
institutions which,  although private,  are,  in  fact,  part and parcel of social policy. 
Greece  offers  yet  another  pattern  of state  intervention  in  establishing  compulsory 
supplementary pensions. The pattern developed from traditions and conditions which date back 
several decades. In 1951, when social security was reviewed and reformed, the state opted for 
a social  insurance pension of a modest amount, although  it was not flat-rate.  Insured earnings 
were  low  and  average  contribution  careers  short.  In  fact,  the  pension  scheme  was  originally 
intended to cater mainly for low paid workers. 
With the assent of  the government, a number of private enterprises voluntarily organised 
supplementary  retirement  benefit  schemes  referred  to  as  'auxiliary  funds'.  State  benefits 
improved later but the need for a network of supplementary arrangements was still felt.  In 1979, 
the  state  enacted  Law  997,  creating  the  Employees'  Supplementary  Social  Security  Fund 
(TEAM). The aim was to provide, through a new compulsory scheme, supplementary pensions 
to  all  private  sector employees  who  were  not  already  covered  by  an  auxiliary  fund.  Earlier 
auxiliary  funds whose  benefits  were  lower than  those mandated  under TEAM were gradually 
taken over. Employees of public enterprises were also affiliated  under special arrangements. 
TEAM became, de-facto, a major part of the state's compulsory provision for retirement. 
In  August  1983  it  was  formally  attached  to  the  state  social  security  institution  (/KA),  albeit 
maintaining separate management and accounts. 
In  1987 a special supplementary pension fund  was organised  for the rural  population. 
Self-employed  persons remained  outside the  mandatory funds.  They were,  however,  allowed 
(since 1979) to organise their supplementary coverage and to make it compulsory on a sectoral 
or occupational basis. 
The recent  social  security  reform  has  not challenged  the  fundamental  choices  made 
earlier,  including a compulsory second tier of pension provision where benefit levels are put into 
common lines and solidarity among occupational groups is  maintained. 
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In  each one of the five countries reviewed above, the decision of the state to introduce 
a strong element of compulsion  within  the  second tier of pension  provision  did  not dissuade 
employers,  workers or trade unions to continue to make private  and  voluntary  arrangements 
capable of enhancing retirement incomes. The parallel development of compulsory and voluntary 
supplementary pension has,  however, a different connotation  in  each Member State, because 
the impact or the performance of the compulsory element is  not necessarily the same. 
The case  of the United  Kingdom stands out as  unique,  insofar as  legislation  permits 
'contracting  out',  that is  workers are  allowed  to opt out  of the compulsory scheme  (SERPS), 
provided that employers and workers meet certain conditions of equivalence in coverage through 
company plans or personal arrangements. 
In Denmark the low benefit expectations emerging from membership in the compulsory 
ATP created pressure in  recent years to develop a wide new network of supplementary pension 
plans.  It  is  characteristic  of the  Danish  approach  that the  voluntary  supplementary  pension 
arrangements  have  mostly  resulted  from  wage  negotiations  concerning  entire  groups  of 
employees  in  a  specific  economic  branch  or  occupation,  while  single  employer  company 
pensions have found less appeal. 
In France, on the contrary, the weight and the considerable extension of supplementary 
protection, which is virtually and effectively compulsory, has definitely discouraged parallel private 
initiative,  Another reason  for the  lack of private  initiative  is  that in  the compulsory schemes 
(AGIRC, ARRCO) the employer has  a choice of plan,  that is  he  has the freedom to increase 
benefit expectation through higher contributions.  Marginal private and  voluntary arrangements 
(top-hat schemes, etc.) for individuals or senior employees do exist. 
In the Netherlands the obligation to belong to industry-wide pension  funds dates back 
to 1949 and is widespread, but it has not crowded out other forms of pension provision. Out of 
about 2.7 million members of supplementary pension funds in the private sector (in 1991) about 
530,000 were not in  industry-wide funds. 
In Greece, the state took a leading role in the promotion and development of compulsory 
provision. However, the trade union movement also took significant initiatives in the organisation 
of mutual insurance funds and mutual benefit societies, some of which are still in operation. The 
trade union freedoms embodied in  the constitution and  special legislation  dating back to 1976 
have provided  the  legal  foundation  for the  inclusion· of pension  commitments  in  a number of 
collective agreements. Moreover, large companies have made additional voluntary arrangements 
for their employees either directly, or through insurance contracts. 
The broad-brush  picture  presented  above  for the five  countries  concerned  is  further 
clarified and enriched by the following  detailed information set out separately for each country. 
The  information  on  compulsory  second-tier  schemes  may  be  better  understood  by  making 
reference to the overall structure of pension provision presented in  the tables in  Chapter 3. 
Detailed Country Information 
DENMARK 
In  1964,  the  law  on  the  Arbeijdsmarkedets  Tillaegspension  established  a  new 
compulsory supplementary labour market pension, A TP.  Participation  in  A TP is  obligatory for 
employees from age 16 to age 66,  provided they are employed (for at least 1  0 hours a week) 
in  Denmark, or are employed abroad by a Danish public or private employer or are on  Danish. 
ships.  Citizens  from  other EC or Nordic countries employed  in  Denmark are  also  affiliated to 
ATP. Contributions to ATP are paid by employers and workers. In  1992 the monthly amount of 
contributions was DKr 65 (worker) and DKr 130 (employer). 
At the age of 67 the accumulated balance of each  member's cumulated contributions 
with interest is paid in the form of a life annuity (pension). In addition to the old-age pension, in 
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Self-employed workers are excluded from A  TP membership; it is,  however, possible for 
them to retain membership acquired while working as employees before becoming self-employed 
(minimum of 3 years' participation  is  required). 
The basic data concerning ATP are summarised below: 
Total number of  Total number of  Number of 
contributors in the  members with a  pensioners 
year  contribution balance 
at the end of the year 
1986  3,300,000  2,550,000  371,000 
1992  3,400,000  2,600,000  478,000 
The value of  accumulated contributions after deduction of the amount paid out in benefits 
has grown from 30.7 billion  DKr at the end  of 1983 to 97.8 billion  DKr at the end of 1992. 
FRANCE 
The  development  of contractual  supplementary  pension  schemes,  having  become 
compulsory,  has  reached significant proportions  in  France.  For reasons of space and  balance 
with  other  country  profiles  shown  in  this  chapter,  the  following  description  focuses  almost 
exclusively on the two largest schemes for wage earners and salaried employees, i.e. the AGIRC 
and ARRCO federations. Only brief mention will be made of the other compulsory schemes listed 
in the overall structure. 
Origin of  AGIRC and ARRCO 
The first regime  complementaire,  as well  as the most significant since it  more or less 
served as the model for subsequent schemes, was formed as a result of the national collective 
agreement  of 14  March  1947  setting  up  a  repartition  (pay-as-you-go)  pension  scheme  for 
engineers  and  managerial  staff (cadres)  of industrial  and  commercial  enterprises.  A  multi-
institutional  basis  was  retained,  but participating  institutions  had  to be  approved  and  become 
members of the Association generale des institutions  de retraite des cadres (AGIRC). 
The unique feature of this arrangement was that all employers belonging to the Conseil 
National du  Patronat Franr;ais  (CNPF),  the  national  employers'  association,  were  obliged  to 
affiliate their own  cadres to one of the funds federated under AGIRC. 
The example of AGIRC was followed  in  other collective agreements. In 1957 the social 
partners decided to coordinate and rationalise the whole network of  repartition pension schemes; 
first, the agreement of 19 May 1957 instituted the Union nationale des institutions de retraite des 
salaries (UNIRS), then the agreement of 8 December 1961 formed the Association des regimes 
de  retraite  complementaires  (ARRCO).  Under the latter agreement  it  became  compulsory to 
affiliate  non-cadres  employees  of  enterprises  belonging  to  the  CNPF  to  an  institution 
administering  a  complementary  pension  scheme  operating  on  a  pay-as-you-go  basis  and 
authorised  by the  Ministry of Social Affairs.  Contractual  commitments were turned  into  wider 
opligation  by  an  'extension  procedure'  whereby  the  supervising  ministry,  having  noted  the 
consensus  of the  organisations  signing  the  agreement,  extended  such  commitments  to  all 
employers  in  the branch of activity  concerned, whether or not they belonged to  an  employer's 
organisation member of CNPF. Coverage was further widened  in  1972. 
The  AGIRC  agreement  of 1947,  as  well  as  the  ARRCO  agreement  of 1961,  was 
extended by law to all employees belonging to the state pension scheme, even if their employer 
did not belong to a branch of activity covered by  CNPF. Few exceptions were made in  respect 
of some employees affiliated to other complementary schemes. 
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contribute also to ARRCO, in  respect of that part of their salary under the social security ceiling. 
By  that time  supplementary  pension  provision  for  private  employees  (blue  and  white  collar 
workers) had become complete. 
Coverage and financing  (AGIRC and ARRCO) 
Both AGIRC and ARRCO are federations of supplementary pension funds (Caisses). As 
of November  1993  AGIRC federated  54  funds,  all  implementing  the  same  contribution  and 
benefit plan. ARRCO federated 111  funds, which overall implemented 46 different type of plans. 
The funds federated by AGIRC deal exclusively with the so-called cadres, a term which 
covers senior executives, technicians and more generally employees ranking above a given level 
in  the company's hierarchy.  Funds federated  by ARRCO cater for all  employees whether they 
are cadres or not and also receive contributions from AGIRC membership (see above) earning 
pension rights. 
Contributions  are  closely  linked  to  the  social  security  earnings  ceiling  which  is 
established  every year by the general social  security pension  scheme for employees  (regime 
general,  CNAVTS). Non-cadres members of ARRCO pay contributions related to earnings up to 
three times the social security ceiling.  Members of AGIRC pay contributions related to earnings 
up  to  eight times  the  said  ceiling;  provided  their  contributions  on  earnings  up  to  the  social 
security ceiling  are paid  into ARRCO (not AGIRC). 
The relevant figures for the first quarter of 1993 were: 
Social security ceiling  Fr.  12,360 per month 
Social security ceiling  x 3  Fr.  37,080 per month 
Social security ceiling x 8  Fr.  98,880 per month 
Each  of the two federation  operates  a full  pooling  of risks  among their own  affiliated 
funds;  costs are shared independently of the demographic or economic condition of a member 
enterprise or an  affiliated fund. 
Contribution rates vary both within AGIRC and ARRCO. All members have to respect the 
minimum  standard  contribution  rate  on  covered  earnings:  4%  in  ARRCO and  12% in  AGIRC. 
Above  the  minimum,  each  member  may  choose  a  higher  rate,  either  through  a  collective 
agreement or by a joint employer/employee decision. 
Restrictions  on  the freedom  of paying  higher optional  contribution  rates have recently 
been  imposed by ARRCO (the maximum allowed  being 6% instead  of 8%), moreover a single 
rate of 6% is to  be  introduced  in  1999. AGIRC affiliates  still  have a choice between  12% (the 
minimum),  14% or 16%. 
The benefit model (AGIRC and ARRCO) 
In  ARRCO and  AGIRC the  originality  of the  financing  technique  and  of the  benefit 
scheme taken together is that they constitute a pooled 'contribution defined' set of plans which 
aims at paying inflation proof benefits at and after retirement. This aim is achieved by introducing 
a 'notional unit' for contributions and for benefits, called the 'point', hence the term 'point system' 
often used in this context. 
A worker acquires  every year a given  number of points  proportional to the  amount of 
contributions  actually  paid.  Points  accumulate  from  year to1year  in  the  worker's  individual 
account, irrespective of  the enterprise where he or she works (within all the enterprises belonging 
to the funds of each federation). At retirement the total number of points acquired is transformed 
into a pension, proportional to the number and to the current value of a point. 
The value of the point is calculated each year by the governing body of each federation. 
It determines the value of newly awarded pensions and that of all  pensions in  payment, whose 
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amount is  re-calculated  each  year.  Up to the end  of 1970, the progression  of the yearly value 
of the point has  outpaced the  level  of the  consumer price  index.  In  recent years the  pace of 
progression follows more or less price inflation. 
Because the system is contribution-defined,  it is understandable that employees wish to 
belong to a higher contribution plan. In fact, it is the employer who, in any case, pays the largest 
share of the joint contribution. 
The normal pensionable age was originally 65 but because from 1983 the state scheme 
paid  full  pensions  from the  age  of 60  to  employees  in  the  general  scheme  with  37.5  years' 
contribution, the AGIRC and ARRCO funds had to be adjusted. Pensions are now awarded from 
the age of 60 to employees with  37.5  years' contribution,  without the actuarial reduction which 
normally applied  for pensions claimed  before age  65.  The ensuing financial  imbalance for the 
two federations  has  been  offset  by  a joint financial  effort by  the  government,  employers  and 
employees (called  Association pour Ia gestion de Ia  structure financiere,  ASF). 
A distinctive feature is  that AGIRC and ARRCO also  credit pension  points to workers 
during  spells  of  unemployment  or  absence  due  to  sickness,  maternity  or  injury.  For the 
unemployed,  the  unemployment  insurance  agency  (UNEDIC)  pays  the  contributions  to  the 
federations. 
It  is  worth  recalling  that when  the  repartition  schemes  were  launched,  past  service 
liabilities  were taken on  by the respective funds without a counterpart in terms of past service 
contributions. Substantial pensions could  be paid from the start to late entrants. This was not a 
negligible social achievement, but it did obviously have a cost. Accordingly, French schemes are 
close  to  maturity  as  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  average  number  of pension  points 
awarded per claim varies little over time: 
AG/RC: average number of points 
per new pension award 
1954  29,670 
1964  26,437 
1974  26,600 
1984  29,200 
1990  30,600 
On the other hand the number of pensions in  payment shows a steady increase. In the 
case of AGIRC, the figures are as follows: 
AG/RC: number of pensions in 
payment 
Year  Old-age  Survivors 
1980  344,010  212,391 
1989  712,857  328,283 
Similar trends are observed in ARRCO. 
The French repartition  system allocates the contribution income received  in the year to 
cover the cost of pensions in  payment in the same year and  it aims  at the full  maintenance of 
the pensions' purchasing power. 
As expenditure rises systematically from one year to another (see above), the system 
can  keep its  promises without excessive increases in  contributions,  provided that the growth of 
membership matches the increasing costs and provided that the members' average insured wage 
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achieve than the former because of slow economic growth and high rates of unemployment. The 
ageing of  the population is also likely to negatively affect the financial equilibrium of  the schemes 
described.  Membership  and  pensions  at  the  beginning  of 1990  in  the  two  federations  were 
reported as follows: 
Number of members  Number of 
pensioners (all 
1990  categories) 
ARRCO  16,675,000  7,289,000 
AGIRC  2,634,000  1,041,000 
Other compulsory schemes 
Independently of the federations ARRCO and AGIRC, certain groups of employees are 
affiliated to compulsory supplementary pension  schemes. The largest of these  is  the scheme 
covering  public  sector  employees  without  civil  servant  status  (IRCANTEC)  with  1,850,000 
members and  1,047,000 pensioners.  It was established  by legislation  rather than as a result of 
collective  bargaining.  Many members do  not spend  years  in  the scheme  as  they move  up to 
established jobs in the public sector or away to other occupations. Pension rights accrued are, 
on  average, consequently much lower than in  other supplementary schemes. 
The fund  for employees  of social  security  institutions  (CPPOSS) was  initiated  under 
collective agreements. The number of employees was 187,000 in  1990 and pensioners totalled 
75,000. Unlike IRCANTEC which operates a benefit point system, CPPOSS's benefits are linked 
to final  salary  and  are  integrated  with  state  social  security.  From  1 January  1994,  CPPOSS 
joined the Federations AGIRC and ARRCO in  order to strengthen its financial  position. 
Mention should also be made of some smaller funds which are either totally or partially 
independent from AGIRC and ARRCO. They cover civil  aviation,  banks and  credit institutions, 
services in  agriculture. Joint employer/employee management is a common characteristic of all 
lhe supplementary schemes described. 
A different situation has developed with regard to the self-employed. Those in handicraft 
joined a supplementary pension fund  (CANCAVA) in  1979. Past service liabilities  were not fully 
validated  and the scheme's pension costs are rising  more gradually than in  the corresponding 
arrangements for salaried employees. Moreover, CANCAVA has been accumulating substantial 
reserve funds (16.8 billion  francs at the end of 1991). 
The self-employed in trade and industry only have supplementary provision for survivors. 
Other benefits, such as  retirement pensions, are optional and generally modest. 
Liberal professionals had to organise substantial supplementary provision  because the 
first tier only granted them minimum coverage. Within this group, lawyers and barristers decided 
in 1954 to make their own separate arrangements. Data on membership was as follows in 1990: 
France: the self-employed 
Self-employed  in trade and  652,000 
industry 
Handicraft  542,000 
Liberal professions  390,000 
Lawyers, barristers  19,000 
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GREECE 
According  to  a  pattern  which  also  prevails  within  the  first  tier  of social  security, 
compulsory  supplementary  pension  schemes  have  been  established  in  Greece  according  to 
occupational criteria.  Overall membership is of the order of 3,360,000 persons. 
The general scheme is IKA/TEAM, founded in 1980. It has gradually absorbed a number 
of occupational funds which could not guarantee the minimum benefits provided by the general 
scheme. At the end of 1991  IKAITEAM covered about 895,000 employees in industry, commerce 
and services.  It had an annual income of 74,853 million  Drachmas (ECU 280.3 million)  and an 
expenditure of 44,000 million  Drachmas (ECU  164.0 million). 
TEAM is a non-profit organisation attached to the main Greek social security institution, 
/KA,  but enjoying separate legal status. It is financed by a contribution of 6% of payroll up to the 
IKA social security ceiling, shared equally between the employer and the employee. It has been 
estimated  that an  employee whose  earnings  are  below  the  IKA ceiling  would,  at retirement, 
obtain a supplementary TEAM pension of approximately 20% of  final earnings (when the scheme 
is fully matured). 
The  second  largest  complementary  pension  fund  is  OGA  which  had  in  1991  a 
membership  of 1,170,000  agricultural  workers  and  farmers.  Income  was  Dr.  35,650  million 
(ECU 33.5 million) and expenditure Dr. 23,000 million (ECU 86.1  million). Apart from IKAITEAM, 
OGA and  IKAIETEAM, there were 57  occupational  'auxiliary'  funds  (of which 44 autonomous 
funds) which reached a broad section of the economically active population. 
As a general rule, the auxiliary funds are financed by employer/employee contributions 
or,  as regards the liberal  professions and the self-employed,  by the members themselves. The 
method  of financing  is  pay-as-you-go.  State  subsidies  (including  resources  obtained  from 
earmarked taxes) have been granted to some funds  in  order to cover any shortfall  of income. 
Since  1992,  however,  such  subsidies  have  been  frozen  at  1992  levels  and  they  are  now 
channelled  through  a new 'solidarity  fund'  (L.A.F.K.A.) whose  aim  is  financial  support to the 
weaker auxiliary funds. 
The network of provident funds is a separate component of compulsory coverage. They 
number  95,  of which  50  cater  for the  legal  profession.  They  pay,  on  retirement  from  the 
occupation,  a lump-sum  benefit  only.  Provident  funds  reach  about  17%  of the  labour force, 
including  liberal  professions,  bank employees,  public enterprise employees and  civil  servants, 
i.e. occupational groups which are simultaneously affiliated for pension entitlements to the above-
mentioned auxiliary funds. 
The large, as well as the small, compulsory auxiliary funds are supervised by the Ministry 
of Health and Social Security. Exceptions are the complementary scheme for seamen (Ministry 
of  the Merchant Navy) and a few funds for some civil and military personnel (Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Defense). 
NETHERLANDS 
Private sector 
On  the  basis  of an  act  adopted  in  1949,  relating  to  compulsory  participation  in 
supplementary industry pension funds,  the Minister of Social Affairs  and  Employment has the 
power,  at the request of a delegation  from the branch of industry, to make participation  in  an 
existing industry pension fund compulsory for all staff employed  in that branch of industry. 
The employee is not free to opt out from a compulsory industry pension fund. Exemption 
of employers from participation  in  a compulsory industry pension fund,  however,  is possible  in 
two ways. First, the industry pension fund itself has the power to exempt an employer if  the latter 
has  set  up  an  alternative  staff pension  scheme  providing  at  least  equivalent  entitlements. 
Secondly, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the power to grant exemptions from 
compulsory  participation  in  special  individual  cases.  The  Minister  exercises  this  power,  for 
example in  respect of foreign workers on temporary secondment in the Netherlands. 
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of a self-employed  person  in  the  pension  fund  which  has  been  established  for his  particular 
professional category. Most of the industry-wide pension funds have become compulsory. 
Industry-wide pension fu 
Year:  1985  1991 
Total number of 
industry-wide funds  77  81 
-of  which 
compulsory  63  65 
Total number of 
members  1,499,077  2,203,977 
In the Netherlands, the following  arguments have been advanced in support of making 
industry pension funds compulsory: 
- the principle of solidarity can be applied and risks are pooled. Contribution rates do not 
depend on the employee's age or health status; 
- labour mobility  is  enhanced within  the industry.  A change of employer does not result 
in the need to change pension fund  membership; 
- employees' membership of supplementary pension funds is  extended considerably; 
- competition  among  employers  is  restrained,  as  far  as  employment  and  pension 
conditions are concerned. 
On the other hand, the policy of  compulsory membership in industry-wide funds has been 
criticized  in the Netherlands on the following  grounds: 
- it may lead to the creation  of undesirable monopolies; 
- it  restricts  the  freedom  of employers  about  plan  design  or  the  choice  of a  plan 
administrators; 
- it may run  contrary to the policy  of integrating  pension  and  compensation  practice for 
firms with several subsidiaries  in  different branches of economic activity; 
- it  may  restrict  the  freedom  of individual  employees  to  choose  how  best  to  make 
contributions or to save for retirement provision. 
Public sector 
There is special statutory supplementary pension legislation for employees in the public 
sector: the 'General Civil Pensions Act' (ABP),  in  which are laid down the entitlements for civil 
servants, and the 'Railway Pensions Act', which applies to railway personnel. As of  January 1994 
the railway pension fund is privatised and has since then been set up as an industry-wide fund. 
Membership of the ABP fund is  compulsory (employees do not have the individual  right to opt 
out). The benefit target for the maximum period of participation  (40 years' service) is a pension 
which,  including  social  security,  amounts  to  70%  of the  last  gross  wage  received.  Pension 
liabilities  of the ABP fund are fully funded. The board of management of the fund consists of an 
equal number of  staff and management representatives, plus a chairman. The total assets under 
44  Occupational pensions in the European Union management  by  the  civil  service  pension  fund  (ABP),  which  covers  about  1 million  public 
servants, was estimated as follows: 
Assets of the ASP pension fund in million Dfl. 
1985  126,600 
1988  149,800 
1992  177,044 
This  makes ABP one  of the  largest pension  funds  in  Europe.  The  1992 asset figures 
were equivalent to  about 82  billion  ECU.  A recent estimate  of the assets  held  by the railway 
employees' fund shows a figure of about 10 billion  Dfl (4.7 billion  ECU). 
UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom all employed and self-employed workers earning more than a low 
threshold income pay contributions to the national social security scheme to earn entitlement to 
a basic pension. The amount ofthe basic pension depends on the individual's contribution record 
and not on the level of their earnings. 
Since 1978, a second tier of provision has been available to all  employees through the 
social security earnings-related  additional  pension  (SERPS). The scheme is  compulsory but it 
is  possible  to  contract  out  of this  part  of social  security  through  membership  in  a  suitable 
occupational pension scheme or by means of an appropriate personal pension plan. 
Earnings-related  pensions  (SERPS) are payable  from  state pension age to those who 
have contributed  as  employed  persons.  Earnings-related widows'  pensions are  also  available. 
The main benefit is an additional pension which was planned to build  up over the first 20 years 
of the  scheme  to  25%  of average  earnings  in  the  range  between  the  lower  and  the  upper 
earnings limits, revalued to the level appropriate at the time of  retirement. This additional pension 
does not accrue in  respect of periods of self-employment. 
The lower earnings  limit corresponds fairly closely to the amount of the basic pension 
(about  18%  of national  average  earnings).  The  upper earnings  limit  is  7.5  times  the  lower 
earnings limit,  currently 135% of national  average earnings.  Following  the 1988 changes, the 
proportion of revalued  earnings which will  be  paid  as  benefits to those who retire will  fall  after 
1988,  until  a  long-term  figure  of 20%  of average  revalued  career  earnings  is  achieved. 
Revaluation  of relevant career earnings is  in  line with the general movement of earnings over 
the period. The upper and lower earnings limits are revalued in line with the basic state pension, 
i.e.  usually in  line with the retail  price index. 
Employers are permitted to contract out,  from the additional  earnings-related pension, 
employees who are members of an adequate defined benefit occupational pension scheme. The 
scheme  must  undertake  to  provide  members  and  their  surviving  spouses  with  guaranteed 
minimum pensions, which are broadly equivalent, although not identical, to the earnings-related 
additional pension to which they would have been entitled  if they had not been contracted-out. 
Those  who  are  contracted-out  are  entitled  to  a  rebate  in  their  National  Insurance 
contributions in  respect of earnings between the lower and the upper earnings limit.  The effect 
of this form of contracting-out is to substitute earnings-related benefits provided by occupational 
pension  schemes,  on  a  fully  funded  basis,  for  the  earnings-related  benefits  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  payable  through the  social  security scheme  on  a pay-as-you-go  basis. 
Almost  half the  work  force  is  contracted-out  through  membership  of  such  defined  benefit 
occupational pension schemes. 
In 1987 the possibility of  contracting-out was extended to those with appropriate personal 
pension  arrangements.  The  minimum  contribution,  which  was  initially  set at the  level  of the 
contribution  rebate  for contracted-out defined  benefit  occupational  pension  schemes,  is  paid 
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certain restrictions on the form in which the benefit may be paid. 
For an  initial  period,  up to March 1993,  a further incentive payment of 2%  of earnings 
in the relevant band was payable in respect of newly contracted-out arrangements, including all 
personal pensions. This incentive payment is no longer payable, but an incentive payment of 1% 
of earnings in the relevant band became payable from April 1993 in respect of all those over the 
age of 30 who have an  appropriate personal pension. 
'  Since the minimum contribution  is the same for all,  regardless of age and sex,  but the 
cost  of providing  a  given  level  of benefit  increases  with  age,  contracting-out  by  means  of 
'personal pension is  particularly attractive to younger employed persons. About a quarter of the 
employed workforce, nearly 5 million  people,  is  now contracted-out on the basis of appropriate 
personal pensions. 
Contracting  out  is  now  also  possible  for  employers  with  money  purchase  (defined 
contribution)  schemes (Contracted-Out  Money Purchase  schemes,  COMPs). Their obligation 
extends only to paying the minimum contribution  into the scheme and no guaranteed minimum 
pensions have to be provided. Additional contributions may be made by the employer and by the 
employees. About 300,000 employees are  now thought to be members of COMPs. 
An  individual  who  has  been  contracted-out  may  still  receive  an  earnings-related 
additional  pension  from  the  state  social  security  scheme.  The  amounts  of any  guaranteed 
minimum pensions payable from occupational pension schemes are simply deducted from the 
total entitlement to additional pension which there would have been if the individual had not been 
contracted-out, and the balance is payable from the social security scheme. 
SERPS is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, with the contribution rates for employees, 
employers and the self-employed set for each  year so as to cover the expected outgoings on 
benefit expenditure and administration  costs, taking  into account any proposed Treasury grant 
from general tax revenue. Earnings-related pensions will become more and more significant, and 
in  future  years  most of these will  be  paid  as  occupational  and  personal  pensions  under the 
contracting-out arrangements. The residual  amount of earnings-related  pensions  paid  through 
the social security scheme is  projected to grow until it constitutes almost one-third of the total 
cost of social security pensions by 2030-31. 
* 
*  *  * 
One of the  main  policy objectives of a compulsory system of supplementary pensions 
is  to guarantee  access to  a second  pension  to  a very wide  group  of citizens.  The  following 
figures seem to support the view that the objective has been broadly attained. In the Netherlands 
a very  extended  voluntary  pension  system  compensates  for the  low  percentage  covered  by 
schemes which have been made compulsory (see Chapter 5). Moreover, if the compulsory ABP 
scheme was included, the coverage percentage shown in Table 12 would rise to around 50 per 
cent. 
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Estimated number of persons covered by compulsory supplementary 
pension schemes (absolute and relative figures) 
Year  No.  of persons  Labour force  (1)/(2) 
covered  (2)  (%) 
Country:  (1) 
Denmark  1990  2,600,000  2,898,000  89.7 
France  1990  17,988,000  24,133,000  74.5 
Greece  1991  3,360,186  3,935,000  85.3 
Netherlands  1990  2,203,977  6,801,000  32.4 
United Kingdom  1990/91  22,700,000  28,658,000  79.2 
Remarks: 
Column (1): 
Denmark:  Number of contributors to A TP 
France:  Membership of ARCCO, AGIRC and other schemes 
Greece:  Compulsory schemes supervised by the Ministry of Health 
and Social Security 
Netherlands:  Membership of industry-wide pension funds 
United Kingdom:  Membership of SERPS 
Column (2):  Source: EUROST  AT Labour Force Survey 
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SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS: 
THE VOLUNTARY OPTION 
Introduction and scope 
For over a century private  and  public  employers  have  used  their discretion  to create 
arrangements with the object of providing their employees with pensions or lump-sum payments 
on  retirement,  disability  or  death.  For  example,  large  industrial  undertakings  in  Germany 
introduced retirement benefits for their personnel well before 1891, when the first state pension 
insurance  scheme  was  created.  In  Denmark similar  initiatives  were  taken  at  the  turn  of the 
century,  although  their development  gathered  pace  only  after  1919.  A  similar  situation  was 
observed  in  the United  Kingdom.  With the introduction  and  extension  of social  insurance  and 
social security, voluntary provision of  retirement benefits by enterprises concentrated on ensuring 
supplementary rather than basic coverage. 
The  rationale  for this  shift  in  emphasis  and  in  aims  has  already  been  discussed  in 
Chapter 1.  In the present chapter, the intention  is to describe and to  analyse how,  in  practice, 
voluntary pension  provision  is shaped, organised and  hilplemented in  Member States.  In order 
to deal  in  an  orderly manner with  such  a vast field  of contemporary practice,  the  substantive 
issues will  be covered under the following  headings: 
- establishment  of voluntary  pension  commitments,  the  actors  and  the  institutions 
involved; 
- coverage, in terms of membership and persons protected by voluntary arrangements; 
- contributions  and  benefits  contemplated  in  prevailing  national  practice,  including 
conditions  for  eligibility  and  maintenance  of  rights  in  cases  of withdrawal  from 
membership; 
- tax treatment; 
- protection of members' rights. 
Establishment procedures and institutions involved 
The whole process leading to the voluntary establishment of  supplementary pensions can 
be  broken  down  into  four distinct  parts.  The  first  is  related  to  the  actors  who  participate  in 
sponsoring the pension arrangement - the employers, trade unions, and  representatives of the 
categories or professions concerned. The role that each plays in  exercising their discretion is a 
matter which Member States have viewed from different angles. 
The second aspect deals with the degree of freedom enjoyed by the sponsoring parties 
in  the context of setting  up a pension  arrangement.  In  every  country  a regulatory framework 
imposes constraints that, as a rule, are readily accepted by employers and employees since they 
bring fiscal rewards. 
The third aspect arises because ultimately pension promises or pension commitments 
voluntarily  undertaken  necessitate  the  establishment  of an  appropriate  institution  to  assume 
responsibility for their management. More than one type of institution  (including the sponsoring 
employer)  may  be  compatible  with  the  requirements  laid  down  by  the  national  regulatory 
framework. 
Fourthly,  institutions  are  in  the  hands  of  responsible  individuals,  representing  the 
interests of the partners in the pension commitments (employers, members, beneficiaries). The 
relative  weight  of the  representation  granted  to  each  group  is  a  matter  of great  practical 
importance, and upon which there are diverging views among Member States. 
48  Occupational pensions in the European Union Taken  together,  these  four  aspects  constitute  the  'institutional  profile'  of voluntary 
supplementary pensions. This profile has considerable national specificity, although paradoxically 
a common feature of the profile  is  that it will  normally differ from  one  undertaking,  profession 
and,  generally speaking,  professional and social status to another. 
National institutional profiles and the traditions they preserve represent a peculiar reality 
that European and national legislators should thoroughly understand and respect when dealing 
with schemes and arrangements that are, within limits,  voluntary.  It is the freedom of choice at 
this  level  which  is  fundamental to the  concepts,  motivations  and  attitudes  underlying  private 
provision. 
A short and factual description, as far as the information was available, of each country 
profile is given in the following  section. 
BELGIUM 
Individual  employers,  in  particular  large  enterprises,  take  the  initiative  to  sponsor 
supplementary benefits (paid  either as pensions or as  lump sums). Less frequently,  retirement 
benefit arrangements are the result of collective agreements covering all employers in a specific 
sector.  In firms  employing  more than 20 workers,  representatives  of the personnel  have to be 
consulted by employers designing a voluntary retirement scheme. 
The applicable regulatory framework is essentially laid  down in: 
- legislation  on  private pension funds (Act of 9 July 1975, Royal Decree of 14/15 May 
1985) and subsequent enactments; 
- legislation  regulating the functioning  of insurance companies; 
- applicable  provisions of commercial or civil  law. 
Employers are free to choose the institution implementing the pension commitment. The 
most common choice is between an autonomous pension fund and an  insurance contract.  A 
pension  fund  may  consist  of a private  and  independent  legal  entity:  a non-profit  association 
(Association  sans but /ucratif,  ASBL), or a non-profit mutual insurance company. 
The statutes of an  ASBL are drawn up by a general meeting  of the association which 
consists of employers' representatives. The presence of employees is not required. The general 
meeting appoints a board of directors which must always include at least one representative of 
the employees, except when the fund  is  contributory,  in  which case employers and  employees 
must have equal representation. 
Employers  choosing  the  'insurance  solution'  take  out  group  insurance  providing 
retirement benefits. The life insurance companies involved  are not allowed to carry out non-life 
activities.  Such  companies  are  administered  by  a  board  of directors  (not  less  than  three) 
appointed  by  the  shareholders'  meeting.  Their renewable  term  of office  may  not  exceed  six 
years. The group insurance contract has a separate legal status with the insurance company. 
A  third  option  available  to  employers  is  to  entrust  an  insurance  company  with  the 
management of the employer pension plan, through a so-called 'deposit administration contract', 
which does not have a separate legal status within the company. 
Mention should also be made of individual pension plans, which were formerly entrusted 
to the Office National des Pensions or to the Caisse Generate d'Epargne et Retraite, and which 
are now managed by a number of private institutions,  mainly large insurance companies. 
All the institutions  described  above  must,  according  to  law,  be  legally  and  financially 
separated from the sponsoring enterprise. 
DENMARK 
Employers,  employees  and  the self-employed  have  taken  the  initiative  to  organise  a 
voluntary second-tier of pension protection. 
The first two of  the above groups have achieved this jointly through collective bargaining 
and wage negotiations.  Only in  a few cases has the initiative  for establishing  a supplementary 
pension scheme come from the employer alone. 
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or to life  assurance companies.  In  several  cases  life  assurance companies  have  been  set up 
specifically with the purpose of  administering pension schemes. In other cases pension schemes, 
mostly company schemes, are administered  by ordinary life  assurance companies. 
There are two forms of pension  funds:  those which  cover employees  either belonging 
to the same branch of economic activity or having a common occupation (industry-wide pension 
funds),  and  those  which  cover  the  employees  of a  single  firm  (company  pension  funds). 
Company pension funds play only a limited role compared with the industry-wide pension funds 
and have been in decline. This is because wage earners have recognised the obstacles to labour 
mobility which may arise from membership of company funds. 
The regulatory framework includes: 
- fiscal legislation  ('Pension Taxation Act'); 
- bank and  insurance legislation  (i.e.  the 'Act on  Insurance Businesses'  regulates the 
functioning  of industry-wide pension funds); 
- pension fund legislation  (i.e. the 'Act on the Supervision of Pension Funds' regulates 
the functioning  of company pension funds). 
According  to  the  provisions  laid  down  in  pension  legislation,  pension  funds  are 
established  as  separate  legal  entities,  independent  from  the  sponsoring  employer.  The 
management board of industry-wide pension funds is elected directly by members, or is chosen 
by the relevant trade union. 
Insurance  companies  involved  in  supplementary  pension  provision  are  joint-stock 
companies.  Management  decisions  are  taken  by  a  board  whose  majority  is  elected  by  the 
shareholders. 
GERMANY 
Pension schemes may be established by individual or group contracts between employer 
and  employees,  or  by  agreements  between  the  employer  and  the  workers'  council 
(Betriebsvereinbarung),  or indeed  by collective  agreement between employers or associations 
of employers  and  trade  unions  (Tarifvertrtige).  In  practice,  pension  agreements  negotiated 
between employers and employees cover employees who, due to their grade and degree of skill, 
are in  a position to negotiate over their employment conditions. 
Collective  agreements  (Tarifvertrtige)  with  the  trade  unions  are  only  found  in  public 
service,  in the construction industry,  in  part of the food  industry and for journalists. In some of 
the  above-mentioned  industries  and  sectors,  enterprises  tend  to  be  small  and  consequently 
employers are not likely to set up a pension  arrangement unilaterally.  They therefore deal with 
the relevant trade union. The sectoral (multi-employer) approach can  be an effective vehicle in 
sectors with high labour mobility,  such as the construction industry. 
Pension arrangements provided for by collective  agreement are binding  on  employers 
and  union members belonging to a specific branch of activity.  However, not all  employees in  a 
given branch may be members of the relevant trade union.  In this case the pension agreement 
will  not apply  in  practice to  all the workforce  in  that branch  of activity,  unless the contracting 
parties request a special declaration of general applicability from the Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Order. This differs from the situation in public service, where provisions of collective 
pension agreements also apply to non-union members. 
Collective  agreements with  works councils  are,  as a rule,  made in  order to restructure 
existing  schemes (or to establish  new schemes in  the case of German subsidiaries  of foreign 
companies).  Works  councils  enjoy  co-determination  rights  which  include  some  aspects  of 
pensions  administration  as  well  as  regarding  benefits.  Trade  unions  do  not  have  similar 
advantages.  The  employer's  discretion,  however,  remains  unchallenged  when  it  comes  to 
deciding  on  the  amount  of his  contributions  to  the  pension  arrangement  or  on  the  financial 
vehicle chosen to implement it. 
Four main  solutions  are  available.  The  first  is  for the employer to handle the pension 
promise himself without establishing a separate institution and without actually segregating funds. 
This option, called 'direct commitment' (Direktzusage) implies the constitution of a 'book reserve' 
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body (Pensionssicherungsverein,  PSV). The majority of German enterprises have made such 
'direct commitments'. 
The second  option  is  to  establish  a separate  pension  fund,  as  an  independent  legal 
institution, organised and managed as a mutual, non-profit insurance institution (Pensionskasse). 
Large enterprises are in  a position to choose this option. 
The third is to establish  an  independent body having separate legal status in  the form 
of a 'support fund' (Unterstatzungskasse).  This is not organised as a mutual insurance company 
since it leaves some discretion to the employer as to the manner of providing  benefits. 
The fourth  option  is  for the employer to insure the benefits directly through a contract 
with an  established  life-insurance company (Direktversicherung).  Disability  and death benefits 
are very often insured directly. Conventional group-life or individual life policies are found among 
this option. 
The  regulatory framework for the above is  mainly to be  found  in  the 1975 'Act on  the 
Improvement  of  Occupational  Pensions'  (Gesetz  zur  Verbesserung  der  betrieblichen 
Altersversorgung).  This act does not include all legal provisions regulating pensions, but it does 
lay down a number of principles and the substance of previous labour court rulings,  which have 
occasionally prescribed less stringent conditions  on  employees (for instance on  vesting). 
In addition, binding provisions for supplementary pensions are found in labour legislation, 
fiscal legislation or company law. Labour legislation is particularly important because it regulates 
the  contract  of employment which  determines  the  employers'  liability  to  honour the  pension 
promise. 
The representation  of different parties  in  the management of supplementary pensions 
depends on the option selected by the employer: 
Book reserves: Since the relevant institution is the company, all management decisions 
concerning  pensions  are  made  by  the  company's  managers,  who  normally  employ  external 
actuarial  or  benefit  consultants.  Employees'  representatives  may  be  consulted,  although  in 
certain cases they must be consulted, where provisions of the 'Works Council Constitution Act' 
so  prescribe. 
Pension funds: Decisions are taken by the board of management of the fund. There are 
legal  requirements  as  to the board's  composition.  If the  fund  is  a mutual  society,  its  general 
meeting  appoints  the board  members.  If the fund  is  a limited  company,  the members  of the 
pension board  are chosen by the company's general assembly,  or in  accordance with specific 
rules laid down in the fund's statutes. In any event, the board must include at least two persons. 
They are appointed by the employer unless, as is most common, the statutes provide for equal 
representation (employer/employee). Workers' councils appoint board members who represent 
employees. 
Support funds:  A board of management is  appointed  according to  company law.  The 
difference between the rules here and those for pension funds is that in support funds the board 
always consists of employer and employee representatives. 
Insured  contracts:  The  composition  of insurance  company  boards  is  laid  down  by 
legislation, which does not provide for the policy holder's (i.e.  employer) representation, unless 
it is  a mutual insurance society. 
IRELAND 
Pension schemes are usually established by individual employers for all their employees, 
or for certain  categories  of their employees.  In  many  cases,  they  are  established  following 
negotiations  with  trade  unions  or  other  representatives  of employees.  These  negotiations 
normally determine the eligibility conditions for membership, benefit levels, whether members are 
required  to  make contributions  and the rate  of contributions.  It  is  then left to the employer to 
make arrangements for the establishment of a scheme on  a formal basis. 
A single pension scheme may be established in  respect of the employees in  a group of 
related companies. There are also a small number of industry-wide schemes, most notably for 
employees in the construction industry. 
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established under legislation  enacted by Parliament, with the detailed rules of the scheme being 
set down in  regulations.  Schemes in the commercial public sector are established  in  the same 
way  as  schemes  in  the  private  sector  (see  below).  The  Minister  for  Finance  has  overall 
responsibility for approving public sector schemes, with a view to standardising the rules and the 
range  of benefits  provided.  When a scheme  is  established  in  either the  private  or the  public 
sector, membership can  be made a condition  of employment and this is  normally the case. 
Schemes in the private sector and the commercial public sector, with few exceptions, are 
financed  on  a  pre-funded  basis.  They  are  mainly  set  up  as  irrevocable  trusts,  as  this  is  a 
requirement to qualify for the tax privileges  for which these schemes are eligible. 
A trust is an arrangement under which a person or group of persons hold  and look after 
property  on  behalf  of others.  The  persons  who  hold  and  look  after the  property  are  called 
trustees, the property is called a trust fund, and the people on whose behalf the trust fund is held 
are called  beneficiaries. 
In the case of an  occupational pension scheme set up as a trust, the trustees hold and 
look after the assets for the  benefit of members  and their dependants. The terms of the trust 
under which a pension scheme is  set up are set out in  a legal document called  the trust deed 
and  rules.  Trust funds  are  fully  separate from the  funds  of the employer who  sets  up  and  is 
associated with the scheme. 
Trustees  are  normally  appointed  by  the  employers  sponsoring  the  scheme,  with  the 
procedures for appointment  and  replacement being  set out  in  the trust deed. The trusteeship 
arrangements can vary from scheme to scheme, but there are three main types of arrangement. 
(a)  Individual trusteeship,  where  all  the trustees are  drawn  from  management and/or 
outside  professionals  (such  as  lawyers,  accountants,  or bank  managers)  and  in 
some schemes from the representatives of employees. 
(b)  Corporate trusteeship:  (i) where the employer, as a corporate body, acts as trustee 
(this  is fairly common in  small insured schemes); (ii)  where a corporate body other 
than  the  employer  acts  as  trustee  (e.g.  a  specialist  firm  providing  trusteeship 
services,  or the trustee department of a commercial bank - this is very common in 
Ireland);  (iii)  where  a  separate  trustee  company  is  set  up  in  lieu  of individual 
trustees. 
(c)  A combination  of individual  and  corporate trustees acting together, with  individual 
trustees who may or may not include employee representatives. 
At present only a minority  of schemes  have  representatives  of members  as  trustees. 
However, from  1 January 1994 most members of funded  schemes will  have a right  under the 
Pensions Act to  participate  in  the selection  of trustees.  It  is  envisaged that arrangements for 
member  participation  will  normally  be  made  by  agreement  between  the  employer  and 
representatives of members. This will  cover such matters as the overall number of trustees and 
the arrangements for the nomination and  election  of a number of trustees by the members. At 
a minimum,  members will  have a right to select for appointment two trustees,  or half the total 
number  of ordinary  trustees,  whichever  is  the  greater,  with  the  remaining  trustees  being 
appointed by the employer. The trustees appointed will then agree either on one of their number, 
with a casting vote,  or on the appointment of a fifth trustee to act as chairperson.  If there is  no 
agreement, the chairperson is to  be nominated by the employer. 
These arrangements apply to schemes which have 50 or more members, or 12 or more 
members,  if a directly  invested  scheme.  For this  purpose,  a directly  invested  scheme  is  one 
which holds any segregated assets (other than cash), as opposed to only participating  in  a unit 
trust or trusts,  or in  a unit-linked  fund  or funds  managed  by  an  institution,  or investing  in  an 
insurance  policy.  It  is  estimated  that  over  200,000  scheme  members  (including  pensioner 
members) will  have a right to participate in  the selection of trustees from 1 January 1994. 
Schemes in the non-commercial public sector which  operate on  a pay-as-you-go basis 
are not established  as trusts. They are  administered  directly by the public sector organisation 
where the scheme members are or have been employed or by the government department which 
has overall  responsibility  for the  organisation  concerned.  They  are  administered  in  much the 
same way as the payment of  salaries and wages. No provision is made to enable representatives 
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participation  does not appear to be  an  issue with scheme members. This is  mainly due to the 
fact that scheme rules normally have a legislative basis and there is state guaranteed financing. 
The administration and operation of occupational pension schemes established as trusts 
are subject to a regulatory framework based on trust law and the Pensions Act 1990, in relation 
to the protection of pension rights,  and  on the Finance Act 1972, in  relation to the approval for 
tax purposes. The Pensions Act 1990 and the Finance Act 1972 also have a limited application 
to unfunded public sector schemes. This regulatory framework is described below in the sections 
on  Tax Treatment and on Protection of Pension  Rights. 
Trustees normally appoint other persons to administer the scheme on their behalf, while 
retaining  overall  responsibility  for the administration.  The administration  of larger schemes is 
usually  carried  out by staff within  the company.  However,  the trustees of such  schemes will 
usually appoint external managers to manage the scheme's investments, and they may appoint 
more than  one  manager.  Other services  which  can  be  purchased  from  pension  consultants 
and/or life assurance companies include: 
- actuarial services,  in the case of defined benefit schemes; 
- advice on  benefit levels and  investment performance; 
- insurance of death in-service benefits (a  common practice in  Ireland); 
- administration of scheme records and associated benefit calculations. 
These services may be purchased separately,  but many smaller schemes purchase a 
package ofservices from a life assurance company, covering a full  range of services. 
The  Pensions  Board  in  its  Annual  Report for 1992 gave  statistics  on  the  number of 
registration/fee contacts i.e. scheme administrators responsible for arranging scheme registration 
and payment of fees to the Pensions Board, in the case of schemes (including all public sector 
schemes) with more than one member. 
Registration/Fee Contacts  Number  Number of  Number of 
Schemes  Members 
Life Assurance 
Companies  16  5,228  55,183 
Brokers/Consultants  27  976  92,707 
Individual Schemes  283  283  265,858 
Total  326  6,487  413,748 
There  were  in  addition  24,259  one-member  schemes,  virtually  all  of  which  are 
administered by life assurance companies. 
It  can  be  concluded  that  in  Ireland  small  schemes  (less  than  50  members)  are 
administered mainly by life assurance companies. Consultants provide administration  services 
for medium sized schemes - 50 to 500  members on  average - while the larger schemes with 
more than 500 members are mainly administered by staff within the company. 
ITALY 
Establishment of a pension  fund (according to the legislation  of April 1993) 
Supplementary pension provision may be established: 
(a)  by collective agreements, at the level of the undertaking or in  a wider occupational 
context, as well as through agreements drawn up by employees themselves under 
sponsorship by national trade union  organisations; 
(b)  by agreements drawn up by organisations of self-employed persons, sponsored by 
suitable professional unions; 
(c)  at the initiative of employers,  in  the absence of the agreements mentioned above; 
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The supplementary pension commitment shall be effected by establishing a pension fund. 
The rules for membership in a pension fund shall be agreed by its sponsors. However, individual 
freedom of membership shall be guaranteed. 
The pension fund must have independent legal status, separate from that of its sponsors. 
Pension funds can take different juridical profiles, such as: (i)  non-profit associations;  (ii) private 
foundations  or welfare  institutions;  (iii)  welfare  funds  operated  by  incorporated  companies, 
provided that their management accounts and controls are fully segregated from the company. 
Fund establishment must be  authorised by the Ministry of Labour and  Social Security, 
subject to submission  and  approval  by the competent supervisory body of the fund's  statutes 
and,  in  particular,  of proof  of the  independence  of the  fund's  management  (vis-a-vis  the 
sponsoring employer) and of details regarding the competence and reliability  of the members of 
the governing body of the fund. A register of authorised pension funds is to be established. 
Employers and employees shall have equal representation in the governing body of the 
fund provided that both parties are under obligation to pay contributions.  Funds financed solely 
by employees do not require employers' representation. 
Public bodies administering state pension programmes (such as INPS) are empowered 
to establish open  pension funds. These are funds set up to offer protection to those individual 
employees or self-employed persons who either do not have the opportunity to join a company 
or a similar collective fund, or who have left one of them (opting out, termination, transfer). 
The right to establish an  open pension fund is also granted to life insurance companies 
and  banking  institutions,  including  equity  investment  funds  (Fondi  Comuni  di  lnvestimento 
Mobiliare)  authorised to operate in  Italy (on the basis of the 1983 legislation). 
Situation prior to the legislation  of April 1993 
Pension plans and funds had been established before April 1993 either on the basis of 
collective agreements, or unilaterally by employers. The main pattern was (i) book-reserves, (ii) 
pension funds or welfare funds (Cassa) with segregated assets and an autonomous legal status, 
and  (iiQ  group insurance contracts. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Voluntary provision is not widespread. Social security retirement benefits are satisfactory 
except for employees earning  above the social security ceiling  (these numbered 16,000 out of 
180,000 insured persons in  1991), almost all white-collar workers. 
The initiative to establish supplementary pensions rests solely with the employer.  The 
employer has a choice between: 
- direct pension  promises,  backed  by a 'book reserve' which  may be  totally  or partly 
externally insured; 
- discretionary pension promises, without reserve back-up. 
In  both cases no specific institution is created for implementing the commitment. 
Further choices,  involving  an  institutional framework, are: 
- establishing a pension fund as an autonomous separate legal entity.  In 1993 only one 
bank had followed this approach; 
- buying a group-life insurance contract with a company established in  Luxembourg. 
There is  no  specific  regulatory framework for voluntary  pension  provision,  except the 
rules dictated by the fiscal authority with regard to the (favourable) tax treatment granted to the 
different ways of implementing  pension promises. 
NETHERLANDS 
For employees in the private sector a supplementary pension scheme can be established 
on the basis of: 
- either a pension promise made by the employer; or 
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- compulsory participation  in  an  industry-wide  pension  fund  (called  hereafter industry 
funds). 
A pension  promise forms part of the conditions of employment as between employees 
and employers. There are different ways in which a pension promise may apply to the employee: 
it may be  included  in  an  individual's  contract of employment,  or it may made be separately in 
writing  (a  'pension document'). 
A pension  promise  is  often  part of a collective  labour agreement which  is  binding  on 
employers and employees. The employer thus has a statutory obligation  (under the 'Collective 
Labour Agreement Act') to honour that pension promise for all  employees. An employee is  not 
free to opt out,  unless the agreement permits exceptions.  Industry funds are  always based on 
collective bargaining in the branch of industry in question. Membership of an employer's pension 
scheme is automatic for new entrants, whether or not they receive a separate 'promise' from the 
employer. 
If no  collective  labour agreement applies,  the employer needs the prior consent of the 
works council  (where one  exists) to set up  a pension  fund.  A company with  35  employees or 
more is  obliged  to set up a works council.  Therefore, if the trade unions  are  not involved  in  a 
pension fund through an industry-wide pension fund or via the regulations in the collective labour 
agreement,  employees  have  a  voice  in  discussions  on  the  pension  scheme  through  their 
representatives on the works council. 
The  employer  who  chooses  to  establish  a  pension  fund  must  comply  with  certain 
requirements laid down in the Pension and Savings Fund Act (Pensioen-en-Spaarfondsenwet, 
PSIIII).  Employers  must ensure that the pension rights  of each  employee  are safeguarded,  by 
investing funds earmarked for pensions outside the company. 
This act gives the employer the following  options: 
- joining an existing pension fund (but where there is an industry fund with compulsory 
participation, the employer has of course no choice); 
- setting  up  a company  pension  fund.  A company pension  fund  may  operate for one 
company or a number of companies which are legally or economically linked; 
- entering into a pension insurance agreement with an insurance company. In this case 
the employer acts as the policy holder and the employee as the beneficiary; 
- allowing the employee to enter into an independent pension insurance agreement with 
an  insurance company.  In this case, the employee acts as  policy holder and is  also 
the beneficiary. 
Under the  PSW act  pension  funds  are  independent  legal  entities  separate  from  the 
sponsoring  employer,  holding their own  assets.  Pension funds generally have the legal status 
of a foundation,  or occasionally that of a limited  company or association.  Insurance companies 
(public or mutual) are legal entities separate from the sponsoring employer. 
Pension  funds  are managed  by  a board  of management with  equal  representation  of 
employers and employees. In industry funds the representatives of the employers' organisation 
must  have  at  least  as  many  seats  on  the  board  as  representatives  of the  employees' 
organisation. In company funds the representatives of the employees must have as many seats 
as  the  employers'  representatives.  With  company  pension  funds,  therefore,  employees  may 
represent a majority on the board. 
There is  no legal provision for the participation  of retired persons or of early leavers in 
the management of pension funds. The PSW  does, however, prohibit the statutory exclusion of 
former members. A participants' council is established at the request of either an association of 
members (industry funds) or of at least 5% of the workforce (company funds). Former members 
are  allowed  representation  in  the council,  whose  role  is  to  advise  management on  proposed 
amendments  to  the  statutes,  or on  the  rules  of the  fund,  and  on  other  important  matters 
(transfers, liquidation,  etc.). 
In  cases  of disagreement  the  council  has  the  power to  lodge  a  complaint  with  the 
insurance chamber against decisions on the management of the fund. 
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A significant growth of voluntary supplementary pension provision has taken place since 
1987 as a result of new fiscal incentives introduced by the government. 
A distinction  is  made between closed  pension  funds  and  open  pension  funds.  Closed 
pension funds are  established  at the initiative  of an  employer,  of a group of employers (in the 
same  branch  of activity)  or  of an  association  of members  of a  given  occupational  group. 
Occasionally  the  employer  and  the  trade  unions  come  to  a joint  agreement  concerning  the 
establishment  of supplementary  provision  (collective  bargaining).  Open  pension  funds  are 
established  at the  initiative  of authorised  fund  management  institutions  (see  below),  offering 
membership to individual  persons, independently of their occupation or branch of activity. 
The regulatory framework covering both types of voluntary funds is set out in: 
- Decree Law No.  225/1989 and  Decree Law No.  415/1991; 
- the new 'Code of Mutual Associations' (Mutua/idades)  approved by  Decree Law No. 
72/90. 
The pension  plan  is the contract which  defines the entitlements and the obligations  of 
the partners in the pension commitment. Since employers generally provide all the resources to 
cover the benefits, they have ample discretion to choose the profile of the pension plans, without 
a great deal of participation  by employees. 
Pension  fund  assets  (closed  or  open)  are  compulsorily  and  formally  entrusted,  by 
contract, to a  fund management institution which has legal status separate from the sponsoring 
enterprise  or  association.  Such  institutions  are  either  financial  companies  specifically  and 
exclusively  established  to  manage supplementary pension  funds  (a  minimum stock capital  is 
required),  or life insurance companies duly authorised to write business in the country. 
Mutual associations (Mutualidades), which have a long tradition in Portugal, offer, among 
other activities, retirement, disability and death benefits for individual members. However, some 
mutual associations also manage collective pension plans and funds entrusted to them by their 
sponsors. 
Pension legislation does not include provisions specifically dealing with the composition 
of,  and  representation  in,  the  governing  bodies  of fund  management  institutions.  A  special 
feature  is  that  open  funds,  managed  by  either  of the  institutions  mentioned  above,  issue 
certificates  of or shares in  the fund  which  may be  purchased  by employers  on  behalf of their 
workers (as well as  by individuals). 
Employers who wish to establish pension commitments other than under the provisions 
of the 1986 legislation are free to do so by making alternative arrangements (insurance policies, 
book-reserves) which,  however, do not attract privileged fiscal treatment. 
SPAIN 
The  oldest  institutions  are  mutual  benefit  institutions  (Mutualidades  and  Montepfos) 
referred to as  'Entidades  de  Previsi6n  Social'.  Traditionally,  they offered  pension  coverage to 
their members on the basis of legislation dating back to 1941  and  1946. The liabilities  were not 
systematically  covered  by  assets;  many  institutions  followed  the  pay-as-you-go  approach.  In 
1984 a reform of these institutions imposed rules on these institutions similar to those applicable 
to insurance companies (i.e.  compulsory funding).  In  1987, following the new Pension Act, the 
Entidades de Previsi6n Social were encouraged to take on the legal and technical profile of the 
new qualified pension funds (see below) and were given until 1997 to build up full actuarial cover 
of their liabilities.  Employers may also follow the route of a direct pension  promise, supported 
by book reserves entered  in  the company's  balance sheet according to prescribed accounting 
standards. 
A new framework was established according to the provisions of the 1987 Pensions Act. 
All pension plans established under the 1987 Pensions Act are called qualified plans and receive 
favourable tax treatment.  Employers  or groups  of .individuals  who  do  not wish  to  meet such 
requirements are entitled to sponsor and to operate unqualified plans, which are not granted tax 
advantages. 
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- Law  33/1984  regulating  private  insurance  and  dealing  in  particular  with  the  legal 
requirements applicable to the Entidades de  Previsi6n  Social. 
- Law 8/1987 (referred to here as the Pensions Act) regulating plans and pension funds, 
and  its subsequent enactments (regulations,  orders). 
- Company law (Ley de  Sociedades An6nimas). 
Voluntary provision  under Law 811987 
A  qualified  supplementary  pension  plan  can  be  established  by  (i)  an  employer 
(enterprise,  corporation,  company);  (ii)  an  association,  a trade union  or any other recognized 
collective body of persons; (iii) an individual, provided that the resources used to finance the plan 
are derived from the individual's  employment income. 
Legislation  lays  down  the  procedure to  be  followed  by  a plan  sponsor,  leaving  little 
choice as far as the institutional framework is concerned. Two separate steps have to be taken: 
first, a pension plan must be established which complies with requirements laid down and which 
is  sanctioned  by the formal  approval of the supervisory authority.  Secondly, the  pension  fund 
must be constituted in the hands of a distinct managing institution. 
The pension plan is the legal instrument which defines the rights and obligations of the 
partners in the pension commitment, i.e. the sponsor and the beneficiaries. The pension plan is 
drawn  up  by  the  sponsor  with  the  assistance  of a  control  committee  (a  minimum  of five 
members) where plan  members have a majority representation.  Formal approval of the plan  is 
granted by the supervisory authority, subject to being satisfied that the legal requirements have 
been met (full funding of liabilities,  no discrimination, etc.). Pension plans have independent legal 
status. 
The pension fund  does not have separate legal status merely because it holds assets 
generated by the implementation of a pension plan. The pension fund has to be entrusted to an 
asset  management  institution  (Entidad  Gestora)  which,  for its  authorisation  has  to  fulfil  the 
following  requirements: 
(i)  it must be registered as a joint-stock company; 
(ii)  it must have a minimum capital; 
(iii)  its sole object must be the administration  of a pension fund,  except in the case of 
a life insurance company duly authorised to conduct business in  Spain; 
(iv)  it must be subject to the authority of representatives of the plan sponsors and of the 
plan  members.  The  Entidad  Gestora  shall  deposit  in  custody its  assets with  an 
Entidad Depositaria,  an  independent custodian (i.e.  a bank) also falling  under the 
supervision of the control committee. 
The  control  committee  of the  plan  has  the  choice  of the  Entidad  Gestora  and  may 
change its choice if it is  not satisfied with the way in which the pension fund  is  managed. 
The structure described has two important characteristics. One is that the nature of the 
benefit  and  contribution  provisions,  as  well  as  the  management  of assets  or its  day-to-day 
administration, are in the hands of bodies (control committees) where the majority is held by the 
members  of the  plan  (employees,  beneficiaries).  This  feature  may have  discouraged  certain 
employers from establishing  a qualified  plan,  preferring  alternative pension  commitments. The 
second  feature  is  that the  legislation  imposes  on  the  parties  concerned  a fairly  rigid  set  of 
procedures, controls,  and  requirements in  all the areas of operation of qualified  plans. 
At 31  December 1992 the number and  characteristics of voluntary qualified plans was 
as follows: 
Number o  Number o 
qualified  plans  members 
Employment related:  442  196 294 
Non-employment related:  85  26 358 
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agriculture and mining  (7).  The non-employment-related  plans  are established  by associations 
of a different nature, the majority of which  cover self-employed  persons  (58  plans).  The trade 
unions have established 4 plans. The above data does not include voluntary individual retirement 
plans,  under Law No.  8/1987, purchased freely from a financial  institution. 
Other forms of voluntary provision 
The most important alternative form of pension coverage is constituted by the Entidades 
de Previsi6n  Social (mentioned  earlier),  reorganised  as  private  insurance institutions  in  1984. 
They are non-profit organisations and  have the characteristic of a mutual benefit society. 
Responsibility  for management decisions rests with the general assembly of members 
upon proposals submitted  by the governing body. The general assembly gathers all  members 
of the society,  or their representatives,  as  the case  may be.  The  number of members of the 
governing body is  laid  down  in  the plan's statutes. Members are elected  by secret ballot at a 
general assembly. Three members, other than those belonging to the governing body, are also 
elected to form a supervisory committee whose responsibility is to prepare an  annual report on 
the financial situation  of the pan. 
To  complete  the  picture,  mention  is  made  of the  fact  that  employees  may  obtain 
supplementary retirement benefits directly through the employer, mainly as a result of collective 
agreements.  Apart  from  promises  supported  by  a  book  reserve  arrangement,  the  employer 
normally takes out individual or group policies with insurance companies. An employer can also 
fulfil  his promise  in  the framework of the so-called  'labour foundations',  which  have,  however, 
only marginal coverage of employees. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
There  is  no  specific  legislative  framework  for  occupational  pension  schemes  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  The main  constraint on  the form these schemes take  is  the  need  to  obtain 
approval  from  the  Inland  Revenue  (the  taxation  authority)  in  order to  qualify  for  beneficial 
taxation treatment. 
In order to qualify for tax privileges, a scheme must be established under an irrevocable 
trust, with the administration and financial management of the scheme in the hands of trustees 
(see  above,  under Ireland,  for an  explanation  of trust terminology).  The trust fund  has to be 
maintained quite separately from the assets of the sponsoring employer and money can only be 
lawfully returned to the employer in special circumstances. This applies to schemes in  both the 
private and public sector, apart from a few public service schemes which are established under 
their own legislation and do not require Inland Revenue approval (e.g. the civil service, the armed 
forces, teachers and  health service workers). 
Pension schemes are usually established  by individual  employers for their employees 
(or for certain categories of employees). A single pension scheme may be established in respect 
of the employees of a group of related companies. There are also a few industry-wide pension 
schemes established for all the employees in a particular industry. The employer must contribute 
to the scheme for it to be approved for tax purposes (or must contribute to another scheme of 
which the employee is  also a member). 
There are no  legal requirements regarding the composition  of the trustees. In  practice, 
about 60  per cent  of members  of private  sector schemes  are  in  schemes  administered  by 
trustees, some at least of whom are elected or nominated as representatives of the members. 
The employer usually has the power to appoint the trustees. 
With one exception, there are no formal requirements for consultation with members or 
employers.  The  exception  is  the  obligation  to  consult  relevant  trade  unions  on  the  decision 
whether to contract out of state second-tier provision.  In practice, pension scheme issues often 
form part of negotiations between the employer and employee associations (or trade unions) with 
respect to remuneration and conditions of service. Changes to pension scheme rules,  including 
benefit improvements, are usually a matter for the employer. Trustees do not usually have the 
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These provisions  are set down  in  the trust deed,  prepared  by the employer's advisers, which 
establishes the scheme. Unless the deed contains a power of alteration, the law does not permit 
changes except where approved by the Occupational Pensions Board. 
Once trustees have been appointed they are not expected to behave as representatives 
of any  particular  sectional  interest.  It  is  their  responsibility  to  administer  the  trust  deed  in 
accordance with the rules of the scheme.  The responsibilities  of the trustees are laid  down in 
general trust law,  which is  of ancient origin  and  does not have specific principles to deal with 
pension  scheme  issues.  Trustees  have  a personal  and  fiduciary  responsibility  to  invest  the 
scheme monies in a prudent way, in compliance with the trust deed and rules. The trustees can 
delegate the tasks of administration and investment to employed staff or to external experts, but 
they  retain  ultimate  responsibility  for  the  sound  management  of the  affairs  of the  pension 
scheme. 
Trustees have the option of either managing the pension scheme as a self-administered 
trust fund,  or to entrust the administration  or the investment or both, to an insurance company. 
Trustees  of large  enterprises  prefer the  self-administered  approach  while  smaller companies 
often have recourse to contracts with an insurance company. Unit trusts and similar investment 
funds  are  part  of the  institutional  framework  for  pension  provision,  which  is  available  to 
individuals (personal pensions) or to trust funds. 
Employees  cannot be  forced to join  a pension  fund  operated by their employer.  Self-
employed persons or employees who are not members of a pension fund can take out their own 
personal  pension  arrangement  with  an  authorised  pension  provider,  such  as  an  insurance 
company, a building society or a bank. On reaching retirement age the proceeds of the pension 
investment must be  used  to  purchase  an  annuity from  an  insurance  company,  although  one 
quarter may usually be taken in  lump sum form. Dependants' benefits can  also be  purchased . 
.  There are limits on the amount of earnings which can be invested in a personal pension, ranging 
from  17.1/2% of earnings  at  most ages  to  almost double that  level  at  ages  close to  normal 
retirement. 
Personal  pensions  can  also  be  used  as  a  vehicle  for  contracting  out  of the  state 
earnings-related additional pension. These are available to members of contracted-in schemes 
and  to  employees  who  are  not  members  of any  pension  scheme.  They  must  be  taken  at 
retirement in the form of a pension.
12 
Schemes with fewer than  12 members may be established  as an  alternative to a trust 
on a self-administered basis under special discretionary powers available to the Inland Revenue. 
These schemes are technically employers' schemes, but in the vast majority of cases are set up 
for a small number of  senior executives (or directors) of a company where these executives have 
a  large  measure  of control  over the  scheme's  investments.  Substantial  numbers  of these 
schemes were set up from 1976 onwards. 
Persons covered 
Voluntary pension provision freely negotiated or organised by employers and employees 
generates a flow of funds  and  a consequent expectation  of benefrts which tends  inevitably to 
cover and to protect the middle and higher income layers ofthe social and occupational structure 
of the population. The probability of being excluded from supplementary pensions is  higher, as 
indicated  earlier,  for  low  paid  workers,  part-time  workers,  women,  employees  of  small 
undertakings and more generally the weaker and  more vulnerable sectors of the labour market 
(see Chapter 4). 
Such  a general statement needs to  be  qualified  because  some  EU  countries  have a 
wider voluntary coverage than others, both as regards employees and the self-employed. On the 
other hand,  a survey  of present  economic  and  political  conditions  indicates  that the  further 
extension  of voluntary provision to hitherto unprotected persons who  may,  one day, find  state 
social security benefits inadequate,  comes up  against obstacles that are not easily  overcome. 
An alternative, as explained earlier, is to introduce compulsory second-tier state pension schemes. 
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Germany: Proportion of enterprises and of 
employees  covered by supplementary 
pensions, by size of enterprise in 
manufacturing (1990) 
Size of  % of  o/o  of 
enterprise  enterprises  employees 
(number of  covered  covered 
employees) 
20 to 49  44  19 
50 to 199  76  44 
200 to 999  89  65 
1000 or more  99  90 
All sizes  64  70 
In  1993,  voluntary  co-
verage,  whether  contractual  or 
independently  sponsored  by  the 
interested  parties,  has  reached 
large  sections  of  the  working 
population in Denmark, in Germany, 
in  Ireland,  in  the  Netherlands,  and 
in  the United Kingdom. 
In  Denmark,  247,000  per-
sons  are  covered  by  industry-wide 
pension  schemes  established  be-
fore  1989,  while  610,000  persons 
are  covered  by  the  pension  sche-
mes  which  have  been  negotiated 
since 1989. Approximately 250,000 
persons  are  covered  by  company 
schemes. There are 232,000 public 
officials  who  are  entitled  to  a 
pension from the state budget. This 
leaves  about  1.1  million  persons 
outside  collective  voluntary  co-
verage  within  a  labour  force 
estimated  at  about  2,900,000  in 
1991. Among the groups excluded, 
about 230,000 persons have taken 
out  a personal  pension  plan.  The  self-employed  and  young  people  are  the  categories  most 
frequently found without supplementary pension coverage. 
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Table 14: 
Germany: Proportion of enterprises and of 
employees covered by supplementary 
pension schemes, by size of enterprises in 
trade and commerce (1990) 
Size of  %of  %of 
enterprise  enterprises  employees 
(number of  covered  covered 
employees) 
3 to 5  24  10 
6 to 9  33  13 
10 to 19  38  13 
20 to 49  50  15 
50 to 199  66  25 
200 to 499  82  35 
500 or more  93  65 
All sizes  31  29 
In  Germany,  according  to 
preliminary results of a new survey 
of  the  Federal  Statistical  Office, 
46.7%  of private sector employees 
were  covered  by  supplementary 
pension  arrangements  in  1992. 
Coverage of full-time employees is, 
however, much higher (51.6%) than 
that  of  part-time  employees 
(19.9%). 
Tables 13 and 14 are taken 
from  the  results  of a study  by  the 
IFO  lnstitut  fOr  Wirtschafts-
forschung.  In trade and  commerce 
where firms tend to be smaller than 
in  manufacturing  the situation  was 
as shown in Table 14. 
Another  source  indicates 
that, overall, the coverage of private 
sector  employees  is  much  higher 
for males  (55.9%) than for females 
(33.1%). 
In  Germany,  the  vast 
majority of public sector employees 
belong  to  one  of  several  supple-
mentary  pension  schemes. 
Membership reached approximately 
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The situation in Ireland is well documented. In 1992, the number of employees who were 
members  of occupational  pension  schemes was  438,000,  rising  to  approximately  500,000  if 
account is taken of intermittent employees and those who will  be joining a scheme when they 
have satisfied  the  eligibility  conditions.  This  total  would  represent  53%  of persons  currently 
employed (excluding the unemployed and the self-employed). 
The most recent data on membership of occupational pension schemes by employment 
sector was obtained in  a national survey of schemes carried out in  1985 for the Department of 
Social  Welfare.  The  majority  of employees  who  are  not  members  of occupational  pension 
schemes fall into the following  categories: 
- employees in  smaller and  less well-established  firms; 
- employees in the agricultural and fishing sectors; 
- part-time, temporary and contract employees; 
- employees who were over the maximum entry age when  a scheme was introduced 
(this is very much a declining group); and 
- employees who opt not to join a scheme when membership is not compulsory. 
Table 15: 
Ireland: 
Estimates of Occupational Pension Scheme Coverage 
by Sector, 1985 
Covered  Not Covered  Total 
Sector:  '000  %  '000  %  '000  % 
Industrial and large service 
firms (excluding  building  and 
construction)  234.8  56.4  181.6  43.6  416.4  100.0 
Small service firms and  non-
agricultural self-employed  0.0  0.0  213.6  100.0  213.6  100.0 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing  0.0  0.0  182.0  100.0  182.0  100.0 
Private sector building  and 
construction  48.8  72.8  18.2  27.2  67.0  100.0 
Non-commercial public sector  231.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  231.0  100.0 
All sectors  514.6  46.4  595.4  53.6  1110.0  100.0 
Source: Keogh and Whelan (1985), National SuNey of Occupational Pension 
Schemes, Dublin:  Economic and Social Research Institute. 
The highly developed coverage of public pensions in  Italy is the main reason for which 
second-tier arrangements are not widespread. The best estimates available indicate that in 1991 
there were about 1, 000 pension plans with about 1, 500,000 members. The majority of plans were 
insured (923), covering 512,000 employees. Self-administered funds, few in numbers, had about 
675,000 members. At the beginning of 1994, the situation had not significantly changed in spite 
o1 the enactment of a new legislative framework in  April  1993. 
Coverage of supplementary pension  provision  is  very wide  in  the Netherlands. A first 
source  of information  was  the  1985  study  by  the  'Netherlands  Pensions  Chambers'  which 
covered all sectors of the economy. Out of a total of 3,629,000 employees between the ages of 
25 and 65, it was found that 2,938,000 employees had some form of supplementary retirement 
provision. The groups excluded from coverage thus represented 17.9% of  the total. The reasons 
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time workers or married women were not eligible to belong to the employer sponsored scheme. 
Employers who did not sponsor a scheme fell within the following  categories: 
- small employers with less than 1  0 employees aged 25 or older; 
- employers with  a mainly part-time staff; 
- employers not belonging to an employers' association and not falling within the scope 
of a collective  labour agreement; 
- employers in the trade and business service sectors. 
A  more  recent  source  gives  an  idea  of  the  recent  growth  of  membership  of 
supplementary pension schemes in the private sector; the following figures include members of 
industry funds or single-employer pension funds: 
lvear:  I  Membership (Netherlands)  I 
11985 
1991  I 
1,949,4211 
2,735,658 
For the United  Kingdom the  last set of complete figures  reflects the situation  in  1991 
(Table 16). 
Table 16: 
United Kingdom: 
Employees in supplementary pension schemes 
1953-1991  (millions) 
Year  Private  Public  Total  Total  Coverage 
sector  sector  members  employed  (%) 
1953  3.1  3.1  6.2  21.9  28 
1963  7.2  3.9  11.1  22.9  48 
1971  6.8  4.3  11.1  22.5  49 
1975  6.0  5.4  11.4  23.1  49 
1979  6.1  5.5  11.6  23.4  50 
1983  5.8  5.3  11.1  21.1  52 
1987  5.8  4.8  10.6  21.6  49 
1991  6.5  4.2  10.7  22.5  48 
Remark:  Not counted are employees who have some pension 
rights,  but who are not accruing benefits in  respect of 
current employment. 
In 1991, out of 1  0. 7 million  members, 6.8 million were males who represented 57.0% of 
total employed males, while 3.9 million were females representing only 37.0% of the total number 
of women employed. Coverage was much higher in  the public sector- 4,200,000 members out 
of 5,800,000  employed  (72.4%)  - than  in  the  private  sector with  6,500,000  members  out  of 
16,700,000 employed (38.9%). 
As  in  other countries,  the size  of establishment  was  a very  important determinant of 
pension coverage, as table 17 illustrates. The following remarks will help to clarify the figures in 
Tables 16 and 17. 
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where lower coverage is due to the prevalence of part-time working.  There are often objective 
administrative grounds for excluding part-timers: they are only allowed to join many public sector 
schemes if they work a minimum level of hours per week (usually 10 hours). Very few part-timers 
in the private sector are members of pension schemes (about 7 per cent).  In 1987, part-timers 
accounted for 3.3 million  employees in the private sector and 1.5 million  in the public sector, of 
whom only 230,000 and 310,000 respectively were members of pension schemes. 
Table 17: 
Coverage according to size of establishment: 
private sector, full-time employees, 
United Kingdom, 1987 
(thousands) 
Size of establishment  Employees  Members  Percentage of 
(number of employees)  members 
1,2  390  80  21 
3-24  3,590  890  25 
25-99  2,990  1,270  42 
100-999  3,680  1,290  62 
1,000 and over  1,250  1,040  83 
Total  11,900  5,570  47 
In the private sector, coverage is generally very high  in  large companies and relatively 
low among small firms. These figures do not, however, include personal pensions, which can be 
expected to be more common among employees of small enterprises. 
Ofthe 10.6 million members of occupational pension schemes in 1987, 9.3 million were 
contracted-out of the state earnings-related  additional  pension  (SERPS). All  of the 1.3 million 
members of schemes not contracted-out were in the private sector, so that 100% of  public sector 
pension scheme members were contracted-out, as were 78% of private sector pension scheme 
members. 
The general picture in other EU countries is generally one of limited voluntary coverage 
for the reasons explained above. In Belgium the estimates available indicate a figure of  650,000 
employees affiliated or insured, of  which 474,000 are salaried employees and 176,000 are wage-
earners,  that  is  respectively  52%  and  15%  of the total  at work  in  each  category.  The great 
majority,  probably 400,000 persons, were covered by group insurance contracts. These figures 
compare with  an  estimated total private sector employment of about 2,000,000.  Furthermore, 
there is  evidence that the large  majority of persons covered are  found  in  the  highest  income 
brackets. 
In  Spain,  at 31  December 1992,  only  about  225,000  workers  had  been  affiliated  to 
collective supplementary pension plans which were qualified under the 1987 legislation. The most 
developed form of supplementary provision under this legislation was the individual purchase of 
a  retirement  plan  from  banks,  which  covered  about  875,000  persons  in  1992.  Data  on 
membership of the mutual benefit associations was not available. 
In  Greece and  in  Luxembourg  only  a few  large  industrial  companies  have  promoted 
voluntary  retirement  benefit  plans.  Portugal,  on  the  contrary,  has  experienced  a  marked 
development  of private  voluntary  provision  since  the  enactment  of the  1985/86  legislation: 
membership rose rapidly to 185,000 in  1990 and further to 217,000 employees in  1991. These 
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4,717,500 in  1990. 
Two  points  should  be  made  here.  The  first  is  that,  as  indicated  earlier,  a  further 
significant extension of voluntary second tier coverage is  unlikely  in the short term. Unemploy-
ment rates  are high  and  new jobs are  often created  in  sectors of the labour market which  are 
less  well  covered  by  employer-sponsored  plans.  Early  retirement,  which  is  frequent,  is  not 
matched by a corresponding  number of entrants in  the labour market. 
The  second  point  is  that  there  are  objective  and  real  obstacles  to  further  voluntary 
sponsorship of supplementary pensions, even if  the economic conditions were to improve. Public 
policy may well wish to see a further shift of responsibility  for retirement from public to private 
arrangements,  but  one  wonders  whether the  state  is  in  a  position  to  efficiently  tackle  the 
emerging obstacles to such a policy and whether it can increase the fiscal incentives beyond the 
present limits.  Rather, the contrary trend on the fiscal front has been seen recently, such as in 
Belgium  and  Italy.  It  is  worth  noting,  for  instance,  that  in  1993  in  Germany  only  1.6%  of 
enterprises without a supplementary pension arrangement were considering  establishing  one. 
Design strategies for pension plans 
Once the decision to establish a particular type of supplementary pension arrangement 
has been taken, the parties concerned,  in  particular employers,  have considerable freedom of 
choice as to plan design and to the method of financing the pension commitment. Such freedom 
is  naturally subject to  the  constraints  laid  down  by the  regulatory  framework.  It  is  moreover 
greatly influenced by the tax environment. 
Some  aspects  of the design  of a pension  plan  are  more  important than  others.  For 
example, should the sponsor promise a retirement pension related to the employee's final salary? 
Should any parallel future social security benefit be discounted or ignored when the promise is 
made?  Should  the  employer's  commitment  be  restricted  to  contributing  into  an  employee's 
retirement account, leaving the latter the investment risk and the choice of converting the capital 
into  a pension  at  retirement?  For the worker, the fact of belonging  to a defined  benefrt  rather 
than a defined contribution plan  makes a considerable difference as far as benefit expectations 
and security are concerned. 
Should  membership be  open  to  all  employees  or restricted  to some? Should  benefit 
entitlements vest immediately or after a minimum period of membership or employment? Should 
the  sponsor rely  for plan  management  and  asset  investment  on  profit-making  institutions  or 
should the plan  be self-administered? And,  most importantly,  how much are the voluntary plan 
sponsors ready to contribute? 
Across Europe the answers given to such questions are extremely varied.  In countries 
where  voluntary  pension  provision  is  at  the  initiative  of individual  companies  the  variety  of 
solutions as to plan design is particularly broad. In the present study, no attempt is made to draw 
up a full  inventory of individual rules,  practices and features of plan design across Europe. The 
subject is  treated  in  voluminous  reference  books  available  to specialists.
13  The  following  are 
selected country highlights showing prevailing benefrt design practice on the basis of information 
available at the end of 1993. 
BELGIUM 
Defined  benefit  schemes  are  the  most  common  form  of pension  plan,  representing 
approximately  70%-80%  of Belgian  plan  membership.  However,  there  is  growing  interest  in 
defined contribution  plans. 
Multinational  companies  normally  provide  pensions  based  on  final  salary,  permitting 
partial or full  lump sum commutation. Typically, the company plan will  aim to provide between 
1.25%-2% of final  average earnings for each  year of service,  minus the state pension  earned 
during company service. Plans  are  integrated with the state social security system, either by a 
direct offset of the assumed state pension,  or by  defining  different accrual  rates  for earnings 
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employees and 0.73% for wage earners). 
Employees are usually required to make small contributions on earnings up to the state 
social security ceiling and to contribute in the range 1  %-6% for earnings above the social security 
ceiling.  Employers provide the bulk of the required  resources. 
The most common method of funding supplementary pension is by insurance contracts. 
Members' rights  vest immediately,  in  both  insured and  non-insured plans  (those organised  as 
non-profit association,  ASBL).  Most plans  are  designed to  cater for the  needs of white-collar 
workers or senior executives. 
DENMARK 
Multi-employer  plans:  All  these  are  defined  contribution  plans.  In  the  schemes 
established before 1989 the employer contributes 8% or 10% of earnings and the employee 4% 
or 5%  of earnings.  The  pension  schemes established  since  1989 are still  being  built  up,  and 
therefore  contribution  rates  are  still  low.  They are,  however,  expected to  reach  about  9%  of 
earnings in the coming  years. The balance of the accumulated individual  contributions  may be 
paid as from age 60 in  the form of a life annuity. At age 67,  a lump sum is  frequently provided 
(2  or 2.5 times the annuity). Invalidity and survivors' benefits are included in the plan. 
Single employer plans: Most of the plans are defined benefit, final salary arrangements. 
Membership rules are stricter,  and there may be  provisions  laid down as to minimum age and 
duration of employment. 
Insured plans: The design pattern  is  more flexible.  Plans  are contribution  defined  but 
give the employee a wider benefit choice at retirement than is  possible under other plans. The 
prevailing choice is to opt for a lump sum benefit. The employee is promised a minimum annual 
interest yield on his accumulated contribution balance, which may be increased by the insurance 
company if investment experience permits. 
In  practice,  all  benefits vest immediately  in  all  the three types of the plans  described 
above. 
FRANCE 
Coverage  by  second-tier compulsory  schemes  being  very  comprehensive,  voluntary 
provision is practically confined to executives and senior staff of large companies and to selected 
groups  of public  servants  who  have  taken  upon  themselves  the  initiative  of  creating  an 
appropriate provident institution. 
Retirement plans in large  firms:  The benefit plan will typically be  integrated with  state 
social security, including within it any compulsory second-tier benefits. For instance, the plan may 
promise 1.8% to 2% of final salary per year of service gross of social security. An alternative is 
to modulate the integrated accrual rate by earnings bands.  Plans which are not integrated with 
social security have also been offered by a few firms (plans additifs):  they may provide 5% or 
·1 0%  of final salary for a given period of service. 
It follows that the large majority of plans are defined benefrt plans. Interest in introducing 
contribution-defined  plans is  more recent, and  is confined to insurance products (under Art.  83 
of the Tax Code). 
Contributions are normally  paid  entirely  by  employers.  Full  funding  of liabilities  is  not 
common, even if the plan  is insured. Most large companies pay benefrts out of current income 
with possible balance sheet reserve cover. 
Retirement plans for public seNants: The PREFON plan is adapted to the nature of  the 
relevant institution, which is a non-profit provident association sponsored by the trade unions of 
public servants, whose assets are managed by  a consortium of leading  insurance companies. 
Liabilities  are  fully  funded  because the  PREFON plan  is  contribution-defined  on  the  basis  of 
employees' contributions only.  Benefits are only in  the form of supplementary pensions,  using 
a technique similar to that of ARRCOIAGIRC (see Chapter 4). Survivors' benefits are included. 
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of public servants. The employees are the contributors; they have a choice of contribution rates 
and, consequently, of pension levels. Pensions are indexed after award according to civil servant 
salaries.  Survivors'  benefits  are  provided.  The  plan  is  partly  funded.  A  constraint is  that the 
employee who wants to join  CREF must commit himself to contributing for at least 10 years. 
GERMANY 
Supplementary pension plans designed for local German companies have a variety of 
benefit targets: many plans guarantee fixed  lump sums at retirement,  others (mainly in  multi-
national or larger enterprises)  are final  salary arrangements. The benefit is  calculated  on  the 
basis of 1% to 2% per year of service on earnings above the social security ceiling. The accrual 
rate  below the  ceiling  ranges  from  0.25% to  0.75%.  Defined  contribution  plans  are  far less 
common. Survivors' benefits are generally included. 
The contributors to the pension plan are as follows: 
- book reserves: only the employer; 
- support funds or direct insurance: mainly the employer; 
- pension funds: two thirds employer, one third employee. 
The total rate of contribution for comprehensive plans ranges most frequently between 
5% to 7% of earnings. Less generous plans require only contribution rates of 2% to 3%. Pension 
plan benefits vest after the age of 35 and after 10 years' participation in the plan or, alternatively, 
12 years' service with 3 years' participation  in  the plan.  Exceptions to the vesting rules can be 
negotiated among different enterprises (i.e. for executives). 
A special feature is the salary replacement insurance, whereby the employee is free to 
entrust part of his salary to the employer for the purpose of purchasing insurance on his behalf. 
This arrangement is  additional to the ordinary pension plan  and  it does not carry any vesting 
requirements, since the funds belong to the employee. 
GREECE 
Strictly voluntary plans are not very developed in Greece, where supplementary pension 
provision is compulsory and broad-based. 
Provident associations  (caisses mutuelles,  etc.): The retirement benefits administered 
by  these  private,  autonomous  associations  are  financed  through  members'  contributions, 
although  employers  may also  agree  to  contribute.  The  range  of benefits  and  the  qualifying 
conditions  vary  from  one  association  to  another.  Typically,  a  pension  is  paid  only  after a 
minimum period of contribution  (1 0 to 15 years). Pensionable age is,  as a rule,  higher for men 
than  for women.  The  investment  of assets  is  frequently  entrusted  by the  association  to  an 
insurance company. 
Group insurance  plans: Coverage is  normally extended to all full-time  employees who 
have  attained  the  age  of 21  (or 25)  and  have  completed  one  year of service.  Employees 
generally may receive  a pension  at  age 65 (60  for females)  under the IKA  rules.  Actuarially 
reduced benefits are normally payable. The benefits insured may take different forms: (i) defined 
benefit  plans  designed  to  pay  an  annuity;  (iQ  defined  benefit  plans  paying  a  lump  sum;  (iii) 
defined contribution plans to which the employer pays 3% to 5% of salary. 
Most retirement plans do not have a vesting provision. The majority of plans are financed 
by the employer; employees' contributions are not common. 
IRELAND 
In  1992 the large majority of members of occupational pension schemes were covered 
by defined benefit plans (2,621 schemes with 385,200 employee members). Defined contribution 
arrangements were more numerous because they typically cover just one or several employees. 
In total these arrangements only cover 52,780 employees. 
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Commissioners (tax authorities) forschemes to be approved for the special tax treatment is two-
thirds of final  pensionable salary. 
The most common accrual rate is 1/60th of final salary for each year of service, leading 
to a pension of two thirds of final pensionable salary for a member who completes 40 years of 
pensionable service. Schemes may offer accelerated accrual of benefits to members who enter 
a scheme late in their career and full tax approval is given in these cases for a maximum two-
thirds pension, where there has been at least 10 years' service at normal pension age. 
Members can be given the option of converting part of their pension into a lump sum at 
retirement,  up to  a maximum  of 1.5 times  final  salary.  This  lump sum is  fully  tax free,  while 
pensions in  payment are subject to tax. 
A significant number of schemes do not provide benefits up to the Revenue limits,  as 
allowance  is  made for the fact that members will  have  an  entitlement to a pension  under the 
state  social  insurance  scheme.  The  method  of integration  of the  occupational  and  social 
insurance entitlements may involve either a straight deduction from the member's occupational 
pension of the amount of the social insurance pension, or an adjustment of  the amount of salary 
for the calculation  of pension entitlements. 
The accrual rate for most schemes in the public sector is 1/80th of final salary for regular 
pension  payments and 3/80ths for the lump sum for each year of service up to  a maximum of 
40 years' service. This means that the maximum pension payable is 50 per cent of final salary 
and the maximum lump sum payable at retirement is 1.5 times final salary. The target of these 
final salary plans normally also includes the state social insurance pension, in the case of those 
public sector employees who are covered for pensions under social insurance. 
Provision is also usually made for pensions for surviving widows, widowers and children. 
The  pension  is  normally  50%  of the  pension  the deceased  member would  have received  at 
normal pension age, but tax approval can be given for a level of pension up to two thirds of the 
maximum pension the deceased member would have received. Pensions are usually payable in 
respect of dependent children  in the form of an  increase of the widow or widower's pension or 
as  a separate  pension,  where there  is  no  surviving  parent.  A lump sum payment is  normally 
given for death in service, calculated as a multiple of annual salary up to a maximum of 4 years' 
salary, the upper limit for tax approval purposes,  but it is  more usual to give  1.1/2 to 2 years' 
salary. This lump sum is  payable irrespective of whether there are surviving dependants. 
Many schemes make provision  for retirement  on  grounds of ill  health.  The  provision 
made  can  vary  from  receiving  a  pension  based  on  accrued  entitlements  to  date  of 
commencement of ill health retirement, to a level of pension that would have been payable if the 
member had  remained in  employment until retirement age. 
Members who leave service before retirement age (e.g. a change of  job}, and who have 
been members for at least 5 years, are entitled under the Pensions Act to have the benefit rights 
accrued in the period after 1 January 1991  either preserved in  the scheme they are leaving or 
transferred to  a new scheme or to a life  assurance company retirement bond.  The preserved 
benefits in a defined benefit scheme must be revalued in the period after 1 January 1996 by 4% 
a year, or in line with the consumer price index, if  price increases are less than 4% for that year, 
until they become payable.  Preserved benefits normally become payable at retirement age,  or 
death  if this  occurs  before  retirement  age.  Early  leavers  who  are  not  entitled  to  preserved 
benefits in respect of periods of pensionable service may receive a refund of their contributions 
paid during these periods. 
Most public sector schemes are exempt from the preservation of benefit requirements 
under the Pensions Act, as they have arrangements for preservation which are in some respects 
different, but at least as favourable as those provided for under the Pensions Act. 
Retirement pensions under occupational schemes are  usually payable for life and are 
in  any event guaranteed for 5 years. Accordingly,  if death occurs within  that time, the balance 
of the 5 years' guaranteed period will  be  paid  to the surviving dependants or to the deceased 
member's estate. 
Recent  surveys  have  shown  that  a  majority  of funded  schemes  (72%)  provided  for 
increases of pensions in  payment on  a regular basis, which are mainly in  line with or related to 
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with pay increases for the category and grade of employee to which the pensioner had belonged 
before retirement. 
The 1985 survey of schemes carried out for the Department of Social Welfare (Keogh 
and Whelan, National Survey of Occupational Pension Schemes, Dublin:  Economic and Social 
Research  Institute,  1985) showed that a quarter of occupational  pension  schemes were non-
contributory, that is  wholly financed  by the employer.  The remainder (75%)  were contributory, 
requiring a contribution from the employee that is based on a percentage of earnings in 70% of 
these schemes. The average weighted contribution per member was 4.43% of pensionable pay 
(Hughes: 1994, see note 10).  To qualify for the special tax treatment afforded to occupational 
pension schemes, the employer must contribute at least one sixth of the total cost. 
Members have the option in many schemes of making additional voluntary contributions 
(AVCs) to the main  scheme or to a separate scheme established  for this purpose,  in  order to 
secure additional benefits. 
ITALY 
Funds  with  segregated  assets  represent  88%  of all  plans  surveyed  in  1991.  Typical 
contribution  rates  ranged  from  4%  to  6%  of earnings  depending  on  economic  activity.  Joint 
employer/employee contributions are most frequent in  banking and industry. Out of 1,078 plans 
953  were  defined  contributions.  Options  to  convert the  lump  sum benefit  into  a pension  are 
available. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Coverage is  normally  extended to employees having  reached  a prescribed  age,  often 
25 years, and who were under 50 or 55 when they joined the firm.  Vesting is generally allowed 
after five years for retirement benefits,  but there is  no vesting for disability and death benefits. 
The typical  benefit  received  at  state  pensionable  age  is  an  annuity.  However,  part 
commutation into a lump sum is allowed in  many plans. 
Defined  benefit  plans  (often  final  salary  arrangements)  are  integrated  with  the  state 
social security system. Benefit indexation clauses are not common. 
The majority of plans provide survivors' benefits. Contributions to insured plans are paid 
by  employers  and  occasionally  employees.  Employees'  contributions  are  not  permitted  if a 
pension promise is financed by a book reserve technique. 
NETHERLANDS 
The large number of retirement pension plans currently tax-approved in the Netherlands 
show a broad range of rules and benefit design features. The following are the main categories. 
(i)  Salary-related benefit schemes with two principal variants; 
- final salary schemes; 
- career average salary schemes. 
(ii)  Defined contribution schemes. 
In addition there are plans which only provide payment at retirement of a fixed  amount 
(independent  of salary  and  sometimes  also  independent  of length  of service).  The  relative 
importance of the various types of scheme is  illustrated  by the figures  in  Table  18 relating  to 
private sector schemes in  1987. 
There is  a consensus among the social  partners that a good quality pension  scheme 
should  provide a pension of 70% of final salary,  including  state social security, after 40 years' 
service. 
Pension plans are integrated with state social security schemes. In the past, integration 
with state social security took into account the different amounts payable to single  persons or 
to couples  under the state scheme AOW. Recently,  objections  have been  raised  against this 
practice,  because of the concern that this may be  a form of sex discrimination  in  occupational 
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There are suggestions 
that the supplementary 
pension  for  equal 
periods  of service and 
salary  should  be  the 
same  for  men  and 
women, irrespective of 
the  different  benefits 
from  the  AOW 
scheme. 
As  far  as 
benefit  targets  are 
concerned,  the  most 
usual  rate  for  a 
maximum  period  of 
membership is  70%  of 
final  salary  (integrated 
with  state  social 
security).  Other  plans 
provide  lower  rates, 
such  as  50%  or 60% 
Table 18: 
Types of pension plans in the Netherlands 
% of membership 
Men  Women  Men and 
women 
(a)  Final pay  69.8  80.6  72.1 
(b) Career average  16.3  11.8  15.4 
(c) Combination of (a) and  (b)  5.7  3.8  5.3 
(d)  Defined contribution  7.5  3.1  6.6 
(e)  Fixed amount  0.7  0.7  0.6 
All  plans  100.0  100.0  100.0 
of final,  or career average salary. 
The accrual rate works out at 1.75% to 2% per year of service. Retirement takes place 
at age 65 with  very few exceptions. Entry age is frequently 25. Widows' pensions are normally 
included  in the plan. Full vesting after one year's scheme membership is compulsory. 
Early leavers are entitled to a deferred benefit proportional to the amount of pension that 
they would have received if they had continued participating in the scheme until retirement age. 
Vested  rights of former plan  members must be  indexed  if pensions  in  payment are increased 
through indexation. 
Contributions  may  be  paid  by  employers  and  employees.  Employees  are  normally 
required to contribute either one half or one third of the required contributions. There also exist 
non-contributory plans. Another formula is to require the employee to contribute at a given rate 
of salary (between 3% and  12%) and to ask the employer to finance the difference. 
PORTUGAL 
Company plans  are  typically  designed  to  provide  a retirement  benefit related  to final 
salary earnings. Most plans integrate with state social security but sli>me are targeted to provide 
a fixed percentage of final pay irrespective of the state benefit. 
Vesting is unusual, except in defined contribution plans. The large majority of plans are 
financed exclusively by employers' contributions. 
SPAIN 
At the end  of 1992, out of 527 qualified  plans,  160 were defined contribution  plans,  19 
only were defined benefit and the balance (348 plans) were a combination of both methods. 
In  past  years  the  benefit target  was  approximately  100%  of final  salary,  integrating 
supplementary and social security pensions. Recent experience shows that plan sponsors prefer 
to avoid  integration  with  the state pension.  Moreover, the present economic situation  induces 
employers to set a maximum limit on their contributions to the plan,  irrespective of the benefit 
target. The 1987 legislation  has moreover prescribed a 'cap' or a maximum amount that, every 
year, can be earmarked for pension fund contributions. The 'cap' was, in 1992, the lower amount 
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corporate profit of the year,  and 15% of net income for self-employed persons. 
Vesting is  immediate in  qualified plans. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
By far the majority of members of pension schemes in the United Kingdom belong to the 
defined  benefit type of scheme.  Most of these  provide  benefits  based  on  salary at  or near to 
retirement. The most common arrangement is for pension to be a fraction of final salary, with a 
pension of 1/60th payable in  respect of each year of service. However, other fractions are also 
sometimes used. Final pensionable salary is defined in the rules of the scheme and may be the 
earnings in the last year before retirement, or an average over several years. Where an average 
is used, the earlier years may be revalued to the level at retirement using  an index, usually the 
retail price index. 
In order to qualify for tax approval it is also necessary to satisfy certain maximum benefit 
rules.  The maximum permissible  pension at normal retirement age is two-thirds of final salary, 
subject to a limit  of £75,000 a year (in  1993/94, raised to £76,800 in  1994/95) on  pensionable 
earnings for persons who have changed jobs or entered new pension  arrangements. Although 
this maximum would  usually only be attained by those with 40 or more years of service, some 
schemes offer accelerated accrual of benefits for late entrants. The maximum two-thirds pension 
may be paid  provided there has been  at least 20 years' service. 
Table 19: 
United Kingdom: 
Number of members of occupational 
schemes by pension accrual fraction 
(thousands) 
Pension accrual fraction  Private  Public 
sector  sector 
Better than 60ths*  895  195 
60ths  3,695  300 
Between 6oths and 8oths  140  285 
80ths  820  3,405 
Less than 80ths  30  15 
Total  5,580  4,200 
* If service is  less than 40 years (40/60ths is 
the maximum permitted by the Inland 
Revenue). 
Part  of the  pension  can  be 
commuted (converted) into a lump sum 
on  retirement,  subject  to  limits  laid 
down by the tax authorities.  This lump 
sum  is  payable  free  of  all  taxes, 
whereas  pensions  are  taxable  as 
earned income. 
Many  public  sector  schemes 
provide  a  pension  of  1/80th  of final 
pensionable  salary  for  each  year  of 
service,  together  with  a  lump  sum 
equivalent to 3 years of pension. In the 
private sector there is  often a different 
pension  accrual  rate,  the  fraction  of 
pensionable salary per year of service 
which  is  used  to  calculate  the 
retirement  benefit.  This  is  shown  in 
Table 19, which includes both members 
in  final  salary schemes and those who 
are  eligible  for  a  pension  and  an 
additional lump sum. 
There  are  also  many  defined 
contribution  plans  in  existence  for 
smaller  enterprises.  Recently,  emplo-
yers setting up a first plan have tended 
to favour defined  contribution  arrange-
ments. 
Personal  pensions  taken  by 
contracted-out employees build up rights in proportion to the sums contributed by the individual, 
less the expenses and  charges of the insurance providers. 
Normal retirement  age  is  defined  for each  scheme.  Until  recently  it  was  common  for 
schemes to follow the state pension  ages,  although  some adopted  a different approach,  such 
as  age 60 for both  males  and  females,  or age 65  for both.  As  a result  of the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities of 17 May 1990 (Barber v.  GRE) most schemes 
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the judgment. At the end of 1993, legislation was enacted to equalize the state pensionable age 
of men and women progressively at age 65. 
Most  defined  benefit  pension  schemes  also  provide  pension  benefits  on  ill-health 
retirement and lump sum benefits on death in service, as well as pensions to surviving widows, 
widowers  and  children.  Widows'  and  widowers'  benefits  are  also  usually  related  to  final 
pensionable salary, defined as at the date of death of the member, or at the date of retirement 
if death  occurred  after the  normal  pension  had  begun  to  be  paid.  Widows'  and  widowers' 
pensions  are  usually  50%,  or occasionally  2/3  of the  deceased  member's  pension.  Many 
schemes increase the payment to the widow or widower if there are dependent children and pay 
orphans' pensions if there is no surviving spouse. A lump sum benefit is also usually payable on 
death  in  service,  regardless  of family  status  and  whether or  not there  are  surviving  family 
members. This can be up to 4 years' salary,  but 2 years' salary is the most common amount. 
Anyone who leaves employment (or the pension scheme) before normal retirement age, 
with 2 or more years' pensionable service,  must be granted entitlement to the accrued benefit, 
although the benefit is not usually payable until retirement age (or, if before, until death). Accrued 
rights deferred to normal retirement age in this way are required  by law to be revalued at 5% a 
year, or in line with the retail price index if this increases at less than 5% a year over the period 
of deferment. 
Early leavers with less than 2 years' service can  be given a simple refund of their own 
contributions. As an alternative to retaining accrued rights in the pension scheme which they are 
leaving, or taking a refund of contributions, early leavers may have the cash equivalent of their 
accrued rights (i.e. a transfer value) paid to another pension scheme or into a personal pension 
arrangement. Where a transfer value is paid to another scheme, it will usually be used to provide 
credited years of pensionable service to be added to the years of actual future membership in 
the new scheme. Sometimes, however, the transfer value is used to provide credits on a money 
purchase (defined contribution)  basis. 
The rules  often provide for pension  in  payment to be  increased by a fixed  percentage 
each  year  (say  3%  or  5%).  The  trustees  however  have  a  discretion  to  award  additional 
increments as the finances of the pension fund  permit, with a view to  maintaining more closely 
the real value of  the pension at the time of award. Most public sector pension schemes currently 
provide automatic or near-automatic indexation of pensions in line with changes in the retail price 
index. 
Recent legislation  provides that for pension rights acquired in  respect of future service, 
pensions in payment must be increased by 5% a year or by the increase in the retail price index 
if this has been less.  However, this provision has not yet been  brought into effect. 
Tax treatment 
As explained earlier, governments wishing to promote a second tier of pension provision 
can either introduce suitable schemes on a compulsory basis or can encourage enterprises and 
individuals to do so through tax incentives. All EU countries have granted privileged tax treatment 
to  private  pension  funds  and  similar  forms  of voluntary  retirement  provision;  some  more 
generously than others. If  the motivation of governments is clear, the implications on their fiscal 
policies in this particular area raise  a number of important questions. 
The first question is whether savings for retirement deserve privileged tax treatment as 
compared  with  other forms  of saving.  The  arguments  in  favour  are  that  voluntary  pension 
provision has a social value in  the sense that society approves any provident behaviour which 
is  bound to  avoid  hardship  in  old  age  and  subsequent dependency on  the state welfare  and 
social  assistance.  More recently,  the value of the 'social  return' of private provision  has been 
emphasised by governments facing escalating costs of public pension schemes (see Chapter 1). 
The arguments against are that on grounds of equity it is not fair to grant tax privileges 
to a section of the working population that is  bound to be the least poor,  not to say the better 
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in the Chapter) seem to justify such a view. 
Table 20: 
United Kingdom: Value of tax relief granted 
to occupational pension schemes 
(£million) 
1986-87  1991-92 
Relief for: 
Employees' contributions  1,700  2,400 
Employers' contributions  3,300  3,400 
Investment income of funds  3,500  5,100 
Lump sum payments from  250  300 
unfunded schemes 
Total reliefs (1)  8,750  11,200 
Less tax liable on: 
Pension payments  2,500  3,400 
Refunds to employers  - 161 
Total tax liability (2)  ·  2,500  3,561 
Net tax relief:  (1)-(2) 
Total net reliefs (rounded)  6,300  7,700 
Source: table 6.9 of Inland Revenue Statistics, 
1992 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
sometimes  argued  that  if  middle 
and high income employees did not 
have  access  to  a second  pension 
through  private  provision,  they 
might put pressure on  the state for 
better public pensions, which in turn 
would  cause  greater taxation  that 
would affect everyone. The fact that 
withdrawing  tax  incentives  from 
private  provision  would  involve 
similar  or greater overall  costs  for 
the  state  has  been  emphasised  in 
Ireland  where  the  state  pays  flat-
rate  old  age  pensions  without  a 
second earnings-related tier. 
A  second  question  is 
whether tax relief on  pension funds 
and  similar arrangements deprives 
the  Treasury  of large  sums  which 
may  be  badly  needed  by  Member 
States,  particularly those experien-
cing  severe  budget  deficits.  It  is 
very difficult to evaluate the overall 
financial impact of pension tax relief 
because there are offsetting factors 
and  shifts  over time.  The  general 
practice  is  to  grant  tax  relief  on 
contributions  to  voluntary  pension 
provision  but  to  tax the  resulting 
benefits when they become due. 
Governments are, however, 
aware of the possible inconsistency 
resulting  in times of fiscal  austerity 
from  the  simultaneous  increase  in 
the  overall  fiscal  burden  and  the 
granting of tax relief for retirement schemes. Recent legislation  in  Italy shows the reluctance of 
finance ministers to provide generous incentives. Belgium has recently tightened the rules on tax 
advantages. In the Netherlands the issue has been raised,  although no action has been taken. 
At the other extreme, Portugal's generous tax incentives granted since 1985/86 have generated 
a sudden surge in the number of private pension funds. 
In countries where private provision has reached significant dimensions, estimates have 
been made of the consequences of providing tax incentives in this area. For the United Kingdom 
the  relevant  estimates  are  given  in  Table  20.  The  net  value  of tax reliefs  in  1992-93  was 
estimated in the 1992 Autumn Statement Statistical Supplement as £8,1 00 million. The value of 
tax relief given on contributions to personal pensions (including retirement annuity considerations 
and free-standing additional voluntary contributions) was estimated as £1,600 million in  1992-93. 
In Ireland, it has been estimated that on a standard cash-flow basis the value of the tax 
reliefs  in  1989 ranged  from  IR£160 million  to  IR£216  million  (Hughes:  1994, see  note  10).  In 
1989, the total cost of pensions under the Social Welfare system (social  insurance and social 
assistance)  in  respect  of retirement,  old  age  and  survivors  amounted  to  IR£1,022  million 
(excluding  administration  costs).  The  estimated  value  of tax reliefs  on  funded  occupational 
pension schemes, therefore, ranged from 16% to 21% of that amount. In 1989, total revenue for 
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ranged from 5.7% to 7.7% of income tax. 
To appreciate fully the various arguments, a budgetary appraisal should be accompanied 
by an assessment ofthe impact on individual persons. From the perspective of individual scheme 
members it can  be  argued that there is  no significant net gain  in  real terms as they ultimately 
pay tax on the money set aside to finance their pensions when these pensions become payable. 
However, the tax concessions  do  favour them  in  two ways.  Tax relief on  the contributions  is 
usually provided at higher marginal tax rates than the tax rates which will apply when the scheme 
members  are  receiving  payment  of their  pensions  in  retirement,  as  their  overall  income  is 
generally lower at that stage than when they were in employment. Most scheme members also 
receive lump sum benefits which are often tax free or taxed at advantageous rates. 
A final  important question relates to employers' behaviour.  Should they spontaneously 
introduce pension arrangements for their staff because of the tax relief on their contributions or 
for other reasons? An objective answer, valid  for all  employers, cannot be given. As explained 
earlier,  motivations  vary and  respond to  a complex set of circumstances.  Experience  shows, 
however, that in  designing a private pension  arrangement, its sponsors are always fully aware 
that different options  may attract more or less  tax relief;  consequently they inevitably tend to 
prefer the solution which is the most tax effective. 
BELGIUM 
Employers'  and  employees'  contributions  to  an  approved  pension  plans  (ASBL  or 
insured) are tax deductible provided that the estimated total pension (state social  security plus 
supplementary  pension)  does  not  exceed  80%  of the  employee's  presumed  final  salary  at 
retirement. As from 1994, a restriction  has  been  imposed to the tax treatment of employees' 
contributions:  only  a  part  (30-40%)  is  deductible,  rather than  100%,  and  this  penalizes  high 
income earners who are subject to high  marginal tax rates.  In  addition,  an  annual tax of 4.4% 
will become payable on both employers' and employees' contributions to supplementary pension 
arrangements (ASBL or insured). 
Capital sums paid at retirement by pension funds or under insurance policies are taxed 
(at age 60)  once for all  at a rate  of 10% to  16%  according to whether the benefit has  been 
financed by the employer (16%) or jointly with the employee (10%). 
Supplementary pensions  are taxed as  normal earned  income,  although  a flat-rate tax 
credit is granted. Assets and investment income are not exempt from tax. The assets of an ASBL 
are subject to an annual tax of  0.17%. Dividends of investments are subject to withholding taxes, 
depending on their origin.  Insurance companies are not subject to the above because they are 
taxed on their profits. 
DENMARK 
Employers' and employees' contributions to a supplementary pension plan are fully tax 
deductible (without any ceiling on annual contributions). Capital sums paid at retirement from age 
60, or at an earlier age, are subject to a flat-rate tax of 40%, while pensions are taxed as earned 
income every year, even if the pensioner takes up residence abroad. 
The returns on  pension asset investment by insurance companies or by pension funds 
are subject to a special flat-rate tax (called 'real interest tax') up to a maximum of 56 per cent. 
An  elaborate formula ensures that the yield  on  investment which  eventually will  benefit future 
pensioners is not excessive (i.e.  not more than 3.5% above price inflation). 
FRANCE 
Employers'  pension  contributions  to  insurance  companies,  pension  funds,  or similar 
provident  institutions  are  fully  deductible.  Allocations  to  book  reserves  are  not  deductible. 
Employees' contributions are deductible provided that coverage is compulsory for the employee 
(for instance contributions to AGIRC and ARRCO or contributions to defined contribution plans), 
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also contributing for pension purposes (not for lump sums). 
Voluntary  defined  benefit  plans  offered  by  insurance  companies  can  offer  a  more 
favourable tax treatment of pension contributions,  provided there are  no vesting conditions. 
Exceptionally the two supplementary schemes PREFON  and CREF allow affiliated public 
employees an  unrestricted tax deduction on  contributions.  Benefits, irrespective of the scheme 
awarding them, are taxed as earned income. 
Pension institutions which are non-profit making enjoy favourable tax treatment on their 
current transactions, including  returns from sums invested. 
GERMANY 
Tax treatment depends on the method of financing the pension  commitment. 
Book reserve plans: 
- employers'  allocations  to  reserves  are  fully  deductible  provided  the  liability  is 
calculated  according  to  approved  conditions  and  assumptions  (no  employee 
contributions are allowed); 
- benefits are taxed as earned income; 
- employers'  premiums  paid  to  reinsure  the  liability  with  the  compulsory  insolvency 
insurance PSV are deductible. 
Pensionskassen and direct insurance: 
- employers' contributions are fully deductible but are included in the taxable income of 
employees; 
- pensions are subject to reduced  income tax rates  (as  are social security pensions); 
lump sums are tax free. 
Support funds: 
- employers' allocations are deductible if they do not exceed prescribed limits; 
- benefits are taxed as earned income. 
The yields  of investments  made by Pensionskassen  and  support funds are  not taxed 
provided  that the  corresponding  assets  have  been  accumulated  in  compliance  with  the  rules 
prescribed. 
GREECE 
Full tax deductibility is granted in respect of employers' and employees' contributions to 
compulsory supplementary pension funds (IKAITEAM, auxiliary funds, etc.) while their benefits 
are taxed as earned income. 
Any  insurance  premiums  paid  by  an  employer  to  cover  a  pension  contract  for  his 
employees are deductible from corporate tax on profits. Premia paid by employees are deductible 
only up to a prescribed ceiling.  Benefits are taxed as earned income. 
Investment returns are not taxed if they accrue to compulsory pension funds. Insurance 
companies fall under the fiscal framework applied to public companies which includes taxes on 
het, not allocated,  profits. 
IRELAND 
The tax treatment of occupational pension  schemes is governed by the 1972 Finance 
Act. To qualify for the tax reliefs  available, schemes must obtain approval from the Retirement 
Benefits  District  of the  Revenue  Commissioners,  which  is  the  regulatory  authority  for tax 
approval purposes. One of the main  conditions for revenue approval in the case of pre-funded 
schemes is that the fund must be set up as an  irrevocable trust. 
All schemes must also comply with certain maximum benefit requirements. These include 
a maximum pension  on  retirement of two-thirds final  pay (after 10 years or more service), with 
an  option of commuting  part of the pension into a lump sum which cannot exceed 1.1/2 years' 
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on grounds of ill  health and for survivors' benefits. 
The employee's contribution is tax deductible up to a limit of 15% of pensionable pay in 
the year in  which contribution  is  paid,  i.e.  tax and social  insurance contributions are assessed 
only on the net income after deduction of the pension scheme contributions. 
The employer's contributions to the pension scheme are tax deductible as a business 
expense in computing the employer's profits for tax purposes and,  in  addition, are not taxed as 
employee's pay. An employer is required to finance at least one sixth of the cost of the benefits 
to which each employee is  entitled at normal retirement age,  if the scheme is to qualify for full 
approval for tax purposes. To prevent pension funds being  used as a method of tax avoidance, 
approval can also  be withdrawn  by the Revenue Commissioners  if a large surplus is  built up. 
Revenue  approval  can  be  maintained  in  these  circumstances  if proposals  are  submitted  for 
reducing the surplus by either providing for improved benefrts up to the benefit limits permitted, 
or reducing contributions,  or a combination of both. 
The income from investment of  the scheme's assets and capital gains are exempt from 
tax. Tax paid  on  company dividends can  be  re-claimed,  and dealings  in government securities 
are exempt from stamp duty. Pension funds are also exempt from Deposit Interest Retention Tax 
with effect from 1 January 1993. 
Lump sums payable on retirement up to 1.1/2 years' salary are fully exempt from income 
tax.  In  the  case  of death  in  service,  lump  sums  up  to  4  years'  salary  payable  to surviving 
qependants are tax exempt. These exemptions apply to lump sums paid under both funded and 
unfunded schemes. 
Refunds  of personal  contributions  to  members who do  not  have  an  entitlement to a 
preserved  benefit  are  exempt from the standard  rate  (27%)  and  higher rate  (48%)  of tax:  a 
special rate of 25% is  payable by them. This rate had been set at 10% until 1992. 
Income tax is  payable  in  the  normal way on  regular pension  payments.  State social 
insurance pensions and any other income the pensioner may have are included in assessing tax 
liability. 
ITALY 
A new fiscal framework for supplementary pensions was established by the legislation 
adopted  in  April  1993, which  was subsequently amended  by  Decree  Law 585  of 30.12.1993. 
Employers' and  employees'  contributions  to  a pension  fund  are  deductible from  corporate  or 
personal income tax, subject to the following: 
- aggregate employer/employee contributions are deductible up to a ceiling  of 1  0%  of 
remuneration  on  which  the  annual  levies  for the compulsory termination  indemnity 
(TFR)  are assessed; 
- employers'  contributions  are deductible  up to a ceiling  equal  to  50%  of the annual 
amount paid  into the TFR scheme; 
- employees' contributions are deductible up to a ceiling equal to 3 million Lira per year; 
- the share of the annual TFR levy transferred to a pension fund is totally deductible; 
- benefits are taxed as earned income; 
- a special levy equal to 15% of aggregate employer/employee contributions  is due to 
the Treasury by pension funds as from July 1994. This levy shall be reimbursable to 
fund  members at the time of benefit payment,  in the form of a tax abatement on the 
amount of tax due on benefits; 
- transfer values are not subject to tax; 
- taxes are levied  on the investment yield  of the assets of a pension fund  at a rate of 
0.125%. 
The tax treatment of premiums paid to purchase an annuity with a lump sum benefit at 
retirement has  been made more favourable by Decree Law No.585. 
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Contributions  paid  by  an  employer into  an  employee  benefit  plan  are tax-deductible. 
These contributions are, however, treated as a benefit-in-kind  and are added to the employee's 
taxable income if the plan is funded through a direct group insurance contract or through a self-
administered pension fund set up as a separate legal entity. They are not taxed as a benefit-in-
kind to the employee when the plan is financed through allocations to internal pension reserves, 
with or without re-insurance. 
An  employer  who  wishes  to  assume  the  employee's  tax  liability  for  the  employer 
contributions to an  employee  benefifiplan,  can  pay a flat-rat~'tax of 6.31%, subject to certain 
conditions  stipulated  by  the tax authority.  The tax treatment of employee  contributions  to an 
employee benefit plan depends on the funding  method of the plan. 
Employees' contributions to group insurance contracts and to private pension funds are 
treated as ordinary life assurance premiums and are tax-deductible up to LFR 6,000 per annum, 
provided these contributions  are paid to  pension funds established  in  Luxembourg or to group 
insurance contracts under-written with  an  insurance company established  in  Luxembourg. 
Pension  benefits  payable  from  both  the  social  security  system  and  a supplementary 
company  plan,  irrespective  of the  funding  method,  are  taxed  as  earned  income.  Lump  sum 
benefits payable from an occupational pension plan  on retirement, are not subject to tax if they 
are  paid  from  a directly  insured  plan  or from  a separate  pension  fund.  Lump  sum  benefits 
payable  on  retirement  from  a book  reserve  arrangement  with  re-insurance  are  taxable  at  a 
separate rate of 34 per cent. 
NETHERLANDS 
Employers' and employees' contributions to approved pension plans (self-administered 
or insured)  are fully tax deductible.  A plan  is  not approved  if the level  of promised  benefits is 
considered  excessive  according to prevailing  social  standards.  Pension  benefits  are  taxed as 
social  security  pensions,  that  is  more  favourably  than  normal  earned  income.  Pension  fund 
assets and the yield from their investment are not taxed. 
PORTUGAL 
Employers'  contributions  to  supplementary  pension  plans  are  deductible  up  to  the 
equivalent of 15% of payroll,  or up to 25% if the covered workers are not insured under the state 
social  security system.  Employees'  contributions  are treated,  for tax purposes,  as  education 
expenses  or  insurance  premiums.  The  taxable  income  can  accordingly  be  reduced  by  a 
maximum amount of ESC  180,000 (single  persons)  or ESC 360,000  (married  persons).  Yield 
from pension plan  investments is tax free. 
SPAIN 
Qualified plans: 
Employees' contributions to supplementary pension plans are fully tax-deductible. They 
are individually  allocated to  members' accounts and they are added to the employee's taxable 
income (as if it was additional salary). However, employees are simultaneously allowed to deduct 
the imputed employers' contributions plus their own (if any) up to the lowest of the two following 
amounts: 
- 15% of gross remuneration from work (as an employee or as a self-employed person): 
or: 
- PTA 750,000 per annum, per member. 
Benefits are taxed  as  earned income.  If they are  lump sums,  a notional  redistribution 
over the number of years of membership is  effected for tax purposes. 
The institutions established to manage the assets (Entidades Gestoras) are exempt from 
VAT and from withholding  or similar taxes on investment yield. 
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There  are  four  main  taxation  consequences  of being  a  tax approved  occupational 
pension scheme: 
- employers' contributions are an allowable expense against profits; 
- employees'  contributions  are  tax deductible,  i.e.  tax is  assessed  only  on  the  net 
income after deduction of pension scheme contributions; 
- employers' contributions to the scheme are not treated as taxable remuneration in the 
hands of the employee, and 
- no  tax is  payable  on  investment  income  or capital  gains  within  the. pension  fund 
(although the recovery by the pension fund of tax paid by companies in which shares 
are held,  in  respect of their dividends, is less than 1  00%). 
In order to qualify for tax approval, the scheme must be established under an irrevocable 
trust and the employer must contribute to the scheme. Employee contributions must be limited 
to a maximum of 15% of earnings and the scheme must comply with  certain maximum benefit 
requirements. These include a maximum pension  (after 20 or more years' service) of 2/3 final 
remuneration (defined  in  one of several approved ways)  and  a variety of constraints on  other 
benefits, including  invalidity pensions, survivors' pensions and  lump sums. 
A lump sum of up to 4 years' salary may be  paid  on  death in  service. This is tax free 
provided it does not pass automatically to the member's estate. A lump sum of up to 1.1/2 years' 
salary may be  paid  to the  member on  retirement,  subject to 20 or more years' service  and  a 
corresponding reduction  in  the member's pension  benefit.  This is  also completely tax free. All 
other benefits are taxable as earned income in the hands of the recipient. 
The tax privileges of belonging to a tax-approved occupational pension scheme are not 
available  in  respect of earnings in  excess of £76,800 a year (about 4.5 times national average 
earnings), except for those individuals who remain in the pension scheme of which they were a 
member prior to 1 June 1989. However, earnings up to £76,800 a year can qualify for benefits 
under a tax approved scheme, even for new members. 
Pension funds which are approved must show that the level of funding  (i.e. the size of 
assets  matching  the  liabilities)  is·  within  the  actuarial  limits  set  by  supervisory  authorities. 
Approved funds are exempt from tax on investment income and on capital gains tax on disposal 
of assets (non-approved pension arrangements are subject to basic rate income tax). 
Protection of  members' rights 
Much  interest has  been  generated  in  Europe  in  recent  years  around  the question  of 
whether the  legitimate  rights  of members of voluntary  and  private  pension  arrangements  are 
sufficiently protected. Protection is needed at several levels. First, protection is needed against 
unjustified  discrimination  (for instance  on  grounds  of sex,  age,  employment  status,  etc.).  A 
second aspect is protection against mismanagement of resources and assets, depriving present 
or potential  beneficiaries  of their benefit  rights.  The third  is  protection  in  case of unforeseen 
events which may negatively affect individual rights, such as bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation 
of the sponsoring enterprise, mergers and acquisition of companies, and similar situations. The 
final  aspect is  protection against practices which diminish  the members' expectations to a fair 
and just benefit, including  protection against the risk of inflation. 
Safeguards and guarantees are built into all the national regulatory frameworks as well 
as  in  the specific  rules  that plan  sponsors draft when  establishing  a pension  fund.  In  certain 
countries ordinary legislation (civil or commercial law) contains provisions enabling beneficiaries 
of pension arrangements to claim their rights in  cases,  for instance,  of misconduct or violation 
of specific obligations by those responsible for managing the pension assets. 
In the following  sections, national details are provided only in  respect of four countries: 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries represent different 
typical patterns of protection of members' rights.  A full  12 country survey would have required 
a separate study. Before examining the country information,  it will  be  recalled that there is  no 
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certainty,  but  legal  safeguards  and  enforcement  of appropriate  sanctions  can  reduce  their 
number and  alleviate their damaging consequences. 
GERMANY 
The  legal  framework  for  protection  of pension  rights  is  essentially  found  in  labour 
legislation.  Safeguards have also been put in place by specific supervisory bodies. Labour court 
jurisprudence is equally important; its main principles  have been consolidated  in the act on the 
improvement  of occupational  pensions  (Gesetz  zur  Verbesserung  der betrieblichen  Alters-
versorgung,  BetrA VG). 
Duties and responsibilities  of management bodies: 
Employers  are  mainly  responsible  for guaranteeing  that pension  promises  are  kept. 
There  are  no  special  duties  or responsibilities  imposed  on  them,  other than  to  respect  the 
financial  safeguards  described  below  and  to  consult with  trade  unions  and  work councils  as 
necessary  (see  earlier  in  this  chapter).  Authorisation  of insurance  carriers  may  be  refused  if 
managers are not reliable. 
Financial safeguards: 
Financial  safeguards  against  insolvency  depend  on  the type  of arrangement that the 
employer has made to finance the pension  promise.  Legal insolvency coverage applies to any 
kind of pension promise with a direct or indirect liability on the sponsoring company. Under book-
reserving  and support funds, therefore,  protection for employees  is  secured using compulsory 
insolvency insurance provided by a single  carrier, the PSV (Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein).  Any 
assets held  by employers  in  respect of these kind  of pension  promises  are  not subject to any 
kind  of supervision  from  the  authorities.  The  existence  of insolvency  insurance  means  that 
members' pension  rights  can  be secured whilst allowing  full  self-investment of the money set 
aside to meet these pension  promises. 
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In contrast, the assets built up in Pensionskassen and under direct insurance represent 
the  security  against  employer 
insolvency and are therefore subject 
Table 21: 
Germany: Compulsory insolvency insurance 
Number of PSV members  37,758 
(employers) 
Contribution rate,  proportionate to  0.08% 
he total volume of benefits 
insured 
Number of pensioners drawing  2,939,182 
PSV benefits 
Number of employees with  4,259,50a 
vested rights insured with  PSV 
Number of insolvency claims  in  185 
1992 
Cost of 1992 claims  DM 140 mio. 
Total PSV expenditure  DM 525 mio. 
to  the  stringent  supervising 
requirements  of  the  insurance 
supervisor  in  Berlin  (the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt  far  das 
Versicherungswesen  - BAV). Accor-
dingly,  Pensionskassen  and  direct 
insurance contracts do not fall under 
the  coverage  of compulsory  insol-
vency  insurance.  Direct  insurance 
contracts  are,  however,  affected 
under  very  special  circumstances: 
where  rights  are  non-irrevocable 
rights  and  where the employer has 
borrowed on the policy or the policy 
has  been  surrendered  to  a  third 
party.  These  are  in  fact  very  rare 
cases. 
The  statutory  carrier  of 
insolvency  coverage  is  the 
Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein  (PSV) 
('pension  guarantee  association'}, 
having  the  legal  form  of a  mutual 
insurance  association  (Versi-
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employers,  of industries  and  of life  insurance  companies.  The  PSVs constitution  very  much 
reflects its origins and the threats to the book-reserving system which  prompted its creation.
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The  act  on  the  improvement  of  occupational  pensions  explicitly  defines  the 
circumstances under which the PSVhas to assume a liability.  The main  circumstances are as 
follows. In the event of an employer going into receivership or becoming bankrupt, the PSVtakes 
the  place  of all  the  beneficiaries  in  petitioning  the  administrators/courts  as  a creditor  of the 
company. Another important situation is the reduction or termination of benefits due to the poor 
financial condition of the employer company,  provided this has been approved by a decision of 
a  court  of law.  In  the  case  where  the  PSV deems  the  reduction  or termination  of benefits 
permissible,  no court decision is required. 
The PSVtakes out annuity contracts with a consortium of insurers in  order to 'buy-out' 
the benefits of  the former employees of the company in question. The PSV charges a levy to all 
employers who use a book-reserve or support fund financing  method so as to meet the annual 
shortfall  between  income  obtained  from bankruptcy  proceeds  and  the  cost  of purchasing  the 
relevant  annuity  contracts.  This  levy  (or 'insolvency  insurance  premium')  is  expressed  as  a 
percentage of  the liabilities of each employer when these liabilities  are calculated on a standard, 
specified actuarial basis. In case of book-reserving, the premium basis is the total book-reserve 
allowed for tax purposes in  respect (only) of already vested benefits and  pensions in  payment. 
Insolvency  coverage  is  compulsory  for  every  company  and  any  kind  of  benefrt 
concerned. This has been considered of particular importance to avoid negative selection, thus 
to allow its carrier to operate satisfactorily. 
As previously pointed out,  legal insolvency insurance is  intended to cover pensions in 
payment and preserved future benefit entitlements (i.e. the legal vesting terms must be fulfilled). 
Thus insolvency insurance only covers the minimum, non-escalating leaving service benefrt that 
must be provided according to German law.  Insolvency coverage does not only apply to old age 
and  post  retirement  benefrts  but  also  to  pre-retirement  benefits  such  as  disability,  early 
retirement, death in service, lump sum payments and certain kinds of prescribed salary related 
benefits.  Benefits  which  are  regarded  as  salary-in-kind  are  not  covered,  e.g.  so-called 
'Vorruhestands/eistungen'. 
The  upper  limit  of  benefits  covered  amounts  to  three  times  the  social  security 
contribution  ceiling  (1993  = OM  259,200).  This  limit  is  rarely  attained.  The  carrier  of legal 
insolvency  coverage  has  to  make  pension  increases  in  line  with  inflation  only  if explicitly 
promised by the plan. The basic data about insolvency insurance in 1992 are shown in Table 21. 
Another aspect of the protection  of members' rights relates to the rules  applied  in the 
event of company mergers and acquisitions.  These rules are: 
- that the liability  arising from book-reserves is transferred to the new company owner 
(both the plan  and the liabilities); 
- pension funds  are not automatically transferable to the new company owner.  Funds 
may continue to operate if the responsible  parties so decide; 
- insurance  contracts  can  be  continued  by  the  new  owner  or transferred  to  another 
insurance carrier; 
- support funds  are not transferable by  law to the new owner,  but  may be  transferred 
on  a contractual basis. 
In connection with plan termination the prevailing  rules  are that: 
- an  employer may at any time decide to close the plan to new entrants; 
- acquired  rights  (including  accrued  rights  in  respect  of  past  service)  must  be 
guaranteed, while  prospective  accruals  can  be  altered  if sound  reasons  can  be  put 
forward; 
- vested rights of current pensioners and of deferred pensioners must be guaranteed; 
- pension funds and support funds remain  in  existence, if necessary, to guarantee the 
payment of benefits; 
- insurance contracts generate a direct relationship between the insurance carrier and 
the employee, who holds the right to the benefits stipulated by the policy. 
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Benefits  in  course  of payment must  be  adjusted  for inflation  at the discretion  of the 
employer, at least every three years, provided the financial situation of the enterprise is sound. 
Partial inflation proofing is acceptable if  resources are insufficient. Retrospective adjustments are 
to be made as soon as the financial situation improves. 
Disclosure of information: 
Works councils  with  co-determination  rights  have  access to  full  information about the 
nature and status of the pension arrangement with which they are involved. As far as members' 
information is concerned the legal requirement is that the employee must have the right to see 
the pension  plan document outlining the benefits,  and that vested terminated employees have 
the right to be  informed  about their vested retirement benefits.  Information  is usually provided 
to members by handing out the pension rules, an explanatory booklet or the insurance contract. 
Members of pension  funds  and  support funds  are  normally  given  information  concerning  the 
financial  status  of the  fund.  It  is  not  normal  practice  to  provide  information  to  members 
concerning the level of any book-reserves. 
SupeNision: 
Book-reserve arrangements and support funds are supervised by the Ministry of  Finance, 
which can  remove tax advantages if fiscal  legislation  is infringed.  Pension funds and insurance 
contracts  are  supervised  by the  insurance  supervision  authority  (BAV).  Authorisation  can  be 
withdrawn where there is a violation  of the rules. 
IRELAND 
To  qualify  for tax approval  and  come  within  the  scope  of the  Pensions  Act,  funded 
schemes must be set up as  irrevocable trusts. The nature of trusts and their administration  in 
Ireland  has  already  been  described  in  an  earlier  section  of this  chapter  (Establishment 
procedures  and institutions  involved).  There are three  essential features  of trusts that are of . 
particular importance in  relation to protection of pension rights. 
- the trust fund must be separate from the employer's business and  its assets may not 
be made available to the employer's creditors; 
- a trust deed and rules, with which trustees must comply, sets down how the scheme 
is to be administered and  members' entitlements awarded; 
- trustees do not have any right to benefit from the fund  but have a duty to act in the 
best interests of  the main beneficiaries- the active members (current employees), the 
deferred  members  (early  leavers),  current  pensioners  and  those  categories  of 
dependants for whom provision  is  made under the trust deed and  rules. 
Pension  scheme trustees  are  subject  to  legal  obligations  set  down  in  trust law  and 
associated  case-law,  and  may  be  sued  under civil  law  for fraud  or other breaches  of trust. 
However, this legal framework on its own does not provide adequate protection of pension rights. 
There are no specific requirements to provide comprehensive and clear information to members 
as to how their scheme is  being  administered,  its financial  viability  and  on their own  personal 
entitlements. There would  normally be substantial costs  and delays involved  in  suing trustees 
for a breach of trust. In addition, even where such legal action succeeds, trustees may not have 
sufficient assets against which a decree for damages could be executed. 
Because of the deficiencies  in  the legal framework for the protection of pension rights 
under trust law, the Pensions Act was introduced in  1990 to complement the provisions of trust 
law and  remedy its  shortcomings. This Act provides that trustees have the main  responsibility 
for administering schemes and complying with the Act's other requirements,  and  in this way is 
designed  to  achieve  a proper  balance  between  ensuring  that  pension  rights  are  adequately 
safeguarded and avoiding over-regulation. 
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The specific duties and responsibilities of  the trustees of occupational pension schemes 
are laid down in  section 59 of the Pensions Act, and these are: 
- to  ensure,  insofar as  is  reasonable,  that contributions  payable  by the employer and 
members of the scheme, where appropriate, are received; 
- to provide for the proper investment of the  resources of the scheme  in  accordance 
with the rules  of the scheme; 
- where appropriate, to make arrangements for the payment of  the benefits as provided 
for under the rules of the scheme as they become due; 
- to ensure that proper membership and financial  records are kept; 
- to  arrange  for members'  rights  to  be  secured  if a decision  is  taken  to wind  up  a 
scheme, and to ensure that the wind up is  completed without undue delay; and 
- to comply with the other provisions of the Pensions Act. 
This has the effect of providing that trustees are now accountable for carrying out these 
duties not just to members under trust law, but also to the Pensions Board under the Act (see 
below). 
The Pensions Act also requires trustees to be specifically accountable to members by: 
- giving members the right to participate in the selection of a proportion of the trustees 
(described  in  the  previous  section  on  Establishment  procedures  and institutions 
involved);  and 
- requiring  trustees to disclose  specific  information  to  members  on  the  scheme,  its 
ongoing administration and financial viability and on members' personal entitlements. 
Disclosure of information: 
Trustees are required to disclose to the members a comprehensive range of information 
about the scheme. Basic information about the scheme must be made available covering such 
matters as eligibility,  conditions  of membership,  calculation  of contributions,  type and  level  of 
benefits and conditions for entitlement, and the addresses for enquiries about the scheme. This 
information  is  normally  made  available  in  a scheme  booklet  and  spouses  of members  and 
employees  who  will  become  eligible  to  join  the  scheme  are  also  entitled  to  receive  the 
information. 
Members are entitled to receive  full  information  on their own  personal entitlements on 
request at least once  every 12  months.  They are  also  automatically  entitled to receive  such 
information on leaving the employment, on retirement, on the death of  a member or a beneficiary 
and in the eventuality of the scheme being wound up. 
Trustees are required to account for the administration of  the scheme by making a wide 
range of documents available,  including the trust deed and  rules  and  an  annual report. 
The annual report must be made available not later than 9 months after the end of the 
scheme year.  In  the  report,  trustees  must account for such  matters  as  the  collection  of the 
contributions due, the investment of the scheme's resources, payment of benefits and,  if it is a 
defined benefit scheme, the actuarial valuation of  the scheme's assets and liabilities. They must 
also  disclose  whether more than  5%  of the scheme's  assets are  invested  in  the  employer's 
business or in  any one shareholding or property. 
These requirements not alone enable members and their trade unions to  monitor how 
their scheme is being administered, but the requirements to disclose can also deter trustees from 
taking actions that might place members' pension rights in jeopardy. 
Financial safeguards: 
The other major protection provided for in the Pensions Act involves a requirement for 
defined benefit schemes to comply with a funding standard. The aim of this is to ensure that the 
scheme  has  sufficient  assets to meet accrued  liabilities,  as  set down  in  the Act,  should  the 
scheme have to be wound up. The future pensions of those already receiving  pensions must be 
fully secured straightaway, as well as the preserved rights in respect of service from 1 January 
1991  of those yet to retire.  Other pre-1991  rights must be  100% funded by 1 January 2001. 
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scheme's assets  and  liabilities  carried  out  and  an  actuarial  funding  certificate  prepared  by  a 
qualified actuary and submitted to the Pensions Board at least every three and a half years. 
Where the certificate specifies that the scheme does  not satisfy the funding standard, 
a funding  proposal must be  prepared in  consultation with the employer and the actuary, which 
is designed to ensure that the scheme will satisfy the standard by the time the next certificate 
is due. This proposal must be submitted to the Pensions Board. 
If it  is  not  possible to  make a funding  proposal,  the trustees may  have to arrange to 
reduce the benefits due to members currently in employment to which the scheme applies (active 
members)  and  notify  these  members  of the  position.  If trustees  fail  to  take  this  action  the 
Pensions Board may intervene and direct them to do so. 
Any self-investment or concentration of  investment in excess of a prescribed percentage 
of the resources of the scheme cannot be taken into account for the purposes of complying with 
the funding standard. 
The measures described are designed to ensure that schemes are administered in such 
a way that there are sufficient assets in  the scheme at all  times to meet accrued  liabilities.  If 
there is  a shortfall as a result of,  for instance, poor investment performance or a failure to pay 
the full  contributions  due, then  it  either must be  made up by  increased  contributions from the 
employer and,  if appropriate,  active  members,  or the pension  entitlements of active members 
may have to be reduced. 
As there is in general no legal requirement on employers to establish and continue with 
occupational  pension  schemes,  it  is  open  to  employers  at  any  stage to  reduce  the  level  of 
pension  entitlements  promised  in  respect of future service or to discontinue the scheme.  The 
same applies in the case of  schemes where the company sponsoring the scheme is merged with 
or is  taken  over by  another company. The fact that the trust fund  must be  separate from the 
employer's  business  and  that defined  benefit  schemes  must comply  with  a funding  standard 
should normally ensure that accrued entitlements are protected. However, it is a matter for the 
merged  company  or the  new  company  in  a takeover situation  whether to  continue  with  the 
scheme in its existing form or make different pension provision or no pension provision in respect 
of future service. 
The provision made for the protection of accrued entitlements in the event of a scheme 
winding  up is  also designed to deal with situations where the employer becomes insolvent.  In 
these situations the scheme invariably has to be wound up. In defined contribution schemes, the 
contributions  are  allocated  to specific  members  and,  if the  scheme  is  being  wound  up,  the 
member's entitlement is directly linked to the value of the contributions linked to him or her. 
Contributions are normally  not allocated  among individual  members in  defined  benefit 
schemes.  The  member's  entitlement  is  determined  instead  by  the  scheme  rules,  and  the 
scheme's assets are allocated on a global basis to provide for entitlements as laid down in the 
scheme rules.  The Pensions Act provides that, notwithstanding the scheme rules, the priorities 
on winding up of a defined benefit scheme should be pensions currently in  payment, preserved 
benefits in  respect of service after 1 January 1991  and  additional voluntary contributions  after 
the  expenses  associated  with  the  winding  up  of the  scheme  are  met.  Current  employees, 
therefore,  have  the  lowest  level  of  protection  in  the  event  of a  scheme  winding  up  with 
insufficient assets to meet accrued entitlements. 
The  Protection  of Employees  (Employers'  Insolvency)  Act  of 1984  provides  for the 
payment to  the  pension  scheme  from  the  Redundancy  and  Insolvency  Fund  of unremitted 
employee contributions up to a maximum of employee contributions due in the preceding twelve 
months and any unpaid employer contributions due in  respect of the preceding twelve months. 
Indexation: 
There  is  no  legal  requirement  to  provide  for the  increase  of pensions  after award  to 
maintain the purchasing power of pensioners. However, recent surveys show that indexation of 
pensions in payment is now becoming a feature of a majority of schemes (more information was 
given in the earlier section on Design Strategies for Pension  Plans). 
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·The Pensions Act also  provides for the preservation  of benefrts  of early leavers,  e.g. 
those  changing jobs,  which  accrue  in  respect of service after 1 January 1991  (see  also  the 
section on Design strategies for pension plans) and for the application of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women. 
Public sector unfunded schemes: 
Public sector schemes which are unfunded are established under legislation enacted by 
Parliament, with the detailed rules set down in  statutory regulations.  They are administered by 
the  relevant  state  authorities  under the  general  supervision  of the  Department  of Finance. 
Accordingly,  legal  protection  afforded to  members' pension  rights  is  similar to that afforded to 
entitlements under state social security schemes. Most members of these schemes are in fact 
exempt from full social insurance cover on the grounds that they are members of state backed 
occupational pension schemes. 
Provision is made for increases in  pensions in  line with  increases in the pay of current 
employees.  Benefits are  fully  preserved in  the case of early leavers who have been members 
of the scheme for at least 5 years. Given the level of statutory protection of members' pension 
rights under these schemes, the Pensions Act only applies to such schemes in  relation to the 
disclosure of information and equal treatment requirements. 
Supervision: 
The  Pensions  Board  was  established  under  the  terms  of the  Act  to  monitor  and 
supervise its implementation and pension matters generally. Pension schemes must register with 
the Board within 12 months of being established, and most schemes are required to pay annual 
fees to the Board which finance its administrative expenses. The Board's main functions are: 
- to  issue  guidelines  to  trustees  on  their duties  and  responsibilities,  and  codes  of 
practice on specific aspects of their responsibilities; 
- to encourage the provision of appropriate training for the trustees of schemes and to 
advise the Minister for Social Welfare on standards for trustees; 
- to  provide guidance for scheme administrators on  compliance with the requirements 
of the Act in  relation to disclosure of information, preservation of benefrts, the funding 
standard and equal treatment; 
- to  ensure that scheme members are fully  informed of their rights  under the Act and, 
in particular, their rights to information on how their scheme is being administered and 
on their own  individual entitlements; 
- to investigate complaints concerning  possible  non-compliance with the provisions of 
the Act and,  if necessary, to take legal proceedings for breaches of the Act. 
Persons  convicted  of an  offence  under the Pensions  Act are  subject to  heavy fines 
and/or two years  imprisonment.  The Board  also  has the power to request courts to order the 
removal of  trustees, if it is considered that such action is necessary in the interests of members 
of schemes, and,  in  certain circumstances, to appoint new trustees. 
NETHERLANDS 
The  legal  framework for protection  of pension  rights  is  found  in  (i)  the  Pension  and 
Savings Fund Act (PSIN), (ii) legislation which has empowered the state to make compulsory an 
industry-wide fund based on collective agreements, (iii) collective agreements and individual fund 
rules and (iv) the powers entrusted to the supervisory bodies, such as the insurance chamber. 
Duties and responsibilities  of  management bodies 
There  are  no  special duties  or responsibilities  imposed  on  the managers  of pension 
arrangements, appointed or elected according to the procedures described earlier,  other than in 
respect of the financial  safeguards and the disclosure practices described below. 
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The Pension and Savings Fund Act (PSW) requires that funds intended for pensions are 
separated from the company by being  paid  into a pension fund  or an  insurance  company and 
cannot  be  claimed  by  that company  or its  creditors.  It  also  requires  that  at  all  times  assets 
(including  insurance  arrangements)  together with  future  contributions  can  be  expected to  be 
sufficient to meet all  liabilities.  Within this general requirement,  there is  scope for flexibility  in 
designing the funding plan to be followed to meet the overall long-term objective. Pension funds 
must be subject to actuarial control and an actuarial valuation must be made at least every five 
years and  submitted to the  insurance  chamber.  Where the arrangement is  with  an  insurance 
company, contributions are paid  at the rates agreed between the arrangement sponsor and the 
insurance company; the insurance company's business as a whole being subject to supervision 
by the insurance chamber. 
If assets are not sufficient to cover past-service rights, the Dutch courts have decided 
that non-payment of contributions is  a property debt and that in the event of the bankruptcy of 
the employer,  these contributions  must be  paid  prior to  paying  the claims  of preferential  and 
ordinary creditors. With regard to future service accruals, the 'Unemployment Act' requires that 
the  relevant  trade  associations  will  take  over the  insolvent  employer's  liability  for  pension 
contributions for a maximum period of one year. 
If  there is a company takeover by means of a transfer of assets, the acquiring employer 
is not bound to continue to honour the pension promises made by the first employer. Generally 
the employee will terminate participation in the pension scheme of  the transferring employer and 
the minimum entitlement will be to the benefits that would have been available had the employee 
left service. Whether there will be a pension provision for the employee with the new employer 
depends  on  whether that  employer  makes  a  pension  promise,  or falls  within  the  scope  of 
compulsory  participation  in  an  industry-wide  pension  fund.  If the  new  employer  operates  a 
pension arrangement, transfer of pension rights from the previous arrangement is possible if the 
pension funds or insurance companies concerned  are  prepared to  cooperate.  If the employee 
has already been  a member of a compulsory industry-wide  pension  fund  with the transferring 
employer, this membership will generally continue after the transfer of the company. 
In the event of the transfer of shares, an employee's participation  in  a pension scheme 
is unaffected as a transfer of shares changes nothing in the contract of employment. However, 
this may not always be the case. For example,  in the case of a company being detached from 
a  larger  industrial  corporation,  its  employees  may  no  longer  be  able  to  participate  in  the 
corporation's pension scheme. As is the case where there is a transfer of assets, their minimum 
entitlement will be to the benefits that would have been available had they left service in normal 
circumstances. 
Indexation 
There is  no  requirement that pensions  must be  increased  once in  payment. However, 
it is common practice for increases to be made to take account of increases in the cost of living. 
In this case, the same level of increases must be applied to the benefits of those who have left 
service but where the pension has not yet come into payment. 
Information  and disclosure 
Under the present rules either the industry-wide pension fund, or a company fund, must 
ensure  that  employees  can  have  access  to  the  statutes  and  pension  regulations.  At  the 
beginning  of May 1993, a bill  was presented to Parliament  aimed  at giving  all  those in  active 
employment an  annual summary and  balance of accrued pension rights. 
Supervision 
The supervision  of pension  funds  and  insurance companies  in  the Netherlands  is  the 
responsibility of the insurance chamber (Verzekeringskamer). 
Pension funds  must register with  the  insurance  chamber within  three months  of their 
establishment. Amendments to statutes and pension regulations must also be communicated to 
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chartered accountant, to the chamber, detailing the financial  state of the fund. 
The insurance chamber has the following  powers with regard to pension funds: 
(a)  to request and obtain information, summon witnesses and experts, consuH records; 
(b)  to make observations, request changes and bring such matters to public awareness; 
(c)  the insurance chamber can submit a request through the Amsterdam court of appeal 
that an administrator be appointed to a pension fund  if: 
- there is evidence of mismanagement of the funds; 
- the board of the fund fails to provide information; 
- the management of the fund  is found wanting. 
The supervision of insurance companies in the Netherlands is laid down in the 'Insurance 
Industry Supervision Act', which has been adjusted in line with the life and non-life directives of 
the Council of the EU. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The main protection for pension scheme members is provided by the trust fund and the 
role  of the trustees.  The trust fund  has  to  be  maintained  separately  from  the  assets  of the 
sponsoring  employer  and  money  can  only  be  lawfully  returned  to  the  employer  in  special 
circumstances. This applies to schemes in both the private and public sectors, apart from a few 
public service schemes which  are established  under their own  regulations  and  do not require 
Inland Revenue approval (e.g. the civil  service, the armed forces, teachers and  heaHh  service 
workers). 
Duties and responsibilities  of trustees 
Once trustees have been appointed they are not expected to behave as representatives 
of any  particular  sectional  interest.  It  is  their  responsibility  to  administer  the  trust  deed  in 
accordance with the rules of the scheme. The responsibility  of trustees is  laid down in  general 
trust law, which is of ancient origin  and does not provide specific principles relating to pension 
scheme issues. The trustees have a personal and fiduciary responsibility to invest the scheme 
monies in a prudent way, in compliance with the trust deed and rules. The trustees can delegate 
the tasks of administration  and  investment to employed  staff or to  external experts,  but they 
retain ultimate responsibility for the sound management of the affairs of the pension scheme. 
Financial safeguards 
In principle, the assets of the trust fund should  be maintained at a level that is at least 
sufficient to ensure that accrued liabilities  can be met should the arrangement be discontinued. 
If  the assets should at any time be shown by an actuarial valuation to be insufficient to meet the 
accrued liabilities,  it is the responsibility  of the trustees to seek to rectify the situation,  usually 
by  means  of additional  contributions  from  the  employer  over  a  future  period.  Employee 
contributions  may also  be  increased  in  some cases.  If the employer is  unable  or unwilling  to 
increase contributions,  it may be necessary for the trustees to wind up the scheme (or apply to 
the Court for directions) and secure benefits for past service. The law then requires the employer 
to meet any deficit. 
A full actuarial valuation must be carried out at least every 3.1/2 years. The actuary must 
comment on the funding  position  in  relation to accrued rights had the scheme been wound up 
on  the valuation  date,  and  must also  advise  on  the  contributions  necessary  in  the future to 
support the benefits. A surplus can only be removed from a continuing scheme with the approval 
of the  Inland  Revenue  and,  in  the  case  of some  contracted-out  schemes,  the  Occupational 
Pensions Board. 
In the event of the insolvency of the employer, or a decision by the employer to cease 
contributing to the scheme, it is the responsibility of  the trustees to ensure that the assets of the 
trust fund are applied to meet the accrued liabilities,  insofar as is  possible,  in  accordance with 
the rules of the scheme. The assets of the scheme cannot be called  upon by the liquidator of 
the employer's business. 
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discontinuance  liabilities,  the  balance  is  treated  as  a  debt  on  the  employer.  In  the  case  of 
insolvency of the employer, this debt will rank with other creditors in the liquidation.  If the debt 
is not paid, the trustees must reduce the benefits payable. This will  be done in accordance with 
the priorities laid  down in the trust deed and rules. 
There  are  no  specific  provisions  in  the  law  to  safeguard  the  interests  of scheme 
members  in  the case  of mergers or acquisitions  of companies  sponsoring  pension schemes. 
However, the trustees of the scheme or schemes involved  must comply with the provisions of 
the relevant trust deeds and rules, which, under Inland Revenue requirements, must provide for 
this situation. The provisions depend on the terms required  by the employer when establishing 
the scheme (subject to any subsequent alteration agreed with the trustees). Members will by law 
receive at least benefits appropriate to leaving service. Invariably there will be a power (but not 
an  obligation)  to  transfer assets  to  a  purchaser's  scheme  or in  some  other way  to  provide 
continuity  of pensionable  service.  The extent of any  unfunded liability,  or any surplus,  in  the 
pension scheme(s) will often be (or should be) a major consideration in negotiating the terms of 
any merger or acquisition. An unfunded liability is a debt on the employer, and on any successor 
employer. 
Indexation 
The rules often provide for pensions in  payment to be increased by a fixed  percentage 
each year (say 3%  or 5%).  Trustees have a discretion to award additional  increments as the 
finances of  the pension fund permit, with a view to maintaining more closely the real value of  the 
pension at the time of award. Most public sector pension schemes currently provide automatic 
or near-automatic indexation of pensions in  line with  movements in  the retail  price index.  (See 
also the section on  Design strategies for pension plans,  above.) 
Disclosure to scheme members 
Trustees  are  required  to  make  regular  disclosure  of certain  prescribed  documented 
information to scheme members. It is  considered sufficient for some details to be available on 
request, for example the trust deed and  rules,  but members must receive a written notification 
that the annual report and accounts (which include an actuarial certificate) are available. A large 
volume  of basic  information  about the scheme  must  actually  be  supplied  to  members.  This 
obligation can be met by issuing a scheme booklet, together with an update in the annual report. 
The information includes: 
- tax approval and contracted-out status; 
- eligibility  and  conditions for membership; 
- how contributions are calculated; 
- whether contributions have been paid in accordance with the rules and the recommen-
dations of the actuary; 
- benefit information; 
- rights of early leavers; 
- names of trustees; 
- investment policy; 
- extent of any employer-related investments; 
- review of financial development of the scheme. 
A statement by the actuary must be included in the annual report, referring to the latest 
valuation and the recommended rates of contribution. A full copy of  the actuary's valuation report 
is available to a member on  request. 
Supervision 
There is  no general system of supervision of pension schemes in  the United Kingdom, 
although,  as  mentioned  above,  certain  requirements  are  laid  down  regarding  authorised 
investment managers, actuarial valuations and the disclosure of information to members. There 
are  numerous statutory provisions  for the protection  of members but their enforcement relies 
upon  the  integrity  of trustees  and  the  legal  rights  of members  in  the  Courts  (or before  the 
86  Occupational pensions in the European Union Pensions  Ombudsman).  In  view  of the  fiscal  advantages  for an  approved  pension  fund,  the 
Inland Revenue exercises strict control on the compliance by pension funds with approved fiscal 
and financial requirements. 
Schemes which  are contracted-out of the state earnings-related  additional  pension are 
monitored by the Occupational Pensions Board,  an  independent statutory body, to ensure that 
they have, and are likely to continue to have, adequate resources to meet accrued liabilities  in 
respect of guaranteed minimum pensions. The actuary has to provide a regular certificate to this 
effect  and  the  supervision  relies  heavily  on  this  certification  process.  However,  no  specific 
funding standards are laid down. 
The  1993 report of the Pension Law Review Committee (the  'Goode Committee') 
On 30 September 1993 the Report ofthe Pension Law Review Committee was presented 
to  the  Secretary  of State  for  Social  Security.  The  report  contained  218  recommendations, 
covering  a broad  range  of issues  in  occupational  pension  provision  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
having particular regard to the importance of strengthening the security of the rights of members 
of pension schemes. The report recommends the creation of a post of 'Pensions Regulator' with 
adequate staffing to· supervise the operation of occupational pension funds and with powers to 
intervene in their affairs in  order to safeguard the interests of members. 
It  is  recommended  that the  trustees  of each  scheme  should  appoint  an  'appointed 
scheme actuary' with responsibility for monitoring the financial affairs of  the scheme, for reporting 
annually  on  the solvency status  of the  scheme,  and  for advising  the trustees on  the level  of 
funding necessary to ensure a satisfactory continuing financial  condition. 
· Pension schemes would be required to meet a minimum solvency requirement based on 
1  00% of the cash equivalents in respect of active members and former members with preserved 
benefits,  together with  100%  of the  cost  of purchasing  annuities  to  buy  out the  liabilities  in 
respect of pensions  in  payment  and  contingent  pensions  payable  to the  dependants of such 
pensioners.  Cash  equivalents  are  already  used  in  the  context  of transfers  between  pension 
schemes, and represent the present value of the preserved pension and other benefits to which 
an early Ieaver would be entitled. 
Pension  schemes  falling  below  the  minimum  solvency  standard  of  100%  of cash 
equivalents would be required to present a plan to demonstrate how the l;)Oivency position was 
to  be  restored.  Should  solvency  fall  below  a  'base  level'  of 90%  of cash  equivalents,  the 
Pensions Regulator would require an immediate injection of cash into the scheme or, failing that, 
consider whether to wind up the scheme and invoke the 'debt on the employer provisions' of  the 
UK pensions legislation. 
It is  recommended that a compensation  scheme should  be  established  to  handle the 
problem  of shortfalls  in  pension  scheme  assets,  restricted  however to shortfalls  arising  from 
fraud, theft and other misappropriation.  The compensation scheme would  be funded by means 
of a  post-event  levy  on  all  occupational  pension  schemes  which  might  be  covered  by  the 
compensation arrangements. 
The  Committee  argues  that  the  scheme  auditor  and  actuary  and  (ideally)  the 
administrator should not be trustees and that,  in schemes with more than fifty active members 
and  pensioners,  active members should  be  entitled to appoint a proportion  of the trustees.  In 
money purchase schemes, where the employer's liability is limited, this proportion should be two-
thirds, while  in  other schemes it  should  be  one-third,  with  a minimum  of two trustees in  each 
case. The provision of information for scheme members should be improved, both in content and 
in  clarity and presentation. 
No fundamental change is  proposed  in  the basic legal structure of UK pension  funds, 
relying  as it does on the ancient precepts of trust law.  However, there should be a consolidated 
Pensions Act,  and the Pensions Regulator would be responsible for administering  it. 
Following receipt of the report of the Pension Law Review Committee, the Government 
has consulted  on the  shape of future  pensions  legislation  and  is  expected to publish  a White 
Paper in June 1994. 
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PENSION FUNDS, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 
A growing concern 
The technique of funding supplementary pension liabilities  is used to varying degrees in 
all the countries of the EU, with the result that the size of funds available for investment varies 
greatly  from  one  country to  another.  Setting  aside  capital  to  cover future  commitments  is  a 
mandatory requirement for pension insurance policies written by life insurance companies.  It is 
also prudent practice for self-administered pension funds relying  on sources which may not flow 
indefinitely,  such as firms which, after having undertaken long-term pension commitments may 
cease to exist because of liquidation,  merger, or cessation of activity. Moreover, the security of 
members' rights,  present and future,  is enhanced by the existence of matching assets. 
It is therefore understandable that governments often only afford a full range oftax relief 
to  occupational  pension  schemes  subject  to  the  condition  that  the  relevant  liabilities  are 
adequately funded  (Italy,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain,  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom  and 
others). Funding (or the equivalent term often used:  'pre-funding') is also frequently considered 
as an important alternative to the pay-as-you-go system in  coping with the effects of an ageing 
population  on  the  financing  of old-age  pensions.  The  aim  of this  alternative  is  to  reduce the 
burden on future generations of the contributions or taxes needed for financing pensions. 
The economic and financial implications of funded supplementary pension arrangements 
have attracted increasing attention in  Member States and from the European Commission for a 
number of reasons.  First, the large accumulation  of assets for pension  purposes can  have an 
effect on savings patterns. Secondly, because the investment of these assets has an impact on 
the  volume  and  behaviour  of capital  markets.  Third,  because  the  yield  of  pension  fund 
investments  regulates  both  the long-term  level  of the  pension  contributions  required  and  the 
amount of retirement  income that fund  members receive.  Finally,  some Member States have 
highly developed financial  markets, attracting capital from abroad, while others do not, and the 
latter hope to increase their domestic market by developing funded second-tier schemes. 
The  theoretical  treatment  of the  relationship  between  pension  funds,  savings  and 
investment  can  be  found  in  specialized  economic  literature  and  studies.  However,  views 
expressed by economists often diverge, and a distinction needs to be made between theory and 
contemporary  practice.  The  present  chapter focuses  on  observed  national  policies  and  the 
practical results achieved. Hereafter, the term 'pension fund' is used, in short, to refer generally 
to all forms of voluntary or compulsory supplementary pension arrangements (second tier) which 
fund all or part of their liabilities. 
The size of  pension funds 
The financial  importance of pension funds can  be measured by the volume of its flows 
(receipts, expenditure),  or by the stock of assets held at any given time. This second measure 
is  more revealing  since  it  provides  an  indication  of the  size of resources held  to match future 
liabilities  and  of the  investment  potential  in  the  hands  of pension  fund  managers.  Available 
aggregate country data on  assets held  is  not always  comparable  because  of the  difficulty  of 
separating  supplementary  pension  portfolios  within  the  balance  sheet  of  life  insurance 
companies. Criteria for valuing the portfolio may also vary from country to country. The following 
information is the last reported by individual Member States. 
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Table 22: 
BELGIUM 
Value of assets held to cover supplementary pension liabilities 
(million Belgian francs, 1986-1991) 
Categories:  1986  1988  1990  1991 
Group insurance  308,378  396,804  467,557  503,442 
Pension Funds  160,000  180,000  192,000  206,000 
Total  468,378  576,804  659,557  709,442 
Source: Neyt (1993), Les trois pi/iers des pensions,  Document de 
travail pour Ia Table Ronde 'Pensions'. 
DENMARK 
Table 23: 
DENMARK 
Value of assets held to cover supplementary 
pension liabilities, 1982-1991 
(million Kroner) 
Year  Industry-wide  Company funds  Insurance 
funds  companies 
1982  25,800  13,400  74,400 
1983  37,800  13,400  85,600. 
1984  45,700  16,300  105,800 
1985  53,500  18,700  125,200 
1986  61,700  19,500  142,800 
1987  68,400  21,100  156,800 
1988  77,400  22,000  174,200 
1989  86,900  22,500  184,600 
1990.  95,400  23,600  201,100 
1991  104,400  24,800  222,000 
Source: Finansti/synet 
The above figures do not include personal pension plans 
purchased by  individuals from banks.  However, the 
figures for insurance companies also include pension 
plans taken out by individuals. 
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Repartition  schemes,  such  as  AGIRC and  ARRCO,  hold  assets  only  as  contingency 
reserves  since  they  do  not  fund  their  liabilities.  As  their  coverage  is  vast,  however,  their 
contingency reserves represent substantial asset holdings: 140 billion French francs in 1991 . The 
handicraft pension fund CANCAVA showed assets worth 16.8 billion francs to cover compulsory 
supplementary pension  liabilities.  Reserves  have  also  been  accumulated  by  funded  pension 
schemes of  large industrial companies (about FF 15 billion), those of  the banking and agricultural 
service  sector (about  FF 26 billion),  the  public  sector schemes  PREFON and  CREF (about 
FF 21  billion); the pharmacists' fund and other minor funded schemes account for an estimated 
asset volume of 75 billion  francs. 
Company savings plans (PEE) had an aggregate asset value of 90 billion French francs 
at the end of 1992. A few tens of billion French francs were in company frozen benefit accounts, 
although not necessarily matching retirement benefits. 
GERMANY 
Only very broad estimates of the amount of funded pension liabilities  are available for 
1992.  A  survey  carried  out  in  1991  of the  40  largest  Pensionskassen,  covering  2,335,000 
employees, showed that the total volume of assets invested amounted to DM 75.8 billion.  The 
amount of book reserves has been growing at a fast pace:  in  1986 these had  been estimated 
by the Bundesbank at DM  168.4 billion. 
GREECE 
Reliable  data  is  available  for assets  held  by  the  compulsory  supplementary  pension 
funds. However, it is not possible to identify the amount of reserves held by insurance companies 
in  respect  of group  (or personal)  insurance 
contracts. The overall amount of  assets of the 
compulsory funds was Drs 398,100 million  in 
1989. 
IRELAND 
The figures in Table 24 show that the 
volume  of  assets  grew  at  an  annual 
compound rate of nearly 30 per cent in the 14 
year  period  under  review.  According  to 
surveys carried out by the Irish Association of 
Pension  Funds  15,  the growth of the value  of 
assets  continued  after  1989,  rising  to 
IR£ 9,300 million  at the end  of 1991  and  to 
IR£ 9,700 million  at the end of 1992. 
ITALY 
The  most  recent  available  figures 
from  the  databank  of the  Centro  Europa 
Ricerche  (CER) show a total value of assets, 
held  by  1  078  pension  funds,  amounting  to 
11,250 billion  lire  in  1991. 
Table 24: 
IRELAND: Value of assets held to 
cover supplementary pension 
liabilities, 1975 - 1989 
(IR£ million, end of year) 
Year:  Value of assets: 
1975  210 
1980  882 
1983  2,249 
1984  2,513 
1986  4,000 
1987  5,527 
1988  6,690 
1989  7,940 
Source: Private Pensions in  OECD 
Countries - Ireland (Hughes: 1994, 
see note 10) 
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Table 25: 
NETHERLANDS: 
Value of assets held to cover supplementary pension 
liabilities in the private sector, 1989-1992 
(million Guilders) 
Year:  Single employer  Industry-wide  Total 
funds  funds 
1989  102,256  98,057  200,313 
1990  104,209  103,421  207,630 
1991  111,407  111,496  222,903 
1992  119,917  120,568  240,485* 
Source: Socia/-economische  maandstatistiek (CBS) 93/4 
* An amount of 736 million  should be deducted from this figure to obtain 
the amount of assets net of non-pension financial liabilities. 
The most recent (1992) estimates of the assets held by the pension funds in the public 
sector were: 
PORTUGAL 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Fund:  Amount of assets: 
Civil Service (ABP)  Dfl177,044 million 
Railways  Dfl 10,031  million 
Table 26: 
PORTUGAL: 
Value of assets held to cover supplementary 
pension liabilities, 1990-92 (million Escudos) 
Open Funds  Total 
167,556  3,176  170,732 
282,866  7,757  290,623 
436,730  15,873  452,603 
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Table 27: 
SPAIN: 
Value of assets held to cover supplementary pension  liabilities 
of qualified plans under  the 1987 Pensions Law* 
(million Pesetas) 
Year:  Employment  Plans for  Total 
related  plans **  members of 
associations 
1990  348,839  15,898  364,737 
1991  503,332  22,804  526,136 
1992  628,402  29,950  658,352 
Source:  INVERCO 
*  Excluding individual  plans which had accumulated by the end 
of 1992 assets valued  at 424,619 million  Pesetas. 
**  The amount of assets shown does not reflect the full  volume 
of  liabilities,  since  employers  have  until  1999  to  transfer 
gradually  to  the  pension  fund  - from  the  company  balance 
sheet- the assets backing past service liabilities  recognised; 
but unfunded, when the 1987 Law came into effect. 
Table 28: 
SPAIN: 
Value of assets held to cover 
supplementary pension liabilities 
of Mutual Benefit Societies 
1987-1992 (million Pesetas) 
Year:  Value of assets: 
1987  225,437 
1988  270,052 
1989  344,877 
1990  580,955 
1991  674,695 
1992  850,000 
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Information  is  available  about  pension  fund  assets,  while  data  for pension  contracts 
handled directly by insurance companies is  not readily identifiable. 
Table 29: 
UNITED KINGDOM: 
Market value of assets held to 
cover supplementary pension 
liabilities of pension funds in the 
public and private sector 
1984-1991 
(£ million, end of the year) 
Year:  Net asset value: 
1984  139,290 
1985  168,059 
1986  211,220 
1987  227,551 
1988*  267,446 
1989*  338,950 
1990*  302,714 
1991*  343,667 
* Figures from 1988 are subject to 
revision 
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Table 30: 
Summary of recent estimates of the value of assets held to cover supplementary 
pension liabilities in the EU (national currency and ECU equivalent) 
Estimates of assets held 
Type of institution 
(million): 
Country:  holding assets:  Year:  nat. currency:  ECU: 
- group insurance  1991  BF 503,442  11,923 
BELGIUM 
- pension funds  1991  BF 206,000  4,879 
- life insurance  1991  Dkr 222,000  28,071 
DENMARK 
- personal plans in 
1991  Dkr 76,400  9,660 
banks 
- pension funds  1991  Dkr 129,200  16,337 
- AGIRCIARRCO  1991  Fr 140,000  20,077 
FRANCE 
- other funds  1992  Fr 168,800  24,648 
- book-reserves  1992  OM 250,000  123,743 
GERMANY  - Pensionskassen  1992  OM  95,000  47,022 
-other  1992  OM  88,000  43,557 
GREECE  - pension funds  1989  Drs 398,100  2,226 
IRELAND  - pension funds  1992  lr£ 9,700  12,751 
ITALY  - pension funds  1991  Lit 11,250,000  7,337 
- private sector funds  1992  Dfl 240,485  105,716 
NETHERLANDS 
- public sector  1992  Dfl187,075  82,237 
1992  Esc 452,000  2,587 
PORTUGAL  - pension funds 
Vl/1993  Esc 556,400  3,185 
- pension funds  1992  Pst 658,352  4,968 
SPAIN  - individual  plans  1992  Pst 424,619  3,204 
- Mutual Associations  1992  Pst 850,000  6,414 
UNITED KINGDOM  1991  £ 344,000  490,719 
Notes: 
Germany:  'Other' assets include those of support funds and direct insurance. 
Greece:  Compulsory auxiliary funds only. 
Luxembourg:  Pension assets do not represent a significant volume. 
United Kingdom:  Total net assets of all UK insurance companies were £277,000 
million  in  1990; this figure includes life insurance, general insurance 
and pension business. 
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value  of  assets  held  to  cover  supplementary  pension  liabilities  in  Member  States.  The 
comparisons should  be  interpreted with  care,  taking  into  account the reservation  made earlier 
as  to the quality  and  comprehensiveness  of the  data.  The  purpose  of the  comparison  is  to 
demonstrate that there are wide differences in Europe as to the financial dimension acquired to 
date by supplementary pension funds. 
UNITED KINGDOM, 1991  NETHERLANDS,1992 
(million ECU)  (million ECU) 
(a) Assets  490,719  (a) Assets  187,953 
(b)  GOP  816,535  (b) GOP  247,589 
(c)  Stock Market  2,725,700  (c)  Stock market  169,900 
capitalisation  capitalisation 
% (a)/(b)  60.1  % (a)/{b)  75.9 
% (b)/(c)  18.0  % (b)/(c)  110.6 
GERMANY, 1992 
(million ECU) 
(a) Assets, incl.  book-reserves  214,322 
(b) Assets, excl.  book-reserves  90,579 
(c)  GOP  1,383,050 
% (a)/(b), incl.  book-reserves  15.5 
% (b)/(c), excl.  book-reserves  6.6 
For the countries with the largest accumulation of assets (or reserves), a comparison has 
been  made with  relevant  macro-economic aggregates.  The  aggregate  (c)  in  the table  for the 
United Kingdom  excludes a small  volume of non-UK securities  (Irish,  etc.). It should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  if account  could  be  taken  of the  volume  of assets  matching  insurance  pension 
business  (groups  contracts,  personal  pensions)  the  ratios  above  would  be  significantly 
increased.
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As far as Germany is concerned, comparisons can be made including book-reserves (i.e. 
the  earmarked  pension  assets  remaining  in  the 
employer's  balance-sheet,  that is  the self-financing 
assets) or excluding them. 
Comparable  figures  about  stock  market 
capitalization  are  not  available  for  Germany  as  a 
whole.  As a matter of broad  reference,  however,  it 
can  be  recalled  that  in  1988  the  total  market 
capitalization  of domestic shares  in  Frankfurt was 
ECU  215,290  million.  The  data  for  Denmark  and 
Ireland is equally interesting. In Ireland, pension fund 
assets represent 25%  of national savings. 
IRELAND, 1992 
(million ECU) 
(a) Assets 
(b) GOP 
% (a)/(b) 
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12,751 
33,039 
38.6 
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(million ECU) 
(a) Assets  54,068 
(b)  GOP  105,370 
(c)  Stock market  40,120 
capitalisation 
% (a)/(b)  51.3 
% (b)/(c)  134.8 
As  mentioned  above,  the  empirical 
evidence  of the  net  effect  on  national  savings  of 
funded supplementary pensions is scarce. However, 
the  fact  remains  that  personal  net  savings  of 
households  in  life  insurance  companies  and 
pension  funds  may  represent  a  very  significant 
proportion  of  net  national  savings.  In  1991  the 
proportion  was  56  per cent of national  savings  in 
the Netherlands and 30 per cent of national savings 
in the United Kingdom. 
The total amount of assets held by pension 
funds  normally  covers  two types  of liabilities:  the 
present value of pension rights already acquired by 
existing  pensioners  and  the  present  value  of 
pension  rights  in  course  of  acquisition  by 
employees who will retire  in  future years. 
If separate  figures  could  be  obtained  for  the  two  groups  of liabilities,  and  of the 
corresponding  number of pensioners  and  of prospective  beneficiaries,  it  might be  possible  to 
calculate other indicators such as (i) the average asset holdings per active fund member and (ii) 
the average asset holdings per pensioner.  Such indicators would throw light on the magnitude 
of pension provision actually available at any given time for specific groups of individuals through 
supplementary arrangements. The macro-economic indicators  discussed above reflect,  on the 
contrary, the relevance of such arrangements for the economy and for the financial market rather 
than for individuals. 
The behaviour of  pension funds in financial markets 
Accumulating  capital  against  future  pension  liabilities  is  prudent  and  reasonable 
behaviour but- it has often been said -it is not beneficial per se to the national economy. What 
ultimately is of importance to the economy is the use made of the capital, that is its investment 
in  specific real assets. 
The  behaviour  of fund  managers  as  institutional  investors  is  conditioned  by  several 
factors: those which determine the supply of financial and non-financial assets, those which may 
restrict their demand,  and  finally  the  structure  and  cost of financial  services  available  on  the 
market. 
Without entering into detail,  it will  be recalled that the supply of capital depends mainly 
on:  (i)  macro-economic factors, such as the level of public debt, aggregate domestic savings, or 
the rate of industrial  investment; (ii)  inflation trends, interest rate trends and the profitability  of 
companies  which  seek finance  on  the  market,  and  (iii)  the  institutional,  legal  and  regulatory 
context having a bearing on  investments. All these elements are highly country-specific. 
As far as demand is concerned, pension fund managers may be in a privileged position 
compared to other institutional investors. Pension rights accrue over a long period and forecasts 
can  easily  be  made  for the time when  pension  payments fall  due.  Accordingly,  pension  fund 
managers can develop long-term investment strategies within which the traditional considerations 
as to asset risk,  yield  and  liquidity  can  be  accommodated. Naturally,  if the regulatory context 
provides for mandatory investment requirements (limits, etc.) pension fund investment managers 
are less free to direct as they may wish the demand for assets. 
The structure and the cost of the financial services available to pension fund managers 
is also bound to have an influence on their choices, in particular because insurance companies, 
banks  and  investment companies  compete for customers.  The  pattern  of performance  of the 
providers of financial services and the fees they charge may change in the future with increased 
competition and the gradual integration and liberalisation  of the  European financial markets. 
The distribution of the portfolio of assets held  by pension funds at any time reflects the 
interaction  of all the factors described above. The pattern of such  portfolios  in today's Europe 
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reflection  of investment  rules  and  regulations  issued,  in  the  public  interest,  by  supervisory 
authorities. The brief country review which follows  highlights the differences observed. Luxem-
bourg has been omitted because of the small volume of assets involved. 
BELGIUM 
Pension fund investment is regulated by the supervisory authority. Both pension fund and 
insurance  carriers  have  to  invest  no  less  than  15%  of their  assets  in  Belgian  government 
securities.  Maximum permissible holding of other assets is  prescribed: 
Investment  Pension  Insurance 
restrictions  Funds  companies 
(Maximum permitted as a % 
of total investment) 
Belgian  bonds  85  50 
International  85  10 
bonds 
Investment funds  85  5 
In  1991,  Belgian  bonds  represented  on  average  45%  of all  invested  assets  by  the 
institutions concerned. 
Table 31: 
BELGIUM: 
Asset Volume by Class 
(million Belgian francs) 
Type of investment:  Life  Pension  Retirement  Total 
insurance  funds  savings* 
Fixed yield  732.2  119.8  44.8  896.8 
Variable yield  205.8  75.1  38.1  319.0 
Other  26.4  10.7  2.3  39.4 
Total  964.4  205.6  85.2  1,255.2 
Source:  OCA (Insurance Supervisory Body) 
* Retirement savings are plans subscribed by individuals,  (normally considered 
as 'third tier' provision). 
DENMARK 
The Act on  Insurance Business  {applicable  to industry-wide  pension  funds  and to  life 
assurance companies) and the Act on the Supervision of Pension Funds (applicable to company 
pension  funds) stipulate that at least 60  per cent of the assets which  cover pension  liabilities 
shall be invested in: 
(a)  securities issued by the Danish Government or guaranteed by it; 
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Municipalities  or other Danish financial institutions placed under public supervision; 
(c)  deposits in  banks; 
(d)  loans (backed by fixed property) not exceeding two thirds of the estimated value of 
the property at the last fiscal assessment; 
(e)  assets which must be considered to have the same security as the assets mentioned 
under (a)-(d) above (this rule  is  used for foreign assets). 
(Rules in the Act on Insurance Business governing the investments are to be modified to comply 
with the EC Third Life Assurance Directive.) 
Similar provisions  are found  in  ATP legislation,  with the exception that at least 75 per 
cent of the assets must be  placed in  assets mentioned under (a)-(  e)  above. In addition,  under 
the A TP scheme an employer has the possibility to borrow an amount not exceeding 50 per cent 
of his contribution to the A TP at current bank loan rates. The results of such policies are shown 
in the following table. 
Table 32: 
DENMARK: 
ATP Asset Volume by Class 
(million Kroner, end of year) 
Year  Bonds  Equities  Loans  Property  Other 
1983  25,500  2,600  100  100  2,400 
1984  29,900  3,200  100  200  2,900 
1985  35,200  4,000  100  600  3,100 
1986  41,500  5,000  200  1,500  2,500 
1987  46,100  6,200  200  1,700  2,500 
1988  51,900  7,400  200  2,200  2,700 
1989  57,600  8,400  200  2,200  2,800 
1990  64,100  10,100  700  2,200  3,300 
1991  71,100  11,900  600  2,500  3,200 
1992  77,400  13,500  700  2,700  3,500 
At least 80 per cent of assets (life assurance companies and industry-wide funds) have 
to be held in the same currency as the liability.  In the case of an EU currency, up to 50 per cent 
of  the liabilities can be covered by assets denominated in ECU. These rules correspond to those 
of the EU Second Life Directive. Company funds are still obliged to cover 100 per cent of their 
pension  liabilities  by  assets  denominated  in  the  same  currency.  However,  the  supervisory 
authorities have shown considerable flexibility  in the application  of this rule. 
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DENMARK: 
Asset Volume by Class(%) 
Private Pension Funds and Insurance Companies 
Percentage of total invested in: 
Year:  Bonds  Equities  Property  Associated  Loans 
companies 
1982  73.3  2.9  2.3  - 8.2 
1983  73.0  4.4  2.2  - 7.5 
1984  74.8  4.5  2.7  - 6.5 
1985  74.1  5.7  3.4  - 5.7 
1986  75.6  5.8  4.0  - 5.5 
1987  75.5  6.3  4.1  - 5.0 
1988  74.1  8.9  4.1  - 4.4 
1989  72.6  10.4  4.3  2.3  4.9 
1990  70.6  10.5  4.2  4.7  4.4 
1991  66.8  12.0  4.1  7.2  3.8 
A noticeable trend is the recent increase in equity investments to the detriment of bonds. 
Two main themes are dealt with  in  relation  to pension  fund  and  life assurance investments in 
Denmark.  First,  it  has  widely  been  regarded  as  an  advantage,  also  by  the  authorities,  that 
institutional  investors place  a larger proportion  of their assets in  shares. This  has meant that 
during  the 1980s ceilings  in  pension  funds  and  on  life  assurance  companies  concerning  the 
investment in  'safe  assets' have  been  lowered,  making  more room  for investment in  shares. 
Furthermore, changing governments have, on various occasions, prompted pension funds to take 
an  active part in  venture capital finance. 
Secondly, fund managers tend to take a growing interest in the management of industrial 
companies, criticizing the Danish system of differential voting rights for shares, which makes it 
difficult for managers to exercise influence over them. 
FRANCE 
The Social Security Code contains general guidance for pension institutions as regards 
the investment of  their reserves. One half of assets must be represented by securities issued or 
guaranteed by the state. AGIRC and ARRCO have developed their own rules within the overall 
guidance and  have adopted  investment policies  which  suit their financial  organisations.  Since 
their liabilities are not funded, the contingency reserves held are mainly invested on a short-term 
basis to ensure the necessary liquidity. 
ARRCO's prudent management practice requires that assets earmarked for investment 
are  invested  in  bbnds  (not  less  than  68%  of the total),  in  loans  (not  more than  12%) and  in 
equities or real estate (not more than 20%). 
AGIRC's rules require that loans should not have more than 10 years' maturity and that 
specific investments do not exceed a given percentage of the total (real estate: 25%; personal 
loans:  25%; securities of a single enterprise:  30%).  Not more than 10%  of the total should  be 
invested in any one security. 
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November 1991  the asset distribution concerning short-term as well  as medium and  long-term 
investments was as follows: 
ARRCO:  54%  of assets are liquid 
45% of assets are invested medium or long-term 
AG/RC:  44% of assets are liquid 
56% of assets are invested medium or long-term 
In general, bonds represent the largest holding. In the federations, AGIRC and ARRCO, 
as well  as  in  their member funds,  in-house asset management is  most common but there are 
exceptions. Data on average yield is scant. It is believed that the rates of return in recent years 
were close to 9%  or 1  0%  per year. 
Insurance companies obey the overall investment guidelines set for the whole industry 
by the supervisory authority. Bonds are well  represented in their portfolios. 
GERMANY 
The Insurance Control Act (VAG) regulates the investment of life insurance companies 
and of Pensionskassen. Section 54 of VAG sets out the types of investment authorized, together 
with  limitations on their proportion within the total volume of assets held. The main constraints 
are as follows. Certain types of investments are authorized without specific limit, except that any 
one  investment cannot represent more than 50%  of the total held:  mortgages, debt,  loans on 
insurance policies,  bearer bonds, term and fixed deposits or savings,  unit-linked  policies. 
The  follo~ing investments are subject to prescribed limits: 
Property 
5%  (freehold) residential 
1  0%  non-residential 
Debentures, bonds, loans  5%  outside Germany 
Ordinary shares (including 
20% for 'tied' reserves 
25% in  'non-tied' reserves ,and 
investment trusts)  5%  in  any one German company 
A general constraint applicable to all  investments is that not more than 2%  of the total 
can  be  placed  in  any one bank. Currency matching requirements are also set out in  the VAG. 
'Tied'  reserves  have  to  observe  full  currency  matching,  subject  to  one-half  being  in  ECU 
denominated assets. For premium reserves, 5% of non-matching reserves are allowed while for 
other liabilities the allowance is up to 20%. 
Portfolio distribution information is available only as regards the investments of a sample 
of 147 large Pensionskassen. 
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GERMANY: 
Asset volume by class 
Pensionskassen, end of 1992 
(million Marks) 
I  Class of assets:  I  DM  million  I  %1 
Equities  1,676  2.1 
Real property  5,626  7.0 
Notes receivable and 
loans  8,356  10.4 
Registered bonds  17,953  22.3 
Fixed-interest 
securities  20,290  25.2 
Mortgages  8,759  10.9 
Shares in  investment 
trusts  15,499  19.3 
Other  2,210  2.7 
Total  80,369  100.0 
GREECE 
The  legal  framework  concerning  the  investment  of the  capital  accumulated  by  the 
compulsory auxiliary funds has been simplified and made more flexible since the entry into force 
of Law 2042 in 1992. Previously, pension funds were obliged to deposit all their surplus with the 
Bank of Greece, or alternatively an appointed Bank which normally invested in state securities 
and, to a lesser extent, in shares and real estate. 
Since 1992 pension funds can withhold every year up to 20 per cent of the accumulated 
capital from the amounts deposited with the Bank of Greece (or its appointed substitute) and can 
invest  directly.  Restrictions  still  exist  because  direct  investment  must  respect  prescribed 
maximum limits:  not more than  40%  in  real  estate and  the rest in  bonds  or shares of quoted 
enterprises. Separate legislation from 1990 has opened the door to the establishment of mutual 
funds  to  be  managed  by  specialised  investment  companies.  The  latest  development  (Law 
2076/1992) consists of enabling a pension fund to establish, independently or jointly with another 
fund, an investment management company (A.E.D.A.K.). 
The  trend  towards  greater flexibility  in  pension  fund  investment  has,  however,  been 
accompanied by the imposition of  strict procedures for obtaining the relevant authorisations from 
the competent government departments, a situation which  may be justified  by the fact that the 
pension funds concerned are compulsory and government regulated. 
At the end  of 1989, the  breakdown  of the assets  held  by  compulsory auxiliary  funds 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Security was as follows: 
Bank deposits  103.1  billion  Drs 
Equities and bonds  110.9 billion  Drs 
Real estate  184.1  billion  Drs 
As far as voluntary supplementary provision  is  concerned,  investment management is 
entirely in  the hands of insurance companies which  have to comply with the rules  on  prudent 
management laid down in  EU  insurance directives. 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  101 ITALY 
A recent estimate (1991) of the composition of the portfolio of Italian pension funds gave 
the following  breakdown. 
Treasury stock  61.0 
Bonds  10.5 
Property  1  0.0 
Investment trusts  10.0 
Shares  3.5 
Others  5.0 
The  strong  preference  for  Treasury  stock  (highly  remunerative)  is  also  typical  of 
investments made by life insurance companies handling  group pension  insurance. 
IRELAND 
The  trustees  of  pension 
funds  have  the  primary  respon-
sibility for the proper investment of 
the  scheme's  resources  under 
Trust  Law  and  the  Pensions  Act. 
This  involves  pursuing  a  prudent 
investment policy and, in particular, 
ensuring  that  there  is  a 
diversification of investments. They 
are  required to inform members in 
the trustees' annual report if more 
than  5%  of the  scheme's  assets 
are  invested  in  the  employing 
company  or  in  any  one 
shareholding  or  property.  There 
are  also  limits  on  the  extent  to 
which  these  investments  can  be 
taken  into  account  in  meeting  the 
funding  standard which  applies  to 
defined benefit schemes. 
One of  the main influences 
in  Ireland  on  the  investment  of 
Table 35: 
IRELAND: 
Asset Volume by Class(%), end of year 
,..  .&  et  1980  1988  1991 
Domestic Equities  16.0  23.3  24.2 
Domestic Bonds  30.0  44.8  31.5 
Property  19.0  4.4  7.0 
International 
assets  23.0  21.0  32.0 
Other  12.0  6.5  5.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources: Heffernan: 1991  and  IAPF: 1992 
and  1993, see notes 15 and  17. 
pension scheme assets in recent decades was the imposition of exchange controls in  1979 and 
their subsequent removal in  1988. Ireland was part of the Sterling area up to 1979 when Ireland 
joined the European Monetary System and the link with Sterling was broken. 
Exchange control  regulations were introduced at that time to protect the currency and 
remained in force until 1988. These regulations did not require repatriation of assets already held 
abroad. Instead they laid down that no more than 10% of cash flow (contribution plus investment 
income less all outgoings) could  be converted into foreign  currency to purchase non  Irish punt 
denominated assets. 
The  average  distribution  of assets  in  Irish  pension  funds  shortly  after the  exchange 
controls were  introduced  (1980),  at the time  of their removal  (1988)  and  in  1991  is  shown  in 
Table 35. The small size of the equity market in  Ireland meant that investments in  bonds were 
at  an  artificially  high  level  by  1988,  because  of the  operation  of  the  exchange  controls. 
Accordingly, when these controls were removed  Irish  pension funds  reduced their exposure to 
bonds and switched a significant proportion of fund assets into foreign equities. The fact that this 
was  mainly  a change to  investment  into  foreign  equities  can  be  illustrated  by the fact that in 
1988, 9.2%  of assets were  invested  in  European  (other than  Irish) equities and this  increased 
to 14.8% in  1991, and in  1988, 8.2% of assets were invested in non-European equities and this 
increased to 13.1  in  1991. 
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Ireland: Pension fund 
investment returns 
3 Year Periods  Real 
investment 
returns(%) 
1971/74  -14 
1975/77  20 
1978/80  0 
1981/83  4 
1984/86  12 
1987/89  15 
1990/92  -2 
Source:  Investment Returns in 
the 1990s (Faherty: 1993, see 
note 17) 
NETHERLANDS 
In  Ireland, the  liabilities  of pension 
schemes are  mainly salary linked  and the 
net  return  required  on  investment  of 
scheme  assets  has  to  be  in  excess  of 
salary inflation. It is estimated by actuaries 
that  salary  inflation  in  the  longer  term 
equals  price  inflation  plus  2%  and, 
therefore,  the  return  required  to  meet 
pension  scheme liabilities  should  average 
price inflation plus 4% over the life cycle of 
a scheme (Faherty: 1993).
17 
Table 36 shows in 3-yearly cycles 
the volatility  in  the investment  returns  for 
pension funds in Ireland in the period 1971 
to  1992.  The  relatively  high  return  on 
investments  during  the  1980s  had  to 
compensate  for  the  low  and  negative 
return  during  periods  in  the  1970s and  in 
the  period  since  1990.  For  instance,  in 
1992,  investments  in  Irish  equities  and 
Irish  property  gave  a  negative  rate  of 
return while European and North American 
equity investments were profitable. 
The  supervisory  body  (PSLN)  does  not  lay  down  rigid  investment  requirements.  It 
confines itself mainly to recommending prudence and to suggesting the diversification of assets. 
The Insurance Chamber monitors actual investment practice. 
In practice, investment by company pension funds in shares of the sponsoring employer 
and  in  loans  to that employer is  permitted  only  up to  a maximum  of 5%  of the  assets of the 
pension fund or, including the free reserve, 1  0%. The recent portfolio distribution of both industry-
wide funds (BPF) and company pension funds (OPF) is summarized in Table 37.  Investment in 
equities has significantly increased to the detriment of loans. 
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NETHERLANDS: 
Volume by Class, 1990-1991 
(In million HFL and %) 
Investment:  BPF  OPF  Total 
1991  1990  1991  1990  1991  1990 
Real estate  17,048  14,739  8,666  7,376  25,714  22,115 
Mortgages  5,283  5,141  2,822  2,021  8,105  7;162 
Equities  19,649  14,746  23,980  19,531  43,629  34,277 
Bonds  17,379  13,954  36,280  31,899  53,659  45,853 
Loans  44,189  45,647  27,340  27,963  71,529  73,610 
Other 
investments  13,457  12,971  4,774  5,264  18,231  18,235 
Deposits  3,917  3,732  3,773  3,817  7,690  7,549 
Total  120,922  110,930  107,635  97,871  228,557·  208,801 
Per cent of total volume 
Real estate  14.1  13.1  8.1  7.5  11.2  10.6 
Mortgages  4.4  4.6  2.6  2.1  3.5  3.4 
Equities  16.3  13.3  22.3  19.9  19.1  16.4 
Bonds  14.4  12.6  33.7  32.6  23.5  22.0 
Loans  36.5  41.1  25.4  28.6  31.3  35.3 
Other 
investments  11.1  11.7  4.4  5.4  8.0  8.7 
Deposits  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.9  3.4  3.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source:  Insurance Chamber (Financiele gegevens pensioenfondsen  1991, 
Verzekeringskamer) 
SPAIN 
Pension fund legislation  contains flexible  rules regarding the choice of investments by 
qualified  pension funds.  Permissible  investments include:  securities,  bank deposits (not more 
than 15% of the total), mortgages, real estate. All these may absorb 90% of investments, with 
the remaining 1  0%  being freely used. 
Limits are set as to the amount invested in securities is)slled  by any one enterprise (not 
more than 5%  of the total),  excluding  securities  issued  by public bodies,  both  domestic and 
foreign. As a rule loans to fund members are not permitted. Exceptions are strictly limited. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  in  the  years  immediately  following  the  1987  legislation,  plan 
sponsors  were  allowed  a  1  0  year  period  of grace to  bring  the  reserves  up to fully  funded 
standards. The actual available assets have so far been invested as shown in  Table 38. 
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SPAIN: 
Asset Volume by Class(%), 1992 
Class:  Qualified  Mutual 
funds  benefit 
societies 
Real estate  3.4  16.4 
Fixed-income securities  86.9  58.5 
Variable income securities  2.0  8.8 
Bank deposits  7.1  1.1 
Mortgages  0.6  0.8 
Other  - 14.7 
Total  100.0  100.0 
PORTUGAL 
Decree-Law No.415/91  of 25 October 1991  lays down in Articles 27 and 28 the principal 
rules concerning the investment of pension funds.  These provisions set out authorized,  as well 
as forbidden,  investments. Investment is  authorized in: 
(a)  Treasury bonds; 
(b)  Bonds, participation securities or other negotiable bonds,  including cash bonds; 
(c)  Equities; 
(d)  Investment in  risk capital funds; 
(e)  Participation  units in  mutual funds; 
(f)  Mortgage loans,  excepting those for industrial estate; 
(g)  Loans made to fund  participants; 
(h)  Cash, bank and  monetary market deposits; 
(i)  Real estate mentioned  in the land registry as part of the fund,  other than industrial 
estate; 
(j)  EU Member States: equities and  bonds quoted on the stock exchange of Portugal. 
Investment is  not authorized in: 
(a)  Securities issued or held by pension fund  managing institutions; 
(b)  Securities issued or held by members of the managing or supervising bodies of the 
managing institutions or of  those holding more than 10 per cent of  their capital stock; 
(c)  Securities  issued  or held  by  enterprises  if more than  10  per cent  of their capital 
stock is held by one or more directors of the managing institution in their own name 
or on  behalf of another person,  their spouses  and  relatives  or their relatives  by 
marriage of the first degree; 
(d)  Securities  issued  or held  by  enterprises  having  in  their  respective  managing  or 
supervising  bodies  one  or more directors of the  managing  institution  in  their own 
name or on  behalf of another person, their spouses and  relatives  or their relatives 
by marriage of the first degree;  , 
(e)  Securities issued or'held by the fund associates or by societies under their control, 
unless the latter issue or hold stock exchange securities or national debt bonds. 
(f)  Real estate used by fund associates or by societies under their control. 
Purchase and sale financial operations of stock exchange movable assets must always 
be  carried  out  by  these  institutions.  The  lnstituto  de  Seguros  de  Portugal  supervises  the 
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and  allocation  of pension funds investments. 
The data shows a representative sample which  covers only the allocation  of 88.0%  of 
the total volume of invested assets (i.e.  Esc.334 billion  out of a total of Esc.380 billion  in  1992). 
Table 39: 
PORTUGAL: 
Asset Volume by Class(%), end of 1992 
Treasury bonds (minimum 15%)  42.1 
Bonds, equities,  participation securities quoted on the stock exchange  26.4 
Bonds, equities,  participation securities (non-quoted, maximum 15%)  5.0 
Risk capital fund  securities (maximum 15%)  0.4 
Bonds, EU stock exchange foreign  equities  and  participation  in  mutual funds  0.8 
(maximum 40%) 
Real estate, mortgage loans* (maximum 50%)  5.9 
Cash, deposits and treasury bills  (minimum 2%)  19.4 
Total  100.0 
* Including loans to fund  members, representing 0.01  of the total. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Since the majority of pension fund liabilities depends on future earnings inflation during 
the period  up to retirement and  on  future price inflation  for pensions  in  payment, fixed  interest 
assets such as  bonds and  mortgages are not in general thought to be suitable investments.  In 
recent years emphasis  has  been  on  investment  in  real  assets,  such  as equities,  property and 
index-linked government securities. 
Pension  fund  trustees  are  required  under trust  law  to  invest fund  assets  in  the  best 
interests of the members. This  is  usually  regarded  as  precluding  investment in  the employing 
company, or in related organisations, unless the terms are fully competitive with those available 
in  the  market.  Any  significant  equity  investment  in  the  employing  company  is  regarded  as 
unsound, since it reduces the security of members' pension  rights.  Insolvency of the employer 
would  affect not only their jobs but also the value of their accrued pension  rights.  Regulations 
have been  introduced to  restrict self-investment of this type, generally to a maximum of 5%  of 
total  assets.  Contracted-out  defined  contribution  schemes  are  required  to  invest  in  certain 
prescribed  assets  (including  insurance  policies),  some  within  certain  limits,  but  these 
requirements  are  not  unduly  restrictive  and  are  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring 
appropriateness  of investment  and  adequate  diversification.  Apart  from  this  there  are  no 
regulations or laws which place restrictions on the investment policy of pension funds. 
Some pension funds are managed on a fully discretionary basis. In other cases, trustees 
establish  a benchmark distribution,  for example 60%  United  Kingdom  equities,  20%  overseas 
equities, and 20% index-linked government securities. The investment manager is then monitored 
against the performance of such a portfolio.  They can deviate from the benchmark to achieve 
improved  returns,  but  will  need  to  be  able  to  justify  to  the  trustees  the  more  'risky'  profile 
adopted. 
Over the 1  0 years from 1982 to 1991, the median return of all pension funds participating 
in  a major performance measurement service was just over 16% a year. This may be compared 
106  Occupational pensions in the European Union with  average price  increases of 5.6%  a year over the same period  and  earnings increases of 
8.2% a year. 
Table 40: 
UNITED KINGDOM: 
Asset Volume by Class (end of 1990) 
£million 
UNITED KINGDOM INVESTMENTS 
Cash, deposits and other short-term assets  20,307 
(net of short-term liabilities  and borrowing) 
Government fixed interest securities  18,160 
Local authority fixed  interest securities  32 
Company fixed  interest securities (including  6,213 
convertibles) 
Loans and  mortgages  227 
All fixed  interest  44,939 
Government index-linked  securities  9,780 
Ordinary shares  142,147 
Unit trust units  4,139 
All equity shares  146,286 
Land,  property and ground rents  26,363 
Property unit trust units  1,656 
All property  28,019 
Other investments  18,552 
TOTAL UNITED KINGDOM INVESTMENTS  247,576 
INVESTMENTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Cash, deposits and other short-term assets  620 
Government securities  5,442 
Ordinary shares  47,460 
Other  1,566 
TOTAL OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS  55,088 
TOTAL INVESTMENTS  302,664 
Source: Financial Statistics (HMSO) 
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A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS AT EU LEVEL? 
While  there  is  no  comprehensive  legal  framework  for  supplementary  (occupational) 
pensions to be  found  in  Community law,  there are  nonetheless  numerous rules  in  the Treaty 
itself or in secondary legislation which have a direct impact on  occupational pension schemes. 
Such rules  exist already in the areas of equal treatment of men  and women, and with 
respect to the protection of workers in the event of insolvency of their employer and of transfer 
of ownership  of the  business  they work  in.  Furthermore,  accounting  standards  laid  down  in 
Community directives 
18  require  occupational  pension  liabilities  to be  clearly shown  in  financial 
statements. In  addition to this existing  legislation,  the Commission has proposed directives on 
the freedom to invest and to manage assets of private institutions for retirement provision and 
on the protection of so-called atypical workers, i.e. mainly part-time and temporary workers. The 
Commission has also started to look at obstacles to the mobility of labour which result from an 
insufficient protection of occupational pension  rights of mobile workers. 
In  this  chapter,  a brief overview  on  existing  and  proposed  EU  legislation  concerning 
pensions will  be  given.  The  issue  of labour mobility  which  has  not yet given  rise  to specific 
legislative  proposals at Community level will be discussed separately in  Chapter 8. 
Equal treatment of  men and women 
The Commission  and the Council first addressed the question of equality of treatment 
in social security legislation with the Council Directive of 19 December 1978 on the progressive 
implementation  of the principle  of equal treatment for men and women  in  matters of social 
security (79fl/EEC). This directive allows  Member States to make a number of derogations to 
the principle  of equal  treatment.  These derogations are  set out in  Article  7(1),  and  cover the 
determination of pensionable age, certain provisions concerning family supplements and certain 
qualifying conditions concerning invalidity and old-age benefits of wives of insured persons. 
In  1986,  a parallel  instrument was  adopted to deal specifically  with  second-tier social 
security schemes, namely the Council Directive of 24 July 1986 on  the implementation  of the 
principle  of equality of  treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes 
(86/378/EEC). 
A major development  came  several  years  later when  the  European  Court of Justice 
(ECJ)  delivered  its  judgment  in  Case  C-282/88  (Barber  V  GRE)  against  the  following 
jurisprudential background. Article 119 of  the Treaty lays down the obligation for Member States 
to ensure that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. 'Pay' is defined in the second 
paragraph  of Article  119 as  ''the  ordinary  basic or minimum  wage  or salary and any other 
consideration,  whether in  cash or in  kind,  which  the worker receives,  directly or indirectly,  in 
respect of  his employment from his employer". Since its judgment in the first Defrenne case, the 
Court has developed a broad interpretation of the concept of 'pay'.  In this case the Court held 
that pay includes:  ·~ .. any other consideration,  whether in cash or in kind,  whether immediate or 
future,  provided that the worker receives it,  albeit indirectly,  in respect of  his employment from 
his employer". 
In the second Defrenne case (C-43/75, judgment of 8 April 1976), the Court went on to 
hold  that Article  119  "applies  directly,  and without  the  need for more  detailed implementing 
measures on the part of  the Community or the Member States, to all forms of direct and overt 
discrimination  which may be identified solely with the aid of  the criteria of  equal work and equal 
pay refeffed to by the Article in  question". 
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in  its  first  Defrenne. judgment (case  C-80/70,  judgment of 25  May  1971) that social  security 
schemes and benefits, in particular old age pensions,  although in principle not entirely separate 
from the concept of pay, did not fall under the concept of 'consideration'. The Court came to this 
decision  on  the  basis  of the  following  characteristics  of social  security systems:  (i)  they  are 
directly governed by legislation without any element of agreement within the undertaking or trade 
concerned and are obligatorily applicable to general categories of workers; and (ii) they provide 
workers with the benefit of a statutory scheme to which workers, employers and in some cases 
the public authorities  contribute financially  in  a measure determined  less  by the employment 
relationship between the employer and the worker than by considerations of  social policy, so that 
the employer's contribution cannot be regarded as a direct or indirect payment to the worker for 
the purposes of Article 119. 
In  its  judgment  of 13  May  1986  in  the  Bilka-Kaufhaus  case  (C-170/84),  the  Court, 
applying  those  criteria,  came  to  the  view  that  benefits  paid  under an  occupational  pension 
scheme originating in an agreement between the employer and the staff committee and forming 
an  integral part of the contract of employment are to be classified  as  'consideration' within the 
meaning of Article 119. 
In  the  Barber case  (C-262/88),  the  Court  had  to  consider whether a 'contracted-out' 
pension scheme approved under United Kingdom legislation fell within the scope of Article 119. 
The  particular  scheme  at  issue  was  a type  of occupational  pension  scheme  established  in 
consultation  between the social partners or by  unilateral decision of the employer,  financed  by 
the employer alone  or by employer and  employees combined,  and  which  employees  may join 
in  partial  substitution  for their statutory pension.  From the  principles  set out above the Court 
deduced that "a pension paid under a contracted-out scheme constitutes consideration  paid by 
the employer to the worker in respect of  his employment and consequently falls within the scope 
of  Article  119 of the  Treaty". 
The above ruling  left unanswered a number of technical questions (see below)  but, on 
the whole,  it  left  no  doubt that,  in  principle,  supplementary  pension  provision  would  have to 
ensure  equality  of treatment  for men  and  women  in  the  following  main  areas:  (0  eligibility 
conditions when joining a scheme,  (ii)  pensionable age and  (iii)  survivors' benefits.  It was also 
understood that the ECJ was  aiming  at enforcing  a broad  principle  of equality in  contributions 
and benefits,  although the Court's ruling  of 1990 did not provide sufficient guidance as to how 
such a principle could,  in  practice, be implemented  in  certain concrete cases. 
Fear that such  legal  provisions  would  have  undesirable  financial  consequences  for 
pension  funds in  a number of countries  and concern about the lack of clarity of the ECJ ruling 
had three immediate consequences. One consequence was that Member States intervened to 
avoid full  retrospection  in the interpretation of the Barber ruling  by adopting a special  protocol 
annexed  to  the  Maastricht. Treaty.  This  protocol  provided  that  benefits  under  occupational 
pension schemes shall  not be  considered  as  remuneration  (pay)  according to the meaning  of 
Art.119 if and insofar as they are attributable to periods of employment prior to 17 May 1990 (the 
date of the ruling  in  Barber). 
Furthermore, Member States (with the exception ofthe United Kingdom) amended Article 
119 of the Treaty, by adding to the original text a third paragraph, which says: 
"This Article shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures 
providing  for specific  advantages  in  order to  make it easier for women  to  pursue  a 
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in their professional 
careers." 
The third reaction to the Barber ruling was that several cases (i.e. Coloroll,  Moroni, Ten 
Oever, Neath) were brought to the ECJ with the specific object of obliging the Court to be more 
specific on matters of retrospection, on the freedom of pension fund actuaries to use sex-related 
actuarial factors and on the treatment of survivors' benefit entitlements. At the end of 1993 the 
ECJ  had  not  yet issued  full  clarification  on  all  issues  under review  but their views  began  to 
emerge. 
In its judgement of 6 October 1993 in  case C-109/91  (Ten-Oever), the Court confirmed 
that the  direct  effect  of Article  119  of the  Treaty  may  not  be  relied  upon  in  order to  claim 
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employment served prior to the date of the Barber judgment of 17 May 1990, except in  respect 
of persons who have before that date initiated  legal proceedings or raised  an equivalent claim 
under the applicable national law. The Court also confirmed that a widower's pension of the kind 
in question at issue in case C-109/91  (an occupational scheme) is to be regarded as 'pay' within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119 of the Treaty. 
On  the  actuarial  question,  the  Court  ruled  ('Neath',  case  C-152/91,  judgment  of 22 
December 1993) that the use of actuarial factors differing according to the sex of the  insured 
person or beneficiary does not contravene the principle  of equality  of treatment provided they 
apply in defined benefit occupational pension schemes. Further clarification is still awaited in the 
Coloroll case (C-200/91), at present pending before the ECJ. 
Returning to the initiatives  of Member States (see above), it should be pointed out that 
the coexistence of two different versions of Article 119 raises difficult legal questions which may 
yet have to be resolved  by the ECJ or by the Community legislator. 
Before ending our discussion on equality of  treatment it is worth taking a brief look at the 
situation  actually prevailing  in  Member States at the end  of 1993. As  far as social  security is 
concerned, most Member States either already have equal pension ages or have taken decisions 
to achieve this  on  a gradual  basis,  with the exception  of Italy.  Most have,  or are  planning  to, 
implement a minimum  pension  age  of 65.  The  nature of implementation  varies:  Portugal will 
equalize pension ages at 65 over a three year period beginning in 1994; the United Kingdom has 
recently  stated that the state  pension  age  will  be  raised  to  65,  but that  equalization  will  be 
phased in  between 2010 and 2020; Greece has equalized  state pension age at 65,  but only for 
all new members to the national insurance scheme. In France, a full pension is due from age 60 
to men and women. In Belgium the flexible pension is due between age 60 and 65 to both sexes, 
but further change will be required to comply with a ruling of  the ECJ which held in 1993 that the 
pension formula did,  in practice,  cause men  (financial) disadvantage. 
In  relation  to  other provisions  (i.e.  the treatment  of survivors)  national  legislation  is 
broadly in  conformity with  Community  requirements,  at  least with  regard  to the avoidance  of 
direct  discrimination  between  men  and  women.  The  general  picture  is  that the  process  of 
adjusting rules and practices to the European requirement of equality of treatment for men and 
women in supplementary pensions has definitely started, although it is far from being completed. 
Much time  may elapse  before the goal  is  fully  achieved,  and  there  are  a number of 
reasons for this.  Sponsors of voluntary pension  arrangements are generally slower to  comply 
with  'European requirements' than civil  servants responsible for state controlled  and managed 
schemes. Secondly, the ECJ does not have the legal competence to prescribe the remedy or the 
solution which employers (or even the state) must adopt to comply with its rulings. The ECJ can 
only stipulate that the remedial measures taken be non-discriminatory. 
On the other hand, signals from the Court are not always clear or exhaustive and leave 
open the possibility of  further challenge and further interpretation. It is equally important to realise 
that  the  definition  of a  right  (to  equal  treatment)  has  immediate  cost  and  implementation 
implications. The prompt reaction of governments in order to pre-empt a costly interpretation of 
the notion of retroactivity in the Barber ruling (see above) is clear proof that cost considerations 
are  important.  The  rights  to  benefit  in  the  area  of social  security,  and  in  that of pensions  in 
particular, are a body of economic and social rights, which gain substance through transfers of 
financial resources and are not mere reflections of legal enactments. 
In the process of aligning  pension fund rules and regulations to EU requirements some 
Member States are, in specific areas, more advanced than others. Pension funds in Ireland and 
in the United Kingdom have made good progress both in the area of eligibility  rules and  in  the 
alignment of retirement age conditions for men and women. In the Netherlands and in Germany 
the relevant questions and the possibility of enforcing changes are currently being discussed. In 
France the main issue seems to be the difference between widows and widowers in survivors' 
benefit entitlements (supplementary schemes). Sometimes, as in Greece and to some extent in 
Ireland, full  equality is only introduced for new entrants or for newly established schemes. 
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only resolved at the end of 1993, and the decision has raised  important unanswered questions 
in countries like Denmark where defined contribution  benefits are widespread. 
A final  problem  in  this  particular area  is  that even  if direct sex discrimination  can  be 
easily identified,  the concept of indirect sex discrimination  is  much more elusive.  Existing  EU 
legislation  bravely attempts to address this issue as well.
19 
The protection of  supplementary pension rights under European labour law 
The  European  Union  has  never  left  any  doubt  about  the  fact  that  the  process  of 
European  economic  integration  should  lead  to  a general  improvement  of living  and  working 
conditions. However, the process of  integration often requires adjustments in individual countries, 
regions  or industries which  may have  painful  effects in  individual  companies.  The  process of 
economic integration will only be acceptable if there are adequate safeguards for workers against 
the negative effects of economic restructuring which  it causes. 
Such  safeguards are  required  by  a series  of labour law  Directives  which  the Council 
adopted  following  the  Commission's  first  social  action  programme  of 1974.  The  Directives 
concern the protection of workers' rights  in  the event of transfers of undertakings
20 and  in  the 
event of insolvency of their employer2
1
•  Both  Directives  refer to occupational  (supplementary) 
pension  schemes and  require  Member States to take the necessary measures to  protect the 
interests of past and  present employees regarding their pension  rights. 
According  to Article  3,  paragraph  3,  of the directive  on  the  transfer of undertakings, 
"Member States shall adopt the measures necessary to protect the interests of  employees and 
of persons no longer employed in  the transferor's  business  at the time  of the  transfer .. . in 
respect of  rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to  old-age benefits, 
including  survivors'  benefits,  under  supplementary  schemes  ... " The  term  'supplementary 
schemes'  refers to company  or inter-company  pension  schemes  outside  the  statutory social 
security schemes in  the Member States. 
Article 8 of the Insolvency Directive reads as follows:  "Member States shall ensure that 
the necessary measures are taken to protect the interests of  employees and of  persons having 
already left the employer's undertaking  or business at the date of  the onset of the employer's 
insolvency in respect of  rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to old-
age  benefits,  including  survivors'  benefits,  under supplementary  company or inter-company 
pension  schemes outside the national statutory social security schemes." 
It should, however, be pointed out that there is no Community definition of supplementary 
pension rights which could  be used in  conjunction with Article 8.  On the contrary, according to 
its  Article  2,  the  Insolvency Directive,  "  ...  is without prejudice  to  national law as regards  the 
definition  of the  terms  .  .  .  'right  conferring  immediate  entitlement'  and  'right  conferring 
prospective entitlement'." 
The effectiveness of the protection given by the Insolvency Directive therefore depends 
on  the  recognition  of expected  occupational  pensions  as  a legal  entitlement  within  the  legal 
framework of Member States. As a result of national legislation and jurisprudence, occupational 
pension benefits are becoming more clearly defined in  legal terms, and it can thus be expected 
that better protection can also be achieved against the consequences of insolvency. 
In  the future,  the  issue  of non-standard  labour relations  will  have to  be  addressed  at 
Community level. The Commission  has proposed legislation which would,  in  particular,  require 
Member States to guarantee an equivalent social protection, including in occupational schemes, 
between non-standard employees and  persons in  full-time  employment of indefinite duration. 
Finally,  it is worth mentioning here that the ECJ has been  asked to express an opinion 
on whether or not the provision of pensions by an appropriate institution is an 'economic activity' 
to  which  EU's  requirements  and  rules  on  competition  should  apply.  The  answer  has  been 
negative so far as regards a public social security institution providing pensions on the grounds 
of its reliance  on the principle  of social solidarity.  A further ruling  has recently been requested 
in  respect of Dutch industry-wide funds established as a result of collective agreements (cases 
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Fysiotherapeuten).  A decision was still awaited at the end of 1993. 
Pension funds and financial freedoms in the European Union 
Another  aspect  of the  possible  impact  of EU  provisions  and/or  goals  on  national 
institutions responsible for managing supplementary pension provision  needs to be addressed, 
namely the  implications  for pension  funds  of the  freedom  of establishment  (Art.52-58  of the 
Treaty), the freedom to provide services (Art.59-66 of the Treaty) and the freedom of movement 
of capital (Art.66-73 of the Treaty). 
It may be recalled that this issue was raised by the Commission in debates on financial 
services for the following reasons. Having advanced and found broad agreement in the proposed 
liberalization  of life  insurance (First and  Second  Life Assurance Directives),  as well  as  in  the 
proposed  harmonization  of investment  guidelines  applicable  to  insurance  and  banking,  the 
Commission recognized that it had actually entered the supplementary pension field. 
In  fact,  by  virtue  of the  Second  Life  Assurance  Directive  (1990),  group  insurance 
contracts taken out by employers and/or trustees to cover retirement benefits for their employees 
could  eventually be bought and sold freely throughout the Community. Free competition  meant 
that  pension  plan  sponsors  would  seek  the  best  or the  cheapest  insurance  arrangements 
available in Europe or will even establish a captive insurance company in any one Member State 
to  handle their pension  plans.  The  Life  Assurance Directives  also  set in  motion  a process  of 
harmonization  of rules  concerning  the  investment  of  the  reserves  held  by  the  insurance 
companies,  including those arising from group pension insurance policies. 
Having gone thus far, the Commission took the view (in  1990) that it was necessary to 
create, by means of a new,  separate directive, a 'level  playing field' between insured and  non-
insured supplementary pension plans, in particular as regards investment choices and investment 
management. A draft directive was  circulated  and  consultations  began  in  1990 with  Member 
States. It was argued that the proposal would create no new freedoms and would confine itself 
to  clarifying the types of restrictions  on  full freedom of movement of capital that were already 
applicable under Community law. 
The  proposed  directive  was  meant  to  cover  financial  institutions  falling  within  the 
definition of 'pension funds'. As far as possible, these have been defined- not without difficulty, 
given Community-wide differences - so as to exclude social security institutions and to include 
all institutions and funds established to provide supplementary (second-tier) pensions and which 
accumulate  segregated  reserves  (assets)  capable  of being  invested.  It  was  made  clear that 
institutions  financed  on  a pay-as-you-go  basis  would  be  covered  only  insofar as  they  have 
balancing  reserves which are invested.  Book reserve schemes would  be outside the proposed 
directive since there are no identifiable  assets. 
In  relation  to the freedom of investment,  the proposal  laid  down  a number of general 
investment  principles,  referring  to  criteria  by  which  assets  should  be  funded,  the  issue  of 
diversification  and  the  principle  that  investments  should  be  restricted  to prudent  levels.  The 
proposal  specified  the  types  of restrictions  which  cannot  be  maintained  in  view  of  capital 
movements  freedom.  First,  there  may  be  no  privileged  access  for  governments  (such  as 
requirements  on  pension  funds to  invest up to  a given  percentage  in  particular categories  of 
assets). Secondly, there may be no requirements to localize assets in a particular Member State. 
Thirdly, there may be no currency matching requirements which cannot be justified on prudential 
grounds. 
Notwithstanding  numerous  subsequent  amendments  and  changes  of emphasis,  no 
agreement  had  yet  been  reached  by  the  end  of 1993.  There  are  two  important  issues  of 
contention  which  remain  to  be  resolved.  The  first  concerns  the  extent to  which  supervisory 
authorities  should  be  able  to  intervene  with  the  providers  of investment  management  or 
(custodian)  services.  The  proposed  directive  would  allow  Member States to  require  that the 
contract between the pension fund  and the service provider contains  clauses to allow Member 
States to  have direct  access to  information  held  by  a service  provider,  either through  him  or 
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meet its contractual obligations,  supervisory authorities  in  one Member State would  be  able to 
directly request the intervention of  the supervisory authorities (ofthe service provider) in another 
Member State. 
The second  issue  relates to rules  for currency matching.  The draft directive originally 
introduced two ceilings:  where liabilities  are fixed  in  monetary terms (such  as  life assurance), 
Member States  may require  pension  funds  to  hold  a maximum  of 80%  of their assets  in  the 
same currency as the one  in  which the liabilities  are  expressed. Where liabilities  are not fixed 
in monetary terms, but determined for instance by final salary, this maximum is lowered to 60%. 
In the Council, a majority of Member States opted for a single 80% ceiling,  but the Commission 
is of the opinion that a single limit is not justified on prudential grounds and could be harmful to 
the interests of members and beneficiaries of pension funds, especially in relatively small capital 
markets. 
A general observation can be made concerning the proposals under review. Community 
action  towards  harmonization  of rules,  practices  or behaviour  has,  in  general,  a  chance  of 
success when, in the relevant field, Member States present a fairly homogeneous situation from 
the start or when they can  easily accept change  in  a particular area  of policy.  The insurance 
market, life or non-life, operates in a technical, economic and commercial environment which is 
fairly homogeneous across the EU. 
Admittedly, some countries have larger or stronger insurance companies and the range 
of products offered to consumers is not identical.  But there is a basic similarity in the business, 
in the style of domestic supervisory frameworks and in the outcome of the provision of insurance 
services. On the contrary, supplementary pensions provision outside the insurance vehicle is not 
at all homogeneous between Member States. Methods of financing, the size of assets held, the 
legal  and institutional  profile,  and even the measure of legal compulsion  applied,  present wide 
differences.  Country  specificity  is  moreover  rooted  in  solid  traditions  which  are  jealously 
preserved and defended. 
The Commission's intention of creating a 'level playing field' between the insurance and 
the  pensions  industry  has  proved  to  be  somewhat  unrealistic,  and  may  explain  the  current 
deadlock on the draft pension directive. Some analysts go as far as to argue that the proposed 
directive  was  probably  unnecessary  in  view  of the fact that pension  fund  assets  are  already 
covered by the Freedom of Capital  Movement Directive  agreed  in  1988. To this  objection the 
Commission  has replied  that the 1988 Directive  did  not go far enough,  insofar as  it would  not 
prevent  Member States  from  applying  certain  restrictions  to  the  investment  of pension  fund 
assets,  some  of which  may well  be  considered  either unreasonable  or contrary to  the  wider 
interests ofthe Community. The draft directive - it was argued by the Commission -was intended 
to give much clearer guidance (in fact an obligation) as to what restrictions could be justified on 
prudential  grounds,  and  more  importantly,  what  could  not  be  justified.  Unfortunately,  not  all 
Member States share the  views  of the  Commission.  It  remains  to  be  demonstrated that the 
interests of fund members will be better served by a policy of total liberalization  and deregulation 
in this area. 
Be that as it may, the draft directive has probably helped to reveal  and to fuel a latent 
conflict  of interest  between  EU  Member  States.  In  recent  years,  an  active  promotion  of 
supplementary pension funds has been made by those governments (Italy, Spain  and Portugal 
among  others)  who  believe  that  such  a  development  would  be  beneficial  to  the  national 
economy.  They believe  that an  increase  in  savings  and  investment in  the  domestic economy 
should  contribute  to  growth,  employment  creation,  the  transfer  of public  assets  to  private 
enterprise and the broadening ofthe domestic stock market. Such goals would be to some extent 
defeated  if directives  were to  facilitate  the  expatriation  of domestic  pension  savings  for the 
benefit of financially  'stronger' markets. Such fears have grown since the 1992-93 crisis of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and the currency devaluations which followed. 
An  example  of the  present mood  can  be  found  in  Ireland.  Much  emphasis  has  been 
placed in recent years by government on the need for pension funds to invest in Ireland to create 
jobs, particularly since the removal of exchange controls resulted in a significant increase in the 
proportion of assets invested abroad. The Minister for Finance in his 1993 budget speech stated 
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the needs of  the Irish economy, particularly the need for more jobs, into account when making 
their investment decisions ...  These funds should invest as much of  their assets as possible in 
Ireland ... " 
Against the  official  view,  experts  have  pointed  out that the  main  difficulty  posed  for 
pension  funds  investing  in  Ireland  is  the  relatively  small  size  of the  Irish  equity  market. 
Accordingly,  it is  argued that to obtain  a more balanced  portfolio,  pension  funds  may have to 
invest abroad. However, the issue is  a complex one  and  the government's attitude cannot be 
readily  dismissed.  First,  experience shows that investing  in  Irish  quoted companies  does  not 
necessarily  mean fully  investing  in  the  Irish  economy.  Secondly,  foreign  institutions  are also 
major investors  in  Ireland.  The general  consensus  in  the country appears to  be  that what is 
lacking is not funds for investment, but opportunities to make worthwhile investments apart from 
equities, which obviously do not provide the full answer to the government's concern. 
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In conclusion, it is beyond doubt that the Treaty's guarantee of freedom in the provision 
of financial services and  in  the movement of capital should also  apply to institutional  investors 
whose  assets  belong  to  supplementary  pension  funds.  However,  questions  which  may  well 
deserve further discussion in this area are the following: 
- which specific 'financial' guidelines are strictly needed for pension funds, independent 
of the existing Community regulations  applicable to the insurance market; 
- which of the above guidelines deserve to be binding and which may be issued by the 
Commission as recommendations only. 
A general  remark of relevance  is  that,  with  few  exceptions,  institutions  for retirement 
provision are essentially non-profit bodies, while banks and insurance companies charge for their 
financial services. In fact, the latter provide financial services, while pension funds buy financial 
services, a difference that is important to keep in  mind. 
Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome makes it clear that non-profit institutions are in principle 
excluded from making use ofthe directly applicable provisions of Article 52, under which Member 
States must eventually guarantee freedom of investment and freedom of services. The Treaty's 
authors must have realized that free  competition  has little  meaning among institutions who do 
not actually compete for customers and who do not charge commercial fees for their services. 
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FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, LABOUR MOBILITY 
AND PENSION RIGHTS: PRESENT SITUATION 
AND PROPOSED STRATEGIES 
The. background to the Commission's initiatives 
The European Commission  paid  early attention to the  practical  implications  for social 
security  schemes  of the  right  to  free  movement  of workers  and  citizens  between  Member 
States.
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develop a system of multi-lateral coordination of social security legislation which culminated in 
regulations 1408/71 and 574/72. The coordination achieved has proved successful in establishing 
equality  of treatment between  nationals and  non-nationals  in  social security and  in  individuals 
taking  up  residence  or employment  in  any  country  of the  Community  without having  to  fear 
undue  loss  of their  social  security  rights,  that  is  without  being  at  significant  disadvantage 
compared to  persons who remained in their own country throughout their life. 
As far as  pensions  are  concerned,  the  system  of multilateral  coordination  has  been 
applied only to the first tier of pension provision, i.e. mandatory social security. When the above-
mentioned regulations were developed it was believed that, at a later stage, a parallel multilateral 
system of coordination  could  eventually  be  put  in  place  in  respect of supplementary pension 
schemes,  in  particular occupational  pensions,  whether based  on  legislation  or on  contractual 
and/or private arrangements. 
However,  a closer scrutiny of the  legal,  institutional  and  fiscal  environment typical  of 
supplementary pensions in  Europe showed that the technique of multilateral coordination  used 
in  regulations  1408/71  and  574/72 was not suitable  for overcoming the  potential  obstacles to 
freedom of movement of persons within the Community posed by the pattern, both complex and 
diversified,  of existing  supplementary  pension  provision  in  Europe.  Yet the  possible  negative 
impact of supplementary pension provision  on the free movement of workers remained a major 
concern of the Commission,  and the search for solutions continued. 
The  next step,  taken  in  1991,  was  to  issue  a Communication  (originating  in  DG  V, 
'Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs') from the Commission to the Council.
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document set  out  the  Commission's  views  and  concerns,  particularly  on  those  aspects  of 
supplementary pension provisions which had implications for cross-border labour mobility within 
Member States. It was recognized  in this Communication that supplementary pensions are  an 
important element of  social protection and that public policy in this area had taken different paths 
according to national traditions and preferences. 
The document recognized that supplementary pension  provision  had  not been subject 
to specific  regulations  at Community  level,  except  for the  question  of equality  of treatment 
between  men  and  women  and  the  possible  impact  of various  directives  regulating  the  life 
insurance  business.  However,  the  Commission's  view  was  that further  initiatives  should  be 
encouraged  because  it  should  be  possible  to  agree  on  a  number  of practical  and/or  legal 
arrangements to enable workers moving from one country of the EU to  another to avoid losing 
supplementary pension rights or being frustrated in their pension expectations. 
On  balance,  the  Communication  has  made  a useful  contribution  towards  initiating  a 
discussion on this subject at European level, and raising awareness that solutions do exist, even 
if they are not easy to find.  Confirmation  of the difficulties  in  making  progress came under the 
United Kingdom presidency of the Council during the second half of 1992. 
The Presidency presented a draft Council resolution on the implications, for workers who 
move from one Member State to another, of  the nature and diversity of supplementary retirement 
provision.  The draft resolution  requested:  "that measures be implemented by Member States, 
or by management and labour where  they already have a role  under national  legislation  or 
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Member State to  another without  having  to  fear  undue  Joss  of rights  to  future  occupational 
retirement pension  benefits,  when  such  benefits play an  important role  in  overall retirement 
income." 
The draft resolution  subsequently pointed to the type of measures deemed to be  most 
desirable to  achieve the stated  objective.  It  encouraged  Member States to explore  in  greater 
depth how the obstacles to labour mobility attributable to supplementary pension provision could 
be removed. The draft resolution failed to secure unanimity at the Council. 
A more recent initiative (originating  in  DG XV,  'Internal Market and Financial Services') 
having a bearing on the issues described, was taken at the end of 1992. It was suggested that, 
to facilitate labour mobility within the Single Market, it would be desirable to avoid the many legal 
and practical problems which may result from a change of membership in  occupational pension 
arrangements, caused by moving abroad to work. 
Since it was not seen as very realistic,  at that stage, to attempt a general application of 
the principle  of freedom of cross-border membership to  all categories of employees and  to all 
types  of pension  arrangements,  the  proposal  - set .out  in  an  initial  working  paper
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- dealt 
exclusively with transfers abroad of employees remaining  with the same employer. Within this 
limited context, the proposal was to consider the feasibility oftaking appropriate steps at EU level 
in  order to  guarantee to  the  employees  concerned  the  right to  continued  membership  in  the 
supplementary pension scheme or arrangement to which the employees belonged before moving 
abroad. 
The working paper pointed out that in some countries the right to continued membership 
is legally denied, or cannot be effectively exercised in specific situations. Legal obstacles did not 
appear to  be  unsurmountable,  but  it was  likely  that legal  barriers  would  be  raised  for fiscal 
reasons.  In  other words,  tax-driven  obstacles  to  continued  membership  were  described  as 
complex and central to the issue. 
The paper also  recognized  that for employees going  abroad while  remaining  with  the 
same employer, the  possibility of continued  membership in  the social security pension system 
of the 'home country' was  already  contemplated,  for a limited  period,  by  regulation  1408/71. 
Clearly any new parallel rule on continued membership in supplementary pension provision would 
have to be  consistent  with  this  earlier  regulation,  for the  obvious  reason  that the  interface 
between first and second tier of pension protection was specific to each country. 
The  process  of consultation  about the  proposal  was  initiated  in  1993.  It  is  likely  to 
continue in 1994 (and possibly beyond) because the fiscal and technical questions involved are 
complex and require further study. 
Some national reactions and realities 
Before returning to the global issues described above and exploring which avenues could 
be  opened  for  making  further  progress  at  European  level  towards  the  removal  of what  is 
perceived as an undesirable obstacle to the freedom of movement of individuals within the Union, 
it is important to review the position of different Member States and to become acquainted with 
some of their realities. 
Occasionally, reference will also be made to the results of a comparative survey of  cross-
border  and  national  obstacles  to  mobility  in  Europe,  carried  out  by  outside  consultants 
commissioned by DG  V.  This source of information,  additional to that provided by members of 
the Observatory Network, will  hereafter be called  'the Survey'. 
BELGIUM 
In  Belgium  an  employee  who  leaves  a  supplementary  pension  arrangement  before 
retirement (or death or disability) has a right to a refund of her/his own contributions, while those 
paid on her/his behalf by the employer are not taken into consideration unless the employee has 
had a minimum of five years' membership or service with the employer. 
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policy has a choice.  He can  continue voluntarily to pay all the insurance premiums required by 
the group policy,  or collect the policy's  surrender value,  or leave any past acquired  rights with 
the insurance company until retirement. 
Employee  members  of a  pension  fund  (i.e.  an  ASBL)  withdrawing  prematurely  are 
entitled to a preserved deferred annuity based on their past service. As an alternative, they can 
obtain a cash payment to be transferred to another pension fund. As a rule,  preserved rights are 
not revalued  or adjusted after withdrawal from membership. 
Employees who transfer abroad are subject to the above conditions  but suffer specific 
disadvantages in  case of a payment of a 'transfer value' from a domestic to a foreign  pension 
plan. According to the Survey, the discrimination was recently formally enshrined by Articles 93 
and 94 of the Law of 28  December 1992 introducing Articles  364bis  and  364ter in  the Income 
Tax Code. The joint effect of these two new articles  is that the payment of a transfer value to 
a foreign  pension  plan  must  be  considered  as  if it  had  been  paid  directly  to  the  employee 
concerned; moreover,  if the employee  is  a foreign  tax resident  at the time  of payment of the 
transfer value, tax is  assessed on  the transfer value as  if it  had been  paid  the day before the 
employee changed his tax status. In Belgium transfer values were formerly the preferred solution 
for employees moving permanently abroad. 
DENMARK 
Supplementary pensions in Denmark are, as a rule, contribution-defined and accordingly 
pre-funded.  In  addition,  Danish  pensions  rest  on  the 'equivalence  principle',  implying  that on 
average  the  value  of  benefits  accruing  to  a  single  wage  earner  corresponds  to  his/her 
contributions. 
A Danish wage earner (or a foreign wage earner who has worked in Denmark) who takes 
on a job in another EU  country has four options as regards his/her old  pension scheme: 
- the employee may retain the accrued pension  rights  in  the old  pension scheme and 
become a member of a new pension scheme in  another EU  country.  At the time of 
retirement,  the  wage earner will  receive  benefits from  both  schemes.  If the  person 
returns to a job in  Denmark, he/she can  resume contributions to a Danish scheme; 
- the employee may transfer the accrued capital value of her/his contributions to a new 
pension scheme, buying pension rights in the foreign scheme; 
- the employee may remain  as an  active member in  the Danish  scheme and  continue 
to pay contributions, thus earning full pension rights in  Denmark; 
- the employee may have the accrued capital value of past contributions and investment 
returns paid  out in  cash to him in  Denmark. 
Seen from the perspective of  job mobility, none ofthe four alternatives mentioned above 
give  rise  to  serious  difficulties,  as  in  one  way  or another the  employee  will  receive  the  full 
accrued pension  rights when she/he moves to a foreign  country. However, some obstacles to 
labour mobility may arise when an employee moves to a foreign job. As regards the first option, 
it may be seen as a disadvantage by the employee that past contributions are administered by 
a Danish pension scheme which is  highly likely to place them in assets denominated in  Danish 
Kroner in  compliance  with  the  relevant  investment  restrictions.  The  second  option  would  be 
impossible where there is no pre-funded pension scheme in the host EU  country. 
The second  and the  last options  pre-suppose that the  employee withdraws the funds 
from the Danish scheme. In this case, according to Danish tax rules, a substantial amount of  tax 
will have to be paid on the funds withdrawn. Funds transferred abroad are taxed due to the tax-
deductibility of contributions. 
Cross-border migration  in  Denmark is  limited.  In  1987 the number of Danish  migrants 
to another EU  country was 2,351, while  1,331  Danish  persons returned home. The figures for 
non-Danish migration are equally small. 
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The broad-based occupational pension schemes federated under AGIRC and ARRCO 
in some cases allow members taking up employment abroad to continue to contribute for pension 
purposes  to  a  French  fund  affiliated  to  these  federations.  Employees  who  do  not  continue 
membership preserve their accrued rights in  France (accrued pension points), and are entitled 
to a revalued benefit at retirement according to the evolution of the value of a pension point. For 
temporary expatriation,  membership in the French supplementary fund  is  maintained while the 
employee remains subject to French social security. 
Apart from the above, AG/RC and ARRCO apply the 'principle  of territoriality',  meaning 
that the place of employment (as  opposed to  nationality)  determines eligibility  to participate in 
a federated supplementary scheme. Thus, a foreign worker coming to work in  France is  eligible 
for coverage as a national. 
Different  rules  apply  to  the  less  widespread  arrangements  such  as  defined  benefit 
retirement  plans  in  large  firms  under Art.  39  of the  Code  General des  lmp6ts  and  defined 
contribution  plans  qualified  under Art.83  of the  Code.  Transfers  abroad  imply termination  of 
membership in  France (unless the transfer is  made within the same company). Transfer capital 
values are not available for rights acquired under Art. 39 defined benefit plans, while the opposite 
is true for the contribution-defined Art. 83 plans. 
GERMANY 
An employee moving abroad to work (with the same employer or otherwise) has several 
options. It is legally possible to remain in the German company book-reserve plan, but it is highly 
unusual.  The  accrued  pension  rights  of employees  covered  in  Germany by  pension  funds  or 
support funds are  fully  preserved if they are  vested.  It  is,  however,  difficult to transform such 
acquired rights into a cash transfer value for buying past service pension rights in a fund abroad. 
Employees moving abroad but remaining  in  company service enjoy preferential treatment. 
Restrictions on  cross-border labour mobility also  arise from fiscal  legislation.  In  cases 
of pension  coverage  by  way  of direct  insurance  or by  pension  funds,  contributions  and/or 
premiums are deductible only if the relevant insurer is  established  in  Germany. 
Another  possible  restriction  would  be  that  insolvency  insurance  (PSV)  only  covers 
pension  rights of employees working  in  Germany. More generally,  Germany follows a taxation 
pattern that is different from that of other countries: yield  from the investment of insurance and 
pension reserves is taxed while the benefit paid  out is  not. 
GREECE 
Preservation and aggregation of pension rights within Greece is guaranteed to employee 
members of compulsory supplementary pension schemes, that is the  large majority  of second 
tier pension arrangements. The technique of totalizing  membership or insurance periods during 
an employee's career is used instead of calculating and paying a 'transfer value' to an employee 
who moves to a different fund. 
Difficulties  may  arise  if the  job  change  implies  taking  up  an  activity  (such  as  self-
employment) which  is  not covered by a compulsory second-tier arrangement.  In this case, the 
employee  would  be  entitled  to  a  refund  of  contributions,  or  to  voluntary  continuation  of 
membership. 
Cross-border transfers within the EU are,  in  principle,  only treated as described above 
if the employee  remains  with  the same employer.  In  practice,  however,  many supplementary 
schemes tend to impose limits on continued membership (limited to a fixed period, or to special 
circumstances). 
In the case of other cross-border transfers within the EU, supplementary pension rights 
are only protected to the extent that accrued rights in  Greece are preserved and deferred. Tax 
advantages for contributions  paid  to  a supplementary scheme only apply to  transactions  and 
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removing obstacles to cross-border transferability of pension rights,  would  be  desirable. 
Non-compulsory second-tier schemes do not afford employees sufficient guarantees with 
regard  to either preservation,  or aggregation,  or indeed  transferability  of accrued  second-tier 
benefrt rights. 
IRELAND 
The  Pensions Act (Part Ill) requires  occupational  pension  schemes to  provide for the 
preservation  of pension  rights  in  respect  of post-1991  service.  The  following  are  the  main 
elements of these preservation requirements. 
- Employees who leave a scheme after 1 January 1993 with at least 5 years' scheme 
membership are entitled to a preserved benefit. 
- The amount to  be  preserved  will  relate to the benefit  rules  of the  scheme and  will 
represent rights accrued (or contributions  paid  under a defined contribution scheme) 
after 1 January 1991;  under a defined  benefit scheme  it  is  assumed that the  rights 
accrue uniformly over total scheme membership. 
- If the employee dies after leaving,  but  before pension  age,  a death benefit must be 
paid  equal to the actuarial value of the preserved benefit or,  alternatively,  a pro-rata 
survivor's pension,  if that is  provided for under the scheme rules. 
- The preserved benefit under a defined benefit scheme must be revalued each year by 
the lesser of 4%  or the increase in the Consumer Price Index, from  1 January 1996, 
or the date of leaving,  if later. 
- Employees may,  as an alternative,  opt for a transfer payment to the scheme of their 
new  employer or to  a Life  Assurance Company  retirement  bond,  subject to  certain 
conditions (see below). 
- Employees leaving, who are entitled to a preserved benefit, cannot obtain a refund of 
their contributions paid since 1 January 1991. Contributions (including AVCs) paid prior 
to that date may be refunded. 
- A scheme may provide higher benefits to employees leaving. 
Employees may opt for a transfer payment within two years of leaving the scheme, but 
thereafter this  option  is  subject to  the  agreement  of the  trustees.  Trustees  may  also  make 
transfer payments to Life Assurance Company Retirement Bonds without the employee's consent 
at the  end of the  two  year period  after leaving,  provided  the transfer payment  is  less  than  a 
prescribed  amount  (currently  IR£3,000).  In  the  case  of defined  benefit  schemes,  a transfer 
payment must be the equivalent of the actuarial value  (as defined  in  the Pensions Act) of the 
preserved benefit on the date on which the member applies for the transfer. 
Transfer payments  can  only  be  made  to  the  scheme  of a  new  employer  or a  Life 
Assurance Company retirement bond. The schemes must come within the scope ofthe Pensions 
Act,  and  the  Life  Assurance  Company  must  be  established  within  Ireland.  This  normally 
precludes transfer payments  being  made to schemes  or Life  Assurance  Companies  in  other 
States. The trustees of the receiving  scheme are required to accept transfer payments and to 
provide benefits of an actuarial value that is equivalent to the amount of the transfer payment. 
As explained above, the Pensions Act only requires schemes to provide for preservation 
in respect of post-1991  pension rights.  Many schemes, however, provide for the preservation of 
pre-1991  pension rights and the Pensions Board is urging all schemes to make similar provision 
for current members on  a voluntary basis. 
Most public sector schemes are  exempt from the preservation  of benefit requirements 
under the Pensions Act, as they have arrangements for preservation which are in some respects 
different, but at least as favourable as those provided for under the Act. There is a public sector 
transfer system in place whereby employees who change jobs while remaining employed within 
the public sector are automatically credited in the new scheme with the period of service in the 
previous employment.  Where employees  leave the public sector,  they qualify for a preserved 
pension  and  lump sum,  provided  they have  completed  at least  5 years'  pensionable  service. 
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the Ieaver and are normally payable from age 60. 
There is a relatively high level of emigration from Ireland. It has been estimated that the 
number of employees with occupational pension rights who have emigrated from Ireland to other 
EU  countries  could  be  about  77,000.  It  is  also  estimated  that  up  to  93%  of emigrants  from 
Ireland go to the United Kingdom and that 97% of immigrants from other EU countries to Ireland 
are  from the United  Kingdom.  This  latter group represents  19%  of the total  number of United 
Kingdom emigrants to other EU countries. 
Consideration  has  been  given  by  the  Pensions  Board to  the  provision  that should  be 
made  for the  protection  of the  pension  rights  under occupational  schemes  of the  following 
categories of employees: 
(i)  posted  workers,  i.e.  employees  who  are  posted  by  their employer to  work for a 
specified  period  in  another state, while  still  remaining  with  the same employer or 
group of employers and who intend to return to work in the 'home country' with the 
same employer,  after the period of posting; 
(ii)  employees who move to different employments in  another state; 
(iii)  scheme members who have entitlements to preserved benefits and/or are in receipt 
of a pension  under a scheme, the main  administration  of which  is  established  in a 
state other than the state where they reside  and/or are employed; 
(iv)  persons who  are  employed  in  and  subject to the social security legislation  of one 
state and  in  respect  of whom it would  not be  economical to establish  a separate 
scheme in  the country of employment and who,  as  a consequence,  are permitted 
to  be  members  of an  occupational  pension  scheme,  the  main  administration  of 
which  is  based  in  another state. 
The Board would  envisage such  provision  being  made by means of an  EU directive or 
regulation  or by  reciprocal  agreements concluded  on  a bilateral  basis  with  other EU  Member 
States. The Board  outlined  its  views  on  these matters in  a note for the  information  of the UK 
Pension  Law  Review  Committee  (the  'Goode  Committee').  This  committee  in  their  report 
published  on  30  September 1993  recommended  'that  the  approach  suggested  by the  Irish 
Pensions  Board  for progress  through  bilateral  agreements  for  occupational  pension  rights 
should be explored in  discussions  between the  UK and Irish  Governments'. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Supplementary pension provision is  not common and  lacks a specific legal framework. 
Under these circumstances,  the  question  of benefit  preservation  and,  possibly,  transferability 
within the country is a matter left to the discretion of plan sponsors. Cross-border transfers are 
not,  in this respect, approached in  a different way. 
NETHERLANDS 
Preservation of accrued rights is guaranteed by legislation  (PSIN). This provides that an 
'early Ieaver' is  entitled to a benefit amount proportional to the length of membership and that 
this amount is  preserved until  normal retirement age.  The indexation  of the preserved amount 
becomes compulsory only to the extent that pensions in course of payment by the relevant fund 
are also indexed. 
In  addition,  regulations permit the transfer of accrued pension rights  ('transfer values'). 
When  an  employee  changes  jobs,  a  pension  fund  or  insurance  company  is  empowered  to 
transfer the value  of the accrued pension  rights to the body administering the new employer's 
pension  fund.  At present, the employee  alone  cannot effect the transfer.  However, a bill  was 
recently  submitted  to  Parliament which  aims  to  give  employees  a statutory  right to  obtain  a 
transfer value. The measure is due to come into force on  1 May 1994. 
The  position  regarding  employees  involved  in  cross-border transfers  is  the  following. 
Dutch legislation applies only to employment in the country. Accordingly,  in the case of workers 
going to work abroad,  participation  in the domestic pension scheme is terminated and the early 
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Ieaver will obtain a preserved benefit as explained earlier.  In this respect it makes no difference 
whether the employee works with the same employer abroad or with a different employer. 
The transfer of pension rights is only permitted to a pension fund or insurance company 
under the supervision of the Netherlands Insurance Chamber, which means that foreign pension 
funds and insurance companies are not eligible  to receive transfer values.  However, the PSW 
does allow the possibility of definitively surrendering pensions and pension rights in the case of 
emigration or intended emigration. This option makes transferring pension rights abroad possible 
in  practical terms,  since with  the  surrender value  the employee  can  buy  into  a pension  fund 
abroad according to the rules applying  in that country. 
A bill was recently put before Parliament aimed at amending the PSW, making it possible 
to  transfer pension  rights  to  a  foreign-based  pension  fund  or  insurance  company.  The  tax 
implications will have to be worked out because normally transfer values would be subject to tax 
in the host country. 
Employees who  move jobs from abroad to the Netherlands will  come under the scope 
of the PSW. If they work in  a branch of industry where compulsory participation  in  an  industry-
wide  pension  fund  applies,  they will  also  be  obliged  to  participate  in  that fund.  In the case  of 
temporary  secondment  in  the  Netherlands,  however,  the  Minister  of  Social  Affairs  and 
Employment can grant an  exemption both from the PSW and from the obligation  to participate 
in  an  industry-wide pension fund. 
Though the acceptance ottransfer values from abroad is permitted on the basis of Dutch 
legislation, tax rules form an obstacle. There are no special fiscal regulations applying to this kind 
of transfer payment. This means that the general rule  applies,  which  is that in  order to qualify 
for tax concessions a pension scheme must be related to one's period of service in the country. 
However,  if on  the  basis  of a transfer  payment  pension  rights  are  also  granted  for service 
abroad, the requirements for eligibility  for tax facilities  are no longer met. 
PORTUGAL 
Supplementary pension  arrangements (pension funds,  book reserves) have developed 
so  far without  paying  attention  to  the  problems  of preservation  or transferability  which  affect 
mobile  employees.  In  the  future,  however,  the  situation  is  likely  to  change.  In  Portugal  the 
competent  circles  believe  that  EU  intervention  in  this  area  would  be  necessary  to  remove 
possible  obstacles  to  cross-border labour  mobility.  One  suggestion  is  to  make  an  individual 
employee  more  involved  and  self-reliant  in  handling  the  transfer of his  accrued  rights  on  an 
individual  basis. 
SPAIN 
Preservation and transferability of accrued supplementary pension rights (both within the 
country and cross-border) are severely restricted under current regulations.  Employees leaving 
a company's pension  plan  have the option  of retaining their entitlement to their accrued rights 
(preservation with deferred rights). A transfer of the entitlement to another plan  is  only allowed 
within  Spain,  and  provided that the receiving  plan  is  a 'qualified'  arrangement under the 1987 
legislation. 
With respect to cross-border job changes,  continued  participation  in the home country 
plan is not allowed.  Payment of transfer values to the host country plan  is  not permitted either. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
As indicated earlier, occupational pension benefits must vest after 2 years' pensionable 
service.  Early  leavers  with  vested  benefrts  may  normally  choose  between  preserving  their 
accrued  benefit  in  the  scheme  which  they  are  leaving,  or taking  a transfer value  to  a  new 
occupational pension scheme, to a personal pension,  or to purchase an annuity. 
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retail price index if less, over the period to retirement age, when the pension (and any lump sum) 
becomes payable. 
A transfer value  taken  as  an  alternative  to  a preserved  pension  is  assessed  on  the 
advice of the scheme actuary so as to be the cash  equivalent of the preserved benefit,  i.e. the 
present value at the date of payment of the transfer value of the benefits which would otherwise 
have  been  payable.  The  actuary  is  expected  to  take  into  account  the  market  value  of the 
underlying assets and  he or she may have regard to the funding  level of the scheme. 
A transfer value from a contracted-out occupational  pension scheme can  only be  paid 
to  another  contracted-out  scheme,  as  it  will  include  an  amount  in  respect  of the  accrued 
guaranteed minimum pension (GMP). However, this GMP element can be repurchased from the 
state scheme and  a transfer value  paid  to  any other scheme in  respect of the balance  of the 
accrued liability,  or used to purchase an  annuity. 
Where an individual is contracted-out of the state additional pension (SERPS) by means 
of an  appropriate  personal  pension  or a  contracted-out  money  purchase  scheme,  benefits 
accruing  in  respect of the minimum  contribution  (equivalent to the  contracted-out rebate)  are 
referred to as protected rights. Although such rights can be transferred from scheme to scheme, 
they must retain their protected rights status and be used to purchase benefits in approved form. 
Protected rights can be bought back into the state scheme, with a corresponding reduction in the 
notional guaranteed minimum pension offset. 
In  order to  satisfy the  requirements  of the  Inland  Revenue  for tax exempt approved 
status, transfer values may only be paid to an  overseas scheme (occupational pension scheme 
or personal pension) if the country of residence of the scheme, the employer and the individual 
coincide, and if  the transferee has left the UK on a permanent basis with no intention of returning 
either to work or to  retire.  Reference to the Inland Revenue Pension Schemes Office (PSO) is 
usually required,  except for small amounts and for transfers to countries or schemes with which 
there is  a reciprocal  agreement.  Benefits  may always  be  preserved  in  the scheme which  the 
employee is leaving,  providing the accrued rights have vested. 
However, there are other conditions  which  restrict  payment of transfer values  abroad: 
transfers cannot be made to pay-as-you-go social security systems such as the French regimes 
comp/ementaires  or to  internal  book-reserve  schemes  such  as  are  common  in  Germany, 
Luxembourg,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Italy.  Subject  to  certain  conditions  imposed  by  the  Inland 
Revenue,  transfers  may  be  made  to  independent  funds  (including  insured  schemes)  in  EU 
Member States. 
The relevant conditions are: 
- the move to the other country must be permanent; 
- the member must have requested the transfer or given written consent; 
- the receiving  scheme must be a tax approved bona fide arrangement; 
- guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) benefits are not usually transferable. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of making transfers as above, the relevant receiving fund 
in another Member State may not be willing to accept a transfer of funds with immediate vesting 
of accrued rights. 
A transfer value may only be accepted from a scheme outside the UK with the specific 
authority of the PSO.  It will  normally be  necessary for the transferring  member to have been 
employed for at least 2 years in the overseas employment to which the transfer benefits relate. 
The resulting  benefit rights  to the  member would,  however,  be  subject to the overall  limit  on 
benefrts applicable to UK schemes. 
Benefits  accrued  in  an  occupational  pension  scheme  in  another  Member State  are 
usually ignored in  relation  to benefit entitlement in the UK.  An  expatriate worker coming to the 
UK may have the choice of: 
- remaining  covered by a home country pension arrangement; 
- joining a UK scheme; 
- participating  in  an  off-shore arrangement. 
Benefits from an exempt approved scheme may be paid to a pensioner or a beneficiary 
resident in  another Member State (or in  any other country). 
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.. There are no specific legislative requirements, other than conditions for obtaining exempt 
approved status, which limit cross-border movement of  scheme members. Individuals may, under 
certain conditions, remain members of an approved scheme in the UK whilst working in another 
country.  The  conditions  cover secondments for periods  of less  than  3 years,  work overseas 
where the earnings are still chargeable, at least in  part, to UK tax, and service with a subsidiary 
of the UK employer (or within the same group) which is expected to last no more than 10 years. 
Alternative strategies for the future 
It is  reasonable to assume that the European Commission will  continue to consider in 
future that the principle of freedom of movement of workers and, more generally, persons within 
the  Union  is  a  paramount  goal.  Current  legal,  fiscal  and  'technical'  arrangements  for 
supplementary pensions in  a number of countries do not facilitate,  and often clearly inhibit, the 
free cross-border movement of persons with supplementary pension rights. 
Two questions deserve consideration  in this context: 
- is  further intervention of the Commission  in  this area desirable and 
- if so,  what strategies are likely to lead the Commission to achieve tangible results? 
Let  us  recall  first that  not every  party  concerned  is,  in  principle,  in  favour of further 
Community  involvement  in  regulating  or  coordinating  the  area  of  supplementary  pension 
provision.  Dissenting  views  are  a minority  and  are  voiced  only  in  few  circles.  But it would  be 
imprudent to dismiss them entirely: the rejection of the 1992 draft Council resolution submitted 
on  this subject by the UK Presidency of the Council  has shown how fragile the prospect is  of 
reaching  unanimity  in  this area.  The  point  is  that supplementary  pension  provision  is  largely 
based  on  voluntary  initiatives  and  on  freely  negotiated  contractual  arrangements.  It  is  often 
argued that a European regulatory framework could - if it was too rigid - discourage rather than 
encourage supplementary pension provision. 
It has also been pointed out that the number of cross-border movements involving loss 
of supplementary pension  rights  is,  on the whole,  modest.  Moreover,  multinational  companies 
find  ways  and  means  to  compensate  their senior expatriates  for any  pension  disadvantage 
suffered in moving abroad. 
It  is  nevertheless  suggested  that,  as  a  matter  of principle,  the  Commission  should 
continue to explore how to improve the present position.  Two strategies may be at hand. The 
first would be to limit any new initiative to stating broad principles and requesting Member States 
to comply with them either voluntarily  or with a minimum of compulsion.  The second would go 
further than formulating goals,  and would  attempt to give specific guidance on  how to achieve 
goals in  specific technical areas, using binding legislation  if necessary. 
(a)  The  strategy confined to matters of  principle 
This approach could take as a point of departure the principle which was first put forward 
in the Communication of 1991, and then embodied again in the unsuccessful UK draft Council 
resolution  of 1992. The principle  is that each worker should  be  able to move to a job (or to a 
place of retirement) in another Member State without having to fear any undue loss of rights to 
benefits  (whether  acquired  or  in  course  of  acquisition)  from  supplementary  pension 
arrangements. 
However, the meaning and implications of the above principle would have to be spelled 
out in  future proposals. For instance, Member States could  be invited to ensure that plan  rules 
(or their equivalent) of  supplementary pensions should, in all cases, guarantee the option, for the 
employee ceasing membership, of obtaining either the preservation of his past service rights or 
a corresponding  transfer value  based  on  his  full  vested  rights.  Independent  of the  financial 
vehicle adopted to implement the plan,  preservation and transfer values should be available on 
request in all  cases. 
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abroad should not be treated less favourably in scheme rules than a transfer within the country, 
leaving  each Member State to  make its  own  comparison  and to take the necessary measures. 
A  weakness  of such  an  approach  is  that  the  possible  loss  of tax  advantages  by 
employers, employees or pension funds consequent on  cross-border transfers are not a matter 
dealt with in the scheme rules but in fiscal or pension legislation.  It does not seem very realistic 
to expect that Member States will  give up their traditional fiscal stance in this area in  order to 
solve the  problems  of a minority of employers  and  employees.  The  ECJ  ruling  in  Bachmann 
(1992) in  fact strengthened the position  of domestic tax authorities. 
A possible solution to such an apparently intractable problem would be to suggest, in any 
new  proposal,  that,  in  exchange  for full  tax deductibility  in  the  host country  for any  pension 
contributions sent abroad, the mobile employee would undertake to pay tax at a favourable (not 
just symbolic)  rate  on  any transfer value  taken  out  of the  country  when  changing jobs. The 
suggestion is that all countries would apply the same, moderate, preferential tax rate on transfer 
values  and  similar  entitlements,  even  if such  exit tax is  not  required  for transfers within  the 
domestic scene. 
At first sight this could seem a very bold proposal and one that is not entirely favourable 
to a mobile  employee. This being the case,  it is also abundantly clear that in the short term at 
least national tax authorities will  effectively oppose any further attempt by the Commission to 
reduce  their prerogatives  in  the area  of pension  transferability  unless  some  compensation  is 
offered to them.  It  could  be  further argued that if the  employee should  return,  retire  and  pay 
income tax (including on his pension}, the tax authorities of the country concerned should refund 
to the former employee the 'exit tax' that he may have paid  on leaving  his home country. 
Another  principle  which  could  be  embodied  in  a  new  Commission  proposal  is  the 
guarantee  of continued  membership  in  a  pension  arrangement  for  employees  temporarily 
seconded or transferred abroad and remaining with the same employer. The application of such 
a principle would have limited  effect because of the necessary alignment of the duration of the 
continued membership in  a supplementary scheme to the duration stipulated for social security 
coverage in  Regulation  1408/71/EEC. Having stated this principle, the Commission could leave 
to Member States the responsibility of finding suitable 'technical solutions' by means of bilateral 
agreements,  to  be  monitored  by  the  EU.  Alternatively,  some  possible  types  of solution  (i.e. 
mutual recognition)  could  be mentioned in  an EU  instrument as examples to stimulate bilateral 
agreements. 
The  above  approach  may  have  more  chances  of success  than  the  approach  now 
pursued by DG XV (see above); it is only an illustration  of how a strategy confined to principles 
may be given substance. More preparatory work would be required. In any event, it would be up 
to  the  Commission  to  decide  whether  to  propose  a  binding  instrument  (directive)  or  a 
recommendation. 
To the extent that supplementary pensions are sponsored voluntarily by employers and 
employees, it might be expedient for the Commission to raise initially the above questions within 
the framework of the 'social dialogue'.  Ultimately,  even if a proposed European instrument was 
not  binding,  a strong  and  clear EU  statement  of principles  and  objectives  in  this  area  may 
nevertheless  have  an  impact on  the  practice  in  the  Member States.  In  many  Member States 
supplementary pension provision  is  closely linked to collective bargaining where EU guidelines 
and recommendations may already have some weight. The same could  be said more generally 
of the likely attitude of national supervisory authorities. 
(b)  A strategy which  attempts a technical coordination  of schemes 
While the strategy described in (a) above might lead to results which are similar to those 
pursued by the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers and the Council 
Recommendation on Convergence of Social Protection Objectives and Policies of 27 July 1992 
(92/442/EEC), an alternative strategy, briefly outlined below, may be to coordinate supplementary 
pension provision  at European level. 
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---...... In addition to asking Member States to observe and to apply a number of fundamental 
principles, proposals could in theory be developed which would include promoting common rules 
or reciprocity  on  various  aspects  of supplementary  pensions.  These  aspects could  relate  for 
instance, to (0  sponsoring and  establishing  pension  plans and the degree of representation  of 
employers and  plan  members;  (ii)  vesting  and  waiting  periods;  (iii)  the separation  of assets of 
plan  sponsors  from  those  of  the  pension  institution  (pension  fund,  etc.)  or  equivalent 
arrangements for securing payment of accrued rights  in the event of the insolvency of the plan 
sponsor;  (iv)  preservation  of rights  and  fair transfer values;  (v)  taxation  issues  and  (vi)  the 
protection of members' rights (including  information and disclosure). 
Even if such coordination,  expressly excluding any attempt at harmonization, was only 
expressed  through  minimal  rules  and  requirements  and  was  limited  to  the  specific  goal  of 
enhancing labour mobility,  both within  a country and  across borders, it is doubtful whether the 
exercise would  be worthwhile given the present state of affairs. 
The  relevant  political  considerations  are  unequivocally  stated  in  the  Council 
Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on Convergence of Social Protection Objectives and Policies: 
"because of the  diversity of the  schemes and their roots in  national culture,  it is for Member 
States  to  determine  how  their  social  protection  schemes  should  be  framed  and  the 
arrangements for financing  and organizing  them". 
This principle which is valid for social protection as a whole is, a fortiori,  relevant for one 
of its components, namely supplementary pension provision, whether compulsory or voluntary. 
The above suggests, in conclusion, that it would be preferable for the Commission to explore the 
acceptability of the first alternative strategy outlined above, namely that the Commission should 
develop a few guiding principles capable of receiving broad acceptance and strictly aimed at the 
improvement of the supplementary pension  situation  of workers who move to a job in  another 
Member State  (or who  retire  abroad).  This  approach  could,  moreover,  focus  both  DG V and 
DG XV on  a common proposal,  enhancing the effectiveness of any further EU initiative. 
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AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
The overview of supplementary pension provision in the countries of the European Union 
leads  naturally  to  a  number of general  conclusions  about  the  present  situation,  while  also 
inevitably raising  questions about the future direction of policy in this area. 
It  is  beyond  question  that the second  tier of pension  provision,  whether voluntary  or 
compulsory,  public or private, contractual or freely sponsored,  has a solid foundation in  all  the 
countries  of the  EU.  Its  importance,  in  terms  of the  number of persons  protected  and  of the 
volume of assets held by funded schemes, varies greatly from one country to another due to its 
relationship with first tier social protection. 
National specificity goes beyond  coverage or financial  strength.  It reveals  itself in  the 
options chosen and the techniques used to achieve the otherwise common objective of enabling 
an  increasing  number of employees  and  self-employed  persons to  have  access to a 'second 
pension'. A distinct 'pensions  culture' seems to have developed around the national pattern of 
supplementary pension provision, a culture that breeds self-confidence in the soundness of  one's 
own  solution  and  a rejection  of foreign  models  and  patterns,  even  those which  have  proved 
successful elsewhere. 
For example,  believers  in  pension  trusts,  in  segregated  assets  invested  heavily  in 
equities,  and  more  generally,  in  fully  funding  future  pension  liabilities,  along  the  lines  of the 
Anglo-Saxon  experience,  remain  sceptical  about the choices  of French or German employers 
and policy makers, who  have secured substantial supplementary pensions for large sections of 
the labour force without funding  future liabilities  and/or segregating the funds  and/or investing 
heavily in  equities. 
Believers  in  the  free  and  voluntary  approach  to  sponsoring  supplementary  pensions 
remain  unconvinced  that the  right  answer  is  compuls.ory  provision  as  in  Greece,  Denmark, 
France or the Netherlands where compulsory provision was used to achieve broader coverage. 
However, if one takes the view that the best system is  one which effectively improves 
social  protection  at  retirement  for  as  many  citizens  as  possible,  then  the  lack  of similarity 
between national approaches or techniques used at second tier level should  not matter much. 
It is the result that counts. The problem, though, is that not all countries have achieved optimum 
results  in  terms of coverage  or effectiveness  of the  second  tier and  that,  at  the  same time, 
reliance  on the second pension  is  increasing  because of growing doubts as to the capacity of 
the first tier to sustain its traditional role  into the next century. 
Another concern  is that cross-border diversity is  perceived, sometimes vaguely,  as  an 
obstacle or as a nuisance along the path towards constructing and consolidating the European 
Union.  The  concern  has  a  legitimate  foundation  but  the  effects  of this  diversity  can  be 
exaggerated unless clearly understood and approached from a realistic viewpoint. 
In the area of  supplementary pensions, free cross-border labour mobility -which is a goal 
of the Union - only  compounds the difficulties  which may exist and,  in  fact,  often do  exist,  in 
securing smooth and fair portability of accrued pension rights in respect of persons moving within 
the domestic borders. 
It would  be  too  easy to  argue that "charity  begins  at  home"  or,  in  other words,  that 
Member  States  should  give  priority  to  order  and  fairness  in  the  area  of preservation  and 
portability of accrued pension rights within their own country first, before arguing for the adoption 
of European rules designed to remove obstacles to  cross-border labour mobility.  On the other 
hand,  the  argument that European  legislation  on  such  cross-border issues  should  come  first 
because it would trigger parallel improvements in the provision for domestic transfers of pension 
rights  is  not entirely  convincing.  This  is  for several  reasons  to  do  with  the  evident  rigidity  of 
different  supplementary  pension  structures  observed  from  country  to  country,  the  different 
degrees of involvement  of traditional  insurance  contracts,  and  the voluntary nature of various 
pension arrangements. Naturally, much would depend on the kind of European directives which 
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obtaining European consensus· in such matters. 
It· is important to realise that Member States have no specific incentive and,  in  fact, no 
compelling  reasons  for spontaneously  modifying  their  approach  to  legislating,  financing  and 
supervising the various forms of supplementary pension  provision which  have emerged  in the 
past or which have been shaped by their policy choices. 
Hence, one might realistically  conclude that, under these circumstances, the pursuit of 
the European Union's goals will  gain  more from  a policy  of building  bridges  between different 
systems and  situations,  whenever this  is  feasible  (which  is  not always the case),  rather than 
imposing  exacting  rules  on  employers  and  employees,  or on the authorities  whose duty it  is 
broadly to safeguard the public interest as well  as that of consumers. 
The agenda for the future includes European issues, such as those sketched above, but 
is  wider than this.  The future  of supplementary pension  provision  is  likely  to  prove extremely 
challenging.  The  issues  to  be  tackled  will  not  be  the  same  in  each  Member State,  as  the 
following  examples may help to demonstrate. 
Occupational  pensions are  part of social  protection:  the concern with  equity,  with the 
desire to avoid  'two-speed' societies,  cannot forever be  confined within  the boundaries  of the 
welfare debate about the first tier.  It has  been  shown that equity was  part of the  rationale  on 
which some Member States relied  in the past when they opted for a compulsory second tier or, 
at  least,  when  they  deliberately  encouraged  the  extension  of coverage  through  voluntary 
initiatives. Member States which followed another path, either deliberately, or because of  different 
political  priorities,  may have to come to grips in  future years with the question of explaining to 
the  public the  virtues  and  shortcomings  of leaving  employers  and  individuals  entirely  free  to 
decide whether it is worthwhile to save for retirement within  an appropriate pension framework. 
The  above  challenge  is  particularly  relevant  for  countries  such  as  Belgium,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Portugal  and  Spain  where social  security pensions are  still  aiming  at fairly  high 
replacement rates and where the 'second pension market' has not yet reached the position which 
it may do in  future years. 
Countries  where  private  pension  funds  have  developed  a  key  position  as  leading 
institutional  investors on  domestic, and occasionally international,  financial  markets, may have 
to  face  other  challenges  in  future  years.  Here  the  cultural  element  which  seems  to  have 
remained  in  the  background  is  predominantly  a  social  one.  The  fact  is  that  not  all  parties 
perceive occupational pensions as a concession of paternalistic employers, as a simple device 
to gain a tax advantage, or as a convenient support for financial markets. The majority's concern 
is  with  the standard  of living  of the  ever growing  number of pensioners  in  Europe  and  this 
depends directly on the level of their basic and supplementary retirement income. 
Pensioners  are  increasingly  being  identified  as  a  category  which  has  an  important 
electoral  influence.  Their interests  as  a group  as  well  as  that  of the  active  membership  of 
pension funds is primarily the expression of a social concern with security in old age, rather than 
with  the performance  of financial  markets.  Their representatives  are  bound  to  become  more 
vocal, to claim more information and control, basing their claims  on the argument that company 
pensions are deferred wages and that in a way the assets accumulated in pension funds belong 
to them. 
No matter which view is taken about the legitimacy of such arguments, one question for 
the future is  the extent to which the vast pools  of pension fund  resources - in  some countries 
their magnitude  approaches the  amount  of the  annual  Gross  National  Product - can  remain 
insulated  from  the  mainstream  national  debate  on  jobs,  public  finance  or defining  the  public 
interest. Another question to  be  answered  is  whether pension  assets will  actually  be directed 
towards expanding the long-term investments badly needed for economic growth as,  in  theory, 
they are better placed to do. 
The  seemingly  never-ending  debate  about the  respective  role  of public  and  private 
pension provision,  also includes challenges for supplementary pension policies  in future years. 
It has  been  shown that in  the recent  political  debate about social  security,  private  retirement 
provision seems to have become desirable mainly as a remedy for the difficulties encountered 
by the state in  sustaining  the growing  cost of mandatory benefits.  The danger is  that,  unless 
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expected, particularly in societies which still firmly believe  in the virtues of social solidarity. 
In  a similar context, the future  relationship  between supplementary pensions  and the 
labour market acquires new relevance.  One reason  is that changes in  work patterns are  likely 
to take place, together with increased flexibility,  a trend which could have a further impact on the 
accrual  of supplementary  pension  rights  and  on  the  pattern  of retirement,  and  hence  on  the 
respective  roles  of the various forms of retirement income.  The definite and  irreversible trend 
towards a higher pensionable age which is now observed in mandatory social security schemes 
is a related factor which will gradually affect individuals in the years to come, and will raise the 
question of whether or not the second tier of retirement benefits should be tied to the mandatory 
pensionable age. 
Before  concluding,  two  other thoughts  come to  mind.  The  first  is  that inflation,  now 
apparently under control,  could  return,  along  with  economic growth,  as  a major challenge  for 
privately provided retirement benefits.  Compulsory indexation techniques are ill-adapted to the 
voluntary environment in which many forms of pension provision operate in  Member States. 
The  second  is  that,  looking  further  ahead,  one  should  also  anticipate  the  possible 
consequences on the debate concerning supplementary pensions of an increased membership 
of  the European family. The arrival of countries which have already decided to join the EU, and 
of other possible entrants, will  bring  yet more diversity onto the European pensions scene. 
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1.  From a general point  of view,  compulsion  may  be  either legal,  by  way  of mandatory 
legislation  or contractual by agreement between the social partners. If it is contractual, 
it  arises  as  a  rule  from  membership  of  an  employers'  or  workers'  organisation. 
Compulsion  may apply to the employer, to the employee,  or both. 
2.  The Beveridge Plan published in the United Kingdom during the Second World War gave 
both  the  signal  and  the  significance  to  the  modern  doctrine  of social  security.  At 
international  level the essential landmarks were the Recommendations No.68 (Income 
Maintenance)  and  No.69  (Medical  Care)  adopted  by  the  International  Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in  1948. 
3.  Commission ofthe European Communities. Draft Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
Coordination of Laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to institutions for 
retirement  provision.  Doc.  XV/198/91-EN,  Brussels,  July  1991  (and  subsequent 
revisions). 
4.  See  for instance:  Organisation  for Economic Coordination  and  Development,  OECD. 
Private Pensions and Public Policy,  Paris,  1992 (ISBN 92-84-13790-4). 
5.  Many publications provide an insight into the historical factors having influenced pension 
policy.  Among  the  numerous  studies  covering  an  international  scene  the  following 
deserve mention: 
- The evolution  of social insurance,  1881-1981  edited by P.A.  Kohler and H.F. Zacher 
in  collaboration  with  Martin  Partington  published  for  the  Max  Planck  lnstitut  tor 
ausUindisches  und  internationales  Sozialrecht  (Munich,  1982)  by  Frances  Pinter,  5 
Dryden Street, London (ISBN 0 86187 242 8). 
- Lucien  Feraud:  Complementary  Pensions,  a  Comparative  Analysis.  International 
Social Security Association,  Studies and Research,  No.7, Geneva,  1975. 
- Lucy apRoberts,  Emmanuel  Reynaud:  Les systemes de  retraite a /'etranger,  Etats 
Unis,  Allemagne,  Royaume-Uni.  IRES, 1 rue de Ia Faisanderie, 75116 Paris (ISBN 2-
95064  73-0-8). 
- International Social Security Association.  Conjugating public and private: the case of 
pensions.  Studies and  Research No.24, Geneva, 1987 (ISBN 92-843-1025-3). 
6.  A survey,  the  results  of which  were  published  in  1993  by  the  Department  of Social 
Security in the United Kingdom,  set out to find  out why employers had made voluntary 
pension  provision  for their employees.  Respondents identified  three main  motives:  (i) 
paternalism (people are not naturally good at making provision for their own future and 
the employer felt obliged to help);  (ii) to attract and  retain  high  quality staff,  especially 
white  collar workers  and  (iii)  as  a reward  for loyalty  and  for long  service.  See  DSS 
Research  Report  No.17,  Employer  choice  of pension  schemes.  HMSO  Publication 
Center, London SW8-5DT. 
Occupational pensions in the European Union  129 8.  Ruellan,  Rolande:  Retraites:  !'impossible  reforme  est-elle  achevee?  in:  Droit  Social, 
no.12, decembre 1993, Paris. 
9.  In  1993 EUROSTAT launched  a second  study on  replacement rates  in  order to refine 
the methodology and,  in  particular,  to  respond to such observations as those made in 
Chapter 2 of the present report. 
10.  Hughes (1985): Payroll Tax Incidence;  The  Direct Tax Burden and the Rate of Return 
on  State  Pension  Contributions  in  Ireland,  Dublin:  Economic  and  Social  Research 
Institute, General Research Series Paper No.  120. 
Hughes  (1994):  Private  Pensions  in  OECD  Countries:  Ireland,  Paris:  OECD,  Social 
Policy Studies No.  13. 
11.  EC  Citizens  and  Social  Protection.  Main  results  from  a  Eurobarometer  Survey. 
Bruxelles,  November  1993  (available  through  Division  V/E/2  of  the  European 
Commission). 
12.  At the end of 1993, the press reported allegations that many people had been wrongly 
advised to transfer their pension rights from a company scheme into a personal pension 
plan. This mis-selling of personal pensions in the UK, recently uncovered, has attracted 
the  attention  of the  Securities  and  Investment  Board  (SIB),  a regulatory  body,  and 
caused claims for redress or compensation. 
13.  Detailed and  updated information is found, for instance,  in: 
- International  Benefits Information  Service  (IBIS),  published  monthly by  Charles  D. 
Spencer Associates Inc.,  250 s. Wacker Drive,  Chicago  IL 60606,  United States of 
America.  IBIS also publishes selected country profiles. 
- The Wyatt Company. Benefits Report,  Europe,  U.S.A. Published every year. Avenue 
Herman-Debroux 52,  Box 3.  1160 Brussels,  Belgium. 
- European Actuarial Consultancy Services (EURACS). EURACS Pension Summaries. 
Published  every  year.  Watson  House,  London  Road,  Reigate,  Surrey  RH2  9PQ, 
United Kingdom. 
The  three  following  recent  publications  contain  useful  information  and  analysis  on 
detailed aspects of supplementary pensions in  European countries: 
- Winfried Schmahl (editor).  The future  of  basic and supplementary pension schemes 
in the European Community- 1992 and beyond.  Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden 1991. ISBN 3-7890-2491-0. 
- 11 risparmio  previdenziale  e i fondi pensione.  A cura di Daniele Pace, introduzione di 
Luigi  Spaventa.  Centro  Europa  Ricerche/Associazione  per  lo  sviluppo  degli  studi 
assicurativi.  Editore Franco Angeli,  Milano 1993. ISBN 88-204-7774-2. 
- European  Financial  Management  and  Marketing  Association  (EFMA).  Pensions  at 
stake,  who  will make a bid? Papers of a Conference held  in  Brussels in  June 1993. 
Distributed by EFMA, 16 rue d'Agnessau, 75008 Paris. 
14.  Brigitte  Hiegemann.  The  German  Company  Pension  Insolvency  System.  Buro  Dr. 
Heubeck, 53 Lindenallee,  5000 KOin  51,  Germany. 
15.  Irish Association of Pension Funds (1992 and 1993), IAPF Investment Surveys 1991 and 
1992. 
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Heubeck, 53  Lindenallee,  5000 Koln  51,  Germany. 
15.  Irish Association of Pension Funds (1992 and 1993), IAPF Investment Surveys 1991 and 
1992. 
16.  In the United Kingdom it is  estimated that pension funds own about one-third of all the 
quoted shares of British industry. 
17.  Faherty,  P.  (1993)  Investment  Returns  in  the  1990s.  Paper  presented  to  the  Irish 
Association  of Pension Funds seminar. 
Heffernan, E. (1991) Investment of  Pension Assets. Paper presented to the International 
Benefits Information Service (IBIS) conference, The Hague,  May 1991. 
18.  See in particular: Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies. 
19.  For a full  analysis of the ECJ's decisions see:  Equality of Treatment between Women 
and Men  in  Social Security.  A European conference  at  Lincoln  College,  University  of 
Oxford: 4-6 January 1994. Documentation available through Lincoln  College. 
20.  Council Directive 77/187  /EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of 
the  Member States  relating  to  the  safeguarding  of employees'  rights  in  the  event  of 
transfers of undertakings,  businesses or parts of businesses (OJ  no.  L 61  of 5.3.77). 
21.  Council  Directive  80/987  /EEC of 20 October 1980 on the  approximation  of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of insolvency of 
their employer (OJ no.283 of 28.10.80). 
22.  A study entitled  'Pension  Fund  Investment'  by  Michael  Walsh  and  John  Murray  has 
recently been  published  in  Ireland, which deals with the potential role of pension funds 
in  providing  venture  and  development  capital.  The  report  was  funded  by  the  Irish 
Association  of Pension  Funds, the Irish Association  of Investment Managers, the Irish 
Insurance Federation and the Department of Finance. 
23.  Commission of the European Communities, DG V: Social Europe,  3/92, 'Social Security 
for Persons Moving within the Community'. 
24.  Communication  from the  Commission  to  the  Council:  Supplementary  Social Security 
Schemes:  The  Role  of Occupational  Pension  Schemes in  the  Social  Protection  of 
Workers and their Implications  for Freedom of Movement.  SEC(91)1332 Final. 
25.  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  XV.  Working  Paper:  Cross-border 
membership of  occupational pension schemes for migrant workers. Doc.XV  /2040/92/EN, 
Brussels,  16.9.1992. 
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